The Ukraine conflict may well pave the way for a larger scale Russia-NATO confrontation. While hard to fathom and with everything suggesting that the scenario remains quite unlikely, it relies on nuclear deterrence as its main pillar. But just how effective can it be in averting a conflict? Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev ponders this question.

       US President Donald Trump’s statements, and his demands to put an end to hostilities in Ukraine may be interpreted as a sign that the spectre of available options for settling the Ukraine conflict is narrowing. Kiev pins its hopes on NATO offering it more weapons, while the Alliance members are set to increase their defence spending and invest in arms manufacturing and infrastructure in the foreseeable future.

       Any attempt to assess the role of nuclear weapons in a present-day armed conflict stumbles upon the fact that the experience in using them in combat is virtually non-existent. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings in 1945 took place in a different political and technological paradigm which disqualifies them as something we could project on the latest developments. On the other hand, the perception of nuclear weapons as a deterrent has firmly taken root in international relations. It is now commonly believed that the cost of aggression against a nuclear power would be unacceptable no matter how small its arsenal. This logic makes Russia virtually invincible considering its status as a nuclear superpower. In fact, the use of nuclear weapons has evolved into a political and moral taboo, even if military planners and researchers have been exploring and modelling various scenarios involving their use.

       It is still commonplace to believe that using nuclear weapons is unacceptable and that the odds of a nuclear power facing an aggression are quite low. But is it?

       This question is becoming increasingly urgent for Russia considering the prospects of a possible major military confrontation with NATO or its members, or in the context of the Ukraine conflict.

       There are more than enough political reasons which could lead to a Russia-NATO clash, and both sides have been articulating them with varying degrees of persuasiveness. Whether it could happen will depend on the limitations the parties face in terms of defence manufacturing and the availability of armed forces for waging an all-out war. Things may change, however. In Russia, the defence manufacturing sector has already gained a lot of momentum and focus during the special military operation. Similar processes are underway in NATO countries. Moreover, in terms of their manufacturing, financial capabilities and resources, they may well get ahead of Russia at a certain point by making more conventional weapons. This, in turn, would enable them to exert more political pressure based on their military might.

       There are several varying scenarios for a possible Russia-NATO military confrontation. For example, certain NATO countries may intervene in the Ukraine conflict. There is also a scenario involving a military and political crisis in the Baltics or in other regions. Any developments along these lines risk escalating into a major conflict. Ukraine has been routinely targeting Russian territory with drones and cruise missiles, while also undertaking attempts to invade its territory. This means that military personnel from certain NATO countries may be joining these operations as formal units and formations rather than by pretending to be off-duty fighters, volunteers or mercenaries. This prospect must be viewed as increasingly realistic.

       Could such developments be prevented through nuclear deterrence? Superficially, the answer appears affirmative. In the event of direct military confrontation, Russia would most likely initially deploy conventional weapons against any adversary. However, the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that missile strikes, aviation assets, artillery systems and similar capabilities - while inflicting damage - fail to critically undermine enemy resilience. NATO possesses damage mitigation capabilities identical to those of Ukraine, merely on an exponentially greater scale. Unlike Ukraine, Western countries currently demonstrate reduced psychological tolerance for human casualties. That said, concerted political mobilisation and strategic propaganda could recalibrate societal sensitivity to losses and acceptance of wartime sacrifices. The Russian armed forces possess substantial combat experience, including extensive defensive operations.

       NATO should be under no illusion of achieving facile victory in conventional warfare. Nevertheless, Russia would confront a formidable adversary.

       Two alternatives exist regarding Russia's potential employment of nuclear weapons in direct conflict with NATO: preemptive tactical strikes against enemy troop concentrations and critical infrastructure; or comparable strikes following conventional escalation. The former scenario proves politically less sustainable, risking Russia's designation as aggressor and consequent international isolation. The latter, while slightly reducing political costs, still permits accusations that Moscow violated the nuclear taboo first. However, apart from politics, other things are equally important. Both scenarios preserve NATO's capacity to deliver nuclear or conventional counterstrikes. Any Russian nuclear deployment risks devastating retaliation, presenting Moscow with an existential dilemma: persist with conventional operations despite potential defeat; continue tactical nuclear exchanges; or eliminate the adversary by employing strategic nuclear weapons, something that guarantees annihilation by a retaliatory strike.

       This paradigm's inherent danger lies in fostering NATO's illusion of impunity – the conviction that Russia would refrain from nuclear weapons use due to fears of inevitable retaliation. Such perceptions render gradual conventional escalation feasible, potentially expanding from Ukrainian war theatre to a broader regional conflict, necessitating the abandonment of Cold War-era deterrence frameworks.

       The inevitable losers in either nuclear or conventional escalation scenarios include: a) Ukraine as primary battleground; b) Russia facing sustained missile and other types of strikes and potential offensives; c) European NATO members, particularly on the eastern and north-eastern flanks who will be subjected to Russian counterstrikes and, under favourable to Russia conditions, to possible advances of its armed forces. The United States will remain relatively insulated except in scenarios involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Though, for Washington, no guarantees exist regarding controllable escalation from conventional to tactical and later strategic nuclear strikes. So, the Americans may also be among the losers.

       Nuclear warfare admits no victors - only in scenarios where one party demonstrates critical weakness. Any strategic calculus predicated upon an adversary's potential collapse risks catastrophic miscalculation for both sides.

       Apparently, in case of direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, mutual recognition of assured devastation exists for both sides. Such confrontation would necessitate comprehensive systemic transformation and casualties unseen in Europe for a very long time. Yet historical precedent demonstrates that quite often prospective losses did not prevent major catastrophies and conflicts. The possibility of a return to extreme-era dynamics cannot be dismissed. While nuclear weapons remain the bedrock of deterrence, their employment taboo and ability to avert aggressionare again in question.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.