In the last 20 years Germany has become for Moscow a kind of a bridge to the United States and NATO. Closer coordination between Berlin and Washington would mean the end to this. Politically Germany – Russia’s closest partner until recently – would become less hospitable. This would reduce the potential of Russia’s European policy against the backdrop of closer partnership between France and the UK.
On May 30, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer published an article in American Project Syndicate with the striking title “Missing America.” The article caused a stir in Germany and other EU countries, and even in Russia and the United States, due to the author’s standing and the ideas he expressed. He made three major conclusions. First, American leadership in the world is still needed. Second, the United States can no longer deploy its might as freely and effectively as it did in the 1990s. Third, EU countries should refocus on closer integration and privileged partnership with Washington.
These are not new ideas. American experts have expressed the same views in many publications over the last decade. What makes this case unique is that they were expressed not by an American political scientist but by the former foreign minister of Germany, a country that has largely opposed the US global role in the past decade. The title of his article, “Missing America,” is also interesting. It is unclear who is missing America, but the article suggests that it is either Germany or the European Union. It seems that part of the German establishment is moving toward the idea of restoring privileged relations with the United States.
Since its reunification in 1990, Germany has distanced itself from the United States regardless of the political party of the administration. Berlin has emphasized its loyalty to NATO and has taken part in the majority of its operations. Berlin and Paris consolidated their privileged relationship within the EU. Germany has improved relations with Russia by acting as its key energy partner and simultaneously as a mediator at talks on disputes between Moscow, Washington and Brussels. Berlin has also assumed the role of main sponsor of EU integration projects (both at its own initiative and as payment for the talks on unification in the 2+4 format). Berlin’s strategic goal was to revise the 1990 Moscow treaty that retained some limitations on German sovereignty.
At the end of the first decade of the new century, Berlin’s moves toward independence have become more pronounced. The Angela Merkel government began to speak about withdrawing American nuclear weapons from Germany. Washington blocked this idea at the NATO summit in Tallinn on April 21-22, 2010, but this has remained a fraught issue in US-German relations. Germany occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security initiative launched in 2012 and proposed jointly by the Carnegie Corporation, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Robert Bosch Stiftung.
The European financial crisis compelled the Merkel government to enhance Germany’s role in the European Union. Berlin achieved its goal – the formation of the European Monetary Fund aimed at overcoming the European financial crisis without the IMF’s participation. At its summit in Brussels on December 8-9, 2011, the EU endorsed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union on the initiative of Germany and France.
But things changed by mid-2013. The German establishment increasingly sees itself as sidelined on European security problems. The formation of the Franco-British tandem has reduced Germany’s role in European politics. Germany is increasingly assigned the role of fighting the financial crisis – a donor to Eastern European countries in need of aid. The resolution of key political issues is increasingly falling to Paris and London, a source of irritation to Berlin.
After the Western European Union dissolved itself, Germany found itself sidelined on military issues. The notorious European Security and Defense Policy has yet to produce a common EU military force. Instead, the 2010 Franco-British accords have become the EU’s military foundation.
The German elite also feels sidelined on Mediterranean issues. London and Paris conducted the Libyan operation in 2011 with Washington’s support and without giving Berlin a second thought. The White House and Downing Street are playing the main role in the Syrian crisis. The Kremlin is consulting the United States, Britain, France, Turkey and Israel on Syria, but not Germany. Berlin has found itself sidelined from Middle East policy for the first time since Operation Desert Fox in 1998.
Germany feels growing resistance from London in discussions of EU fiscal problems. Backed by Sweden, the Czech Republic and Hungary, David Cameron’s government blocked the German proposal for closer coordination of the budget policies of EU countries. In the spring of 2012, the EU refused to discuss the German proposal to have South European countries establish government development banks. The idea expressed by President of the German Federal Bank Jens Weidmann on November 14, 2012 to establish an agency for coordinating the budget policies of the EU countries also failed to receive support. Paris is less likely to support Berlin’s fiscal initiatives now than in the 1990s.
Berlin is growing skeptical that the European project will lead to a revision of the 1990 Moscow treaty. The privileged dialogue with Russia has not led to this either. In Germany there is an entire generation of politicians for whom the prospect of removing the limitations on German sovereignty seems delayed indefinitely. In theory, closer cooperation with the United States may be helpful in this respect. It would be easier for Berlin to revise the treaty in cooperation with Washington than without it.
Russian policy of Euro-Atlanticism
Russia would not welcome a revision of the treaty. In the last 20 years Germany has become for Moscow a kind of a bridge to the United States and NATO. Closer coordination between Berlin and Washington would mean the end to this. In this case, Russia and Germany would continue their energy cooperation but politically Germany – Russia’s closest partner until recently – would become less hospitable. This would reduce the potential of Russia’s European policy against the backdrop of closer partnership between France and the UK.
Transitioning to a posture of Atlanticism would entail serious changes for Germany. In the last 20 years, Germany has been acquiring a great power status thanks to an Atlantic not a Euro-Atlantic strategy. Reorienting toward Washington would put Germany on the same level with the small and permanently slighted countries of Eastern Europe. The great power status with the formal limitations on its sovereignty which Germany has worked so hard to reclaim would be called into question. This would be a difficult choice given Britain’s increasingly independent policy.
Since the mid-1960s, the Kremlin has divided NATO countries into two groups – advocates of Atlanticism (Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark, later joined by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) and Euro-Atlanticism (France, Germany and Italy), which have tried to limit American leadership with a package of stabilizing agreements. Moscow built its European policy on a tacit alliance with the second group, with a view to promoting advantageous initiatives on European security and blocking unwanted US steps. When France switched to Atlanticism, Moscow had to adjust its stance, in part by expanding its dialogue with London. If Berlin follows the French example, it will be pointless for Russia to pursue dialogue with Washington and London with the mediation of mainland Europe. This would objectively reduce Germany’s role in European politics. It was Euro-Atlanticism and priority dialogue with Moscow that allowed Berlin to play a special role in European politics, obviating the limitations imposed by the 1990 Moscow treaty. Will Germany be able to retain its hard-earned great power status if it opts instead for Atlanticism?
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.