FOR years, hedge fund managers were the undisputed masters of the universe. They influenced the fortunes not just of companies and markets but countries too.
No more. They have been usurped at the top of the financial food chain by a new breed of market savant. Nowhere is the power shift more apparent than in South Korea.
When South Korea was reeling from the Asian financial crisis in 1998, its president-elect, Kim Dae Jung, called in George Soros for advice. The billionaire investor, who’d been vilified in South Asia for profiting from the economic chaos, arrived in Seoul to red-carpet treatment. After three days of meetings, he addressed the local media.
“This is a very severe problem,” he said. “But I think it can be overcome within a relatively reasonable period of time.”
He suggested that if policy makers pushed through his prescribed reforms, his Quantum Fund would invest substantial sums into the economy, and others would likely follow. In the 10 days after his visit, the South Korean market benchmark rallied 28%.
Today’s playmakers don’t have the same name recognition as George Soros, but they are no less powerful.
There are three of them: S&P Dow Jones Indices, MSCI and FTSE Russell. Their nondescript names mask their enormous influence. Between them, they design, calculate and manage hundreds of thousands of financial indices that steer capital around the world.
In total, over US$50 trillion (RM209 trillion) of investor funds are benchmarked against metrics that these three entities control.
Like the hedge funds before them, it’s not just companies that fall under their gaze but countries too. By setting the criteria for index membership, they act as gatekeepers, determining which countries are eligible for investment by many of those funds.
One country sitting at their gates is South Korea, where their judgments have become an issue in the upcoming presidential election.
Despite recovering from its crisis and growing to become a top 10 global economy in the past two decades, South Korea is still classed by MSCI as an emerging market rather than a developed one.
So, while its listed companies have access to the US$960bil (RM4.02 trillion) of funds benchmarked against MSCI emerging market and related indices, they are ineligible for investment from the roughly US$3.6 trillion (RM15.1 trillion) pool of funds that tracks developed market indices.
Lawmakers in Seoul are not happy. Over the years, they’ve offered MSCI the same red-carpet treatment they once offered Soros – to no avail. Now, as the country heads towards the March 9 vote, one leading candidate has pledged to attempt to secure an upgrade to developed market status.
In parallel, the finance minister has proposed changes to South Korea’s foreign-exchange regime to address one of MSCI’s principal concerns.
The rewards are enticing. Goldman Sachs Group Inc estimates that net capital infows resulting from a change in classification could amount to US$44bil (RM184.2bil).
Perhaps more importantly, reclassification bestows the imprimatur of a globally recognised standard-setter.
Assuming this leads to a narrowing of South Korea’s valuation discount against other developed markets, Goldman Sachs analysts reckon it could add 35% to the value of the market.
Indices were never meant to command such influence. They started life as simple confidence barometers, sponsored by newspapers as a daily service to their readers. But as Mark Makepeace, former head of FTSE Russell, observes,
“Humans gravitate to order, making sense of information by grouping it into families to rank and review.”
Such gravitation led the investment industry first to adopt indices as performance benchmarks and then to track them as the end unto themselves.
For the companies crafting the indices, this has been a profitable development.
Index providers like MSCI make money in three ways. They charge index funds and managers of exchange-traded funds a few basis points on the assets that track their benchmarks; they charge exchanges like CME a commission on each traded option or futures contract linked to their indices; and they charge subscription fees to a range of third-party users.
Benchmarked assets
At MSCI alone, benchmarked assets have grown to US$16.3 trillion (RM68.2 trillion) from US$7 trillion (RM29.3 trillion) in 2013.
Revenue has grown in tandem. Last year, MSCI index revenue was up 23% to US$1.25bil (RM5.23bil) and, because the cost of managing index infrastructure is broadly fixed, margins are very high.
In 2021, MSCI had an Ebitda margin of 76% in its index business, higher than most listed US companies. And all this on a relatively small headcount – MSCI has roughly the same number of employees as some of the largest hedge funds, yet its influence is now an order of magnitude greater. Index providers’ critical position at the heart of financial markets has not gone unnoticed by regulators. In the aftermath of the Libor scandal in 2012, authorities heightened their scrutiny of all market benchmarks. Up until that point there had been little oversight of stock indexation, and new European Union rules were introduced.
However, since then, the industry has consolidated its position through a series of mergers at the same time as demand for their benchmarks has grown.
In January this year, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority announced the launch of an industry review on the basis that “the market for benchmarks and indices provision may not be working well,” citing high switching costs and an increase in prices.
Power struggle
In addition to the glare of regulation, index providers are subject to a power struggle with their main customers – asset managers whose own industry is also concentrating rapidly.
MSCI’s largest customer is BlackRock Inc, which accounts for 20% of its index revenues, up from 18% in 2020. Several of these large customers have launched self-indexing strategies.
For now, companies like MSCI have assumed the power mantle from hedge funds, but power shifts continuously. South Korea may be a useful place to watch. — Bloomberg
Marc Rubinstein writes for Bloomberg. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.