The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated that Moscow failed to become a full-fledged G8 member, Washington’s honorary junior partner. The United States is reverting to privileged consultations with its closest allies. Russia remains involved in a broader format, the G20, and in a potentially anti-American grouping, BRICS.

       Among other things, the Ukrainian crisis has resulted in Russia being suspended from the G8. Right now one is hard put to say how far this process will go. The G7 countries may confine themselves to cancelling the Sochi summit and return to the usual format of interaction with Russia a year or two later. Another possibility is a complete reinstatement of the G7 format. No matter how the current crisis ends, it has proved that the full-blooded G8 cooperation between Russia and the West, as contemplated in the mid-1990s, has failed to materialize. The disintegration of the G8 is a natural process triggered by more profound causes than the varying attitudes to Crimea’s accession to Russia.

       Russia’s integration in the G8 began at the Munich summit in 1992, when rapprochement was in both sides’ interests. The G7 showed support for home policy conducted by President Boris Yeltsin. Prospective enlargement of the G7 could help the Clinton administration to demonstrate that there was a real basis for Russian-American partnership. Russia was eager to join the elite club involved in political and economic decision-making. It was logical, therefore, that the participants in the 1998 Birmingham summit agreed to replace the G7 by the G8.

       But the situation remained ambiguous for the next 15 years. Russia step by step emerged as a full-fledged G8 member. In 2002, the Kremlin pushed through the official decision to rename G7 as G8. In 2005, Russian finance minister joined financial and economic discussions on an equal footing with others. In 2006, Russia held the G8 chairmanship and hosted a summit in St. Petersburg whose agenda was dominated by energy security, a vital concern for Russia.

       In parallel, however, the United States launched an unprecedented campaign for Russia’s expulsion from the G8. The first calls to this effect were heard in summer 2005, when certain East European countries accused Russia of exonerating Stalinism. (They referred to the May 9, 2005 celebrations dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Russian victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). In spring 2006, threats to drop Russia from the G8 came from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and the Congress that passed non-binding resolutions to this effect. From that time on, Washington revived these threats almost every year in response to various occasions, including Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech, the Five-Day War, the energy crisis in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s comeback to the Kremlin and his support for the Syrian government. None of the other G8 members objected to the US proposals, all of that creating the impression that the G7 countries, being “friends” among themselves, saw Russia as an outsider.

       But some deeper problems could be discerned behind this psychological schism. As years passed by, it became increasingly clear to all members that the G8 was a format for Russia-West consultations rather than a well-oiled mechanism.

       First, Russia’s integration made the club less effective from the US point of view. The old G7 was geared to the military mechanism of NATO. (Only Japan was not a NATO member, but its potential was controlled by Washington.) Integrating a country possessing a military and nuclear potential comparable to that of the United States disrupted the club’s military unity. In response, US media became increasingly vociferous in demanding that G8 be replaced by some other institution.

       Second, after its G8 integration, Russia urged to reform the concept of energy security. The old G7 was originally an energy organization created in response to the First Oil Shock of 1973. The understanding of energy security that evolved in the G7 reflected the interests of energy importers. At the St. Petersburg summit in 2006, Russia managed to get other participants to approve a resolution saying that this concept should take into account both importers’ and exporters’ interests. Given Moscow’s tough stance on the energy crises involving Ukraine and Belarus, this caused a nervous reaction in the G7 countries, including Germany.

       Third, Russia’s G8 status was a threat to US leadership. America predominated militarily over other G7 members, none of which had the potential for destroying the United States. The Russian integration tipped the balance. To keep the unity, Washington had to either bring the Russian nuclear potential down to the level of the other six states (such as Britain or France) or raise their potentials to the Russian level. Neither was in its interests.

       Fourth, Russia was among the founders of an alternative club, BRICS. Opinions vary regarding its efficiency but the very fact that Russia was a member of two clubs (one loyal and the other opposed to the US) eroded the G8’s ability to approve unanimous decisions.

       Things deteriorated further after 2008, when the G20 came into being. The new format made it possible for the US diplomacy to address two agendas. First, it wanted to eliminate European preeminence in the old G8 by diluting European members with Asian countries. Second, it sought to have the Asian economic giants share the responsibility for the fate of the international financial system. But the emergence of the G20 made Russia doubt the expediency or preserving the G8. The group could no longer be regarded as a club of the most advanced countries (what was Italy or Canada economically by comparison with China and South Korea?) or the most important countries (it was the G20 and not the G8 that discussed how to deal with the world financial crisis).

       The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated that Moscow failed to become a full-fledged G8 member, to wit, Washington’s honorary junior partner. Not surprisingly, the G8 now appears a spent negotiating format. The United States is reverting to privileged consultations with its closest allies. Russia remains involved in a broader format, the G20, and in a potentially anti-American grouping, BRICS. The G8 format is likely to be artificially kept alive for some time but this will not arrest the process of Russia-US reciprocal repudiation unfolding within the club.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.