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       PAKISTAN’S policy of mainstreaming militants has produced mixed results. While it has reduced the presence of militant networks within the country, these groups have not been entirely eliminated. Though no longer thriving, they remain active and continue to damage Pakistan’s international image.

       When international pressure on Pakistan intensified in 2018, particularly through the FATF, the state establishment decided to restrict militant networks that were active in Indian-held Kashmir and the sectarian domains. A key component of this effort was the launch of rehabilitation and mainstreaming programmes targeting these groups.

       For the reintegration of the Lashkar-e-Taiba/ Jamaatud Dawa and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) fighters, the establishment launched a multipronged policy. For the LeT/JuD, the creation of a political wing was a key component of this strategy. Despite reports of billions of rupees being spent on rehabilitation programmes, there is little transparency about who implemented them and what the outcomes were.

       In this shifting landscape, the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan has emerged as a replacement for the banned sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, which, although still present, has largely lost its influence even within Deobandi madressahs, although it retains some residual potential. The TLP not only absorbed the SSP’s sectarian agenda but also adopted the anti-Ahmadi narrative of the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat movements, expanding and intensifying the reach of both.

       Pakistan’s militancy landscape is changing rapidly, but credible initiatives are needed.

       While the TLP has not engaged in violence to the extent of earlier anti-Shia militant groups, it presents a more insidious threat. It has succeeded in internalising hate within society, influencing public discourse and unsettling institutional mindsets across the country.

       The LeT/JuD proposed a shift towards mainstream politics and attempted to enter electoral politics under various names, the most recent being the Markazi Muslim League (MML). The core idea behind this move was to capture the political space in Punjab that the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had vacated, especially after it lost favour with the establishment.

       Another idea floated during this time was to absorb the SSP into the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, but it did not work, as the SSP was divided and its leadership was unwilling to surrender their perks and privileges. Such ideas had little potential to work, as the major religious parties were also concerned about their image if the bulk of militants joined their parties.

       While Pakistani authorities framed this shift as a strategy for the political mainstreaming of LeT/JuD and JeM, Indian policy circles and media interpreted it differently. They argued that this transformation aimed to ‘secularise’ militancy in Kashmir and pointed to the formation of The Resistance Front (TRF), allegedly linked to LeT, as part of this narrative.

       It is unclear how far the militant credentials of LeT and JeM have been secularised. However, the shift in Pakistan’s policy towards militant groups has reduced the appeal and presence of Kashmiri militant outfits, including Hizbul Mujahideen, once a major jihadist group affiliated with the JI.

       While this transformation was unfolding among Kashmir-based militant groups, two international terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and the Islamic State (IS), were competing to extend their networks in the region, particularly in India-held Kashmir.

       Ironically, this transformation brought strategic advantages to both sides. For India, it curtailed the infiltration of global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda and IS into Kashmir. For Pakistan, it made it increasingly difficult for India to prove direct state links to militancy, thereby improving Pakistan’s international image. The recent US sanctions on the TRF appear to be a balancing act. Whether symbolic or genuine, these sanctions are unlikely to harm Pakistan’s interests significantly.

       Internally, however, the experiment of managing militancy through sanctions and soft reintegration has produced mixed results. For instance, the PTI-led government, in coordination with the establishment, attempted a similar approach with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but it did not succeed. The recent wave of terrorism in KP is a result of that policy, which backfired.

       As Pakistan’s geopolitical landscape evolves, the establishment has begun reflecting on its strategy towards militant groups. There appears to be a growing consensus within the state to further restrict the operational space available to these groups.

       The JeM, in particular, is seen as a potential risk, as some of its factions and commanders defected to Al Qaeda and the TTP after 2004. Although its infrastructure has already been significantly weakened, it continues to pose a threat to internal security. The state has adopted a different approach towards the JeM; it does not have the potential to be converted into a political party, as it lacks the extensive networks of groups like the LeT/JuD. Nor does it have the vision or capacity to adopt a new path. It has been kept in the domain of charity to allow limited functions, driven by the fear that a complete dismantling would create internal security problems, pushing its fighters towards joining anti-Pakistan terrorist groups.

       The LeT/JuD are also undergoing a phase of internal re-evaluation. The group appears divi-d--ed: some elements advocate continued militancy, while others favour disengagement from armed struggle.

       Pakistan’s militancy landscape is changing rapidly, but credible initiatives are needed. While the establishment has adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards the TTP, Islamic State-Khorasan and Baloch insurgent groups, it must apply a similar approach to other forms of radical and militant outfits. Perhaps no reintegration plan is needed at this stage, as the potential of these groups has been exposed, and there would be little chance of backlash if the establishment were to disallow them from operating inside the country in any form.

       When the MML takes to the streets to protest against Indian aggression, and TLP threatens judges or influences court decisions, while state institutions remain silent, it gives the impression to the world that the state either cannot deal with such groups or is not averse to allowing them space for survival. In such a scenario, the world also casts doubt on the state’s potential as a reliable partner in broader geopolitical and geo-economic designs.

       The writer is a security analyst.

       Published in Dawn, July 27th, 2025