On April 17, 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe begins a three-day visit to the United States. His meeting with Donald Trump in Florida will continue the so-called “golf diplomacy,” launched by Shinzo Abe to strengthen personal ties with the American president. In February and November 2017, two informal meetings between them took place on the golf course, and the current one is the third meeting of this kind.
The summit agenda is expected to be quite rich. First, Abe and Trump will meet face to face, then there will be several working meetings with the two countries’ experts on national security and trade. Among the topics are the North Korean nuclear program, cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, problems of the South China Sea, as well as issues of bilateral trade relations. The seriousness of talks is confirmed by the fact that the American delegation consists of the most senior White House officials, including National Security Advisor John Bolton, United States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Vice President Mike Pence.
For the Japanese prime minister the conditions of the visit are unfavorable. Inside Japan, a scandal continues to develop about Abe’s involvement in office abuses in the interests of his close friends, which has already led to plummeting of his ratings. Therefore, diplomatic success becomes a matter of political survival for the Japanese prime minister.
However, the tasks facing Abe are complicated by the development of the situation around North Korea, which is unfavorable for Japan. In late March, Kim Jong-un visited Beijing and met with Xi Jinping. Agreements were reached on holding summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in (April 27) and US President Trump (late May-early June). The Japanese leadership welcomed Kim Jong-un’ recent statement about the commitment of the DPRK to the idea of the Korean Peninsula denuclearization. However, Japan has always taken the toughest stance towards Pyongyang, insisting that “dialogue for the sake of dialogue” does not make any sense and that the beginning of negotiations should be conditioned by the real steps of the DPRK towards reducing its nuclear programs.
Although Seoul and Washington informed the Japanese leadership about the upcoming dialogue with Pyongyang, Japan, which has no leverage over the negotiation process, actually turned out to be on the roadside. That said, alarmist moods are expressed in Japan, in particular by the well-known political scientist Watanabe, that Pyongyang, making steps towards Seoul and Washington, but ignoring Tokyo, aims to damage the tripartite relations of the United States, South Korea and Japan. At the same time, Pyongyang’s agreements at the summits with Seoul and Washington are seen by many in Japan as a kind of backstabbing, reminiscent of the notorious “Nixon shocks” of the early 1970s, when the American leadership normalized relations with communist China without proper consultations with its Japanese ally.
Tokyo fears the possibility of a separate deal at the upcoming meeting between Trump and Kim Jong-un, when the North Korean side can agree to abandon the nuclear weapons carriers, capable to reach the main American territory, while small and medium-range missiles will remain out of this agreement. Things became even worse when the new US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, said at Senate hearings that the purpose of the meeting with Kim was to reach an agreement, according to which the DPRK would abandon attempts to threaten America with its nuclear weapons. In this regard, many in Japan wonder whether Tokyo can fully rely on America’s security guarantees, whether America would continue to keep its “nuclear umbrella” over Japan and whether Japan would have to react independently to the North Korean nuclear threat, for example, by creating its own nuclear missile potential. Such a threat is felt in Japan extremely sharply in the light of the successes of the North Korean nuclear program, when North Korean Hwasong missiles are capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the entire territory of Japan.
So one of the main goals of Abe’s visit to the US is to dispel the abovementioned fears, to demonstrate the unity of views on the North Korean issue, and to give impetus to mutual efforts to coordinate actions regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Moreover, the summit is intended to confirm that the American security guarantees toward Japan remain unchanged. Abe said in parliament that he would seek assurances from Trump that during the meeting with Kim Jong-un he would raise the issue of eliminating all North Korean missiles capable of reaching Japan. “Getting rid of the intercontinental ballistic missiles only does not make much sense for Japan,” the Japanese prime minister said.
Simultaneously, the Japanese prime minister will insist on continuing the policy of carrot and stick towards Pyongyang. The turn in North Korea’s policy, expressed by Kim’s conciliatory remarks, is regarded in Tokyo as a result of the maximum pressure strategy against the DPRK, which Japan always supported. Abe will obviously try to convince Trump not to trust only the words of the North Korean leader and not to give up rigid forms of pressure on Pyongyang, including the policy of economic sanctions. Japan, as before, will try to persuade Trump to raise the issue of kidnapped people and other human rights issues during the talks with Kim.
As for trade and economic issues, they are not simple for Abe either. Trump will obviously seek a bilateral trade agreement with Japan, he will try to get the most favorable conditions for American interests – for example, high import tariffs for Japanese steel and aluminum. Abe’s goal will be to defend the interests of Japanese exporters and, under certain conditions, to discuss the possible return of America to the updated Trans-Pacific partnership, especially after the American president recently instructed his advisers to examine such an opportunity again.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.