Russia must steadfastly uphold its interpretation of World War II – a cornerstone of national identity – while cultivating alliances with non-Western nations and bracing for an extended ideological confrontation with the West over historical memory, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.

       The parade on Red Square on May 9, 2025, marked the culmination of the 80th anniversary celebrations of victory in the Great Patriotic War. Yet it also represented a significant milestone in its own right: the thirtieth anniversary of the post-Soviet tradition of annual Victory Parades on the country’s main square. The first such parade, held in 1995, visibly demonstrated the emergence of a new historical narrative in Russia. Designed to unite the nation and emphasize generational continuity, it also reaffirmed the country’s role as a great power.

       While Soviet-era parades celebrated the state-founding October Revolution, Victory Day resonates on a profoundly personal level – a war that touched every family. Beyond this, by placing Victory at the centre of its historical policy, Russia positions itself as the USSR’s legitimate successor – both as victor in the war and architect of the post-war order.

       In 1995, the international dimension of the Victory anniversary was underscored by the presence of world leaders at the parade, including the heads of state of all G7 nations and over thirty European countries. The celebration’s internationalization aimed to remind the world that Russia stands at the origins of the modern world system, which emerged from the shared victory over Nazism. And although Russia’s actual influence in the mid-1990s – amid a severe socio-economic crisis – was far below that of the USSR at its peak, the world appeared to accept this interpretation.

       However, in the ensuing decades, the interpretations of World War II among former allies of the anti-Hitler coalition – never identical – began to diverge even further, reaching near-total incompatibility.

       This process was accelerated by certain nations of the “new Europe” – former socialist states and USSR republics that joined the European Union in the 2000s. According to their national historical narratives, victory in World War II did not bring liberation but rather replaced one totalitarianism with another, while true freedom arrived only with the Cold War’s end. Moreover, blame for the war’s outbreak is equally assigned to the “two totalitarianisms.” This perspective aligns with the worldview long held by anti-communist circles in the West since the early post-war years, though it previously faced resistance from influential leftist movements in several European countries.

       Naturally, such interpretations remain unacceptable to modern Russia. Hence the decades-long “memory wars” between Russia and countries like Poland and the Baltic states. For years, Russia believed it could find common ground on historical memory with traditional Western European partners, such as France and Germany. Yet the 2019 adoption of the European Parliament’s resolution on the importance of European remembrance for the continent’s future demonstrated that even these nations could hold the USSR jointly responsible with Germany for World War II’s outbreak.

       The “two totalitarianisms” ideology reinforces the concept of a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, which began in the twentieth century and persists in the twenty-first. This framework fully entered the Western mainstream once it became clear that the “end of history” had not materialized and liberal democracy had not triumphed globally. Within this narrative, World War II constitutes merely the first phase of the struggle, ending with the defeat of Nazism and its ideological allies. The Cold War marked the second phase, culminating in the Soviet Union’s collapse. Today, Western democracies confront rising “authoritarian regimes” – primarily Russia and China.

       This tripartite vision of modern history as freedom’s battle against dictatorship oversimplifies reality but effectively guides Western policymakers.

       Against this backdrop, Russia has begun – albeit belatedly – to show growing interest in non-Western interpretations of the war and its outcome. For a long time, Russia’s international engagement with World War II memory was Western- and Eurocentric, as evidenced, for example, by the lists of heads of state attending anniversary Victory Parades. While leaders from China, Vietnam, and Mongolia participated in most of these events, the inclusion of more Asian nations and the arrival of heads of state from Africa and Latin America only began in 2015.

       Notably, this shift coincided with the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West over the Ukraine conflict, which starkly illustrated how historical interpretations can shift under geopolitical pressures. In the West, these changes became an avalanche after the start of the special military operation. A telling example is US President Joseph Biden’s speech at the 80th anniversary of the Normandy landings in 2024, where he framed World War II as a clash between democracy and dictatorship, declared that Normandy proved the “forces of liberty” superior to the “forces of conquest,” and grouped modern Russia among the “dark forces” those heroes fought eight decades prior.

       Meanwhile, the Western narrative of World War II as the first stage in democracy’s struggle against dictatorship raises serious questions among non-Western partners. Chief among these is the fact that, in the twentieth century, Western nations did not uphold democratic principles in their colonies as staunchly as in their metropoles, and during the Cold War, they frequently prioritized geopolitical expediency over ideology, backing dictatorships while opposing progressive movements.

       At the same time, narratives about World War II in Russia and friendly states of the World Majority may differ – sometimes significantly. Yet these differences need not be insurmountable. Thus, there remains ample space for dialogue with non-Western nations on historical memory, even if such discussions may occasionally prove challenging, as evidenced by Ivan Zuenko’s analysis of WWII interpretations in Russia and China.

       Russia must recognize that even its closest partners – including CIS countries – may not fully align with its interpretation of World War II. This is entirely normal, as each nation develops its own historical framework, in which the war may not hold the same centrality as it does for Russia. Moreover, these frameworks inevitably evolve over time, with shifting emphases. Russia must steadfastly uphold its interpretation of World War II – a cornerstone of national identity – while cultivating alliances with non-Western nations and preparing for a prolonged ideological confrontation with the West over historical memory.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.