One of the global security consequences of the current Ukrainian crisis is the visibly raising ‘nuclear fears’ in both political elites and wider public opinion among the world. It hardly comes as a surprise that the nuclear fears of the U.S. national security elite differ from those in Moscow.
As regards to the Russian fears, the one point is connected with possibilities to break the current status quo in the nonproliferation regimes. The Ukrainian political crisis of 2013-2014 brought to a head a discussion that had been going on before about Ukraine’s nuclear status. Naturally, should Ukrainian government take a decision to start its own nuclear program, it would challenge the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Even though Ukraine’s capabilities to build a nuclear bomb in short-term are rather questionable such a possibility should not be ruled out due to a number of factors. There are fears in Russia now that such a development would be tolerated by the NATO nuclear powers (in the framework of highly raised tensions between Russia and the U.S. now).
The second point is the raising fears that the current Russia-U.S. tensions could escalate into a real nuclear war, or at least to put it into the real agenda of bilateral relations. The highly raised tensions between Russia and NATO, the decisions of the Wales NATO Summit to build a new network of capabilities along the Russian border in the Baltic and in the Arctic, were considered by some Russian experts as having a real risk of (mutual) provocations which could escalate into an open war with a real possibility for using nuclear weapons. The possible short-term outcome from these fears could be Russia’s withdrawal from START/SORT treaty to ensure its own security in case of the U.S. ‘first strike’, especially given a significant build-up in the U.S. BMD capabilities.
The Ukrainian crisis has raised also the issue of a possible tactical nuclear war in Europe, in Ukraine (or wider in Central/Eastern Europe) without escalating into global nuclear strikes. Taking into consideration that such an option could become real one day, it seems logical already now for Russia to think about its own effective capabilities for this. Again, this can lead Russia to reconsider its participation in INF treaty.
As for the U.S., the Ukraine crisis did not reawaken fears of nuclear war anywhere near the extent that was widespread during the 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis or the Reagan-era Euromissile crisis. However, among the U.S. national security elite, there has been a widespread concern that Ukraine’s de facto defeat in the war combined with the nonfulfillment of the security assurances associated with the Budapest Memorandum will further weaken the global nuclear nonproliferation regime already threatened by a number of adverse developments.
Despite the fact that Russia and U.S still continue to cooperate in the nonproliferation area there has been some visible collateral damage from the Ukraine conflict. The de facto suspension of the Group of Eight process could make it harder to take necessary decisions on such initiatives as Global Partnership or reformatting the nuclear security summits that are to end in 2016. The economic sanctions on Russia might also decrease the funding that the Russian government is willing and able to employ to secure its own nuclear material which will make them more accessible to the terrorist groups and non-state actors, even though the chance of it is very little.
Finally, there is a risk though very low of armed clashes between nuclear-armed countries. Both Moscow and Washington are unhappy with the recent developments in the U.S. and Russia’s strategy respectively. However, American fears about a nuclear war occurring between Russia and the United States remain minimal. Instead, the major source of near-term U.S. nuclear angst is that other governments with territorial aspirations, above all China, may be tempted to achieve them by applying the same types of tactics that Russia used in Georgia and Ukraine. If China becomes more aggressive, then the risks of war between it and the United States increases.
Fortunately, now Beijing still successfully cooperate with Moscow and Washington in discouraging North Korean provocations and nuclear weapons tests. The challenge now is to sustain this trilateral cooperation in the cases of Pyongyang and Tehran, avoiding direct military confrontations between these three great powers, while preparing to expand their nonproliferation partnership to other areas when future conditions are more propitious.
This article is based on Valdai Papers #2 , prepared within the framework of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club research program.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.