The idea of a partnership between the SCO and Washington failed because the Bush administration took strict steps against Central Asian states. One such step was its strong criticism of the Uzbek government for suppressing an armed rebellion in Andijan in May 2005. The current U.S. Administration seems to have taken into account Washington's previous mistakes.

       The United States stepped up its policy in Central Asia this fall. On Sept. 22, the U.S. Congress repealed sanctions operating since 2004 on military assistance to Uzbekistan. In October, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton toured Central Asia, visiting Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The key issues of her negotiations with regional countries concerned how to strengthen cooperation and stabilize Afghanistan and the development prospects in the region after the planned withdrawal of NATO troops from the country in 2014. Particular attention was paid to Clinton's talks with Uzbek President Islam Karimov on Oct. 22-23.

       Against this backdrop, the United States has shown its interest in a partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). U.S. analysts discussed the need to expand cooperation with the organization last summer. Media reported in October that U.S. President Barak Obama’s Administration hopes to open talks with the SCO about a format for cooperation. The United States will seek either an observer status or a dialogue partner status in the SCO.

       Washington has been interested in cooperating with the organization since it opened military bases in Central Asia. In 2002, former President George W. Bush's administration considered the possibility of the United States entering the SCO or receiving associate member status. The White House's offers provoked a crisis in the SCO. Uzbekistan supported the U.S. proposal. However, China was against the initiative. Meanwhile, Russia and Kazakhstan wanted to preserve the organization's unity and at the same time did not want to quarrel with the Americans as they waged war against the Taliban.

       The idea of a partnership between the SCO and Washington failed because the Bush administration took strict steps against Central Asian states. One such step was its strong criticism of the Uzbek government for suppressing an armed rebellion in Andijan in May 2005. The current U.S. Administration seems to have taken into account Washington's previous mistakes. The United States has now taken a series of measures that allow the possibility of linking up with the SCO.

       First, the White House seeks influence over the SCO's policy decisions. A dialogue partner status does not provide access to the organization's restricted documents. However, a partner may receive access on demand from a SCO member. The groundwork for this may be a renewed U.S.-Uzbek partnership.

       Second, Washington supports expanding the list of the SCO's partner states. The United States supports an application filed by Turkey on Oct. 21. Washington also supports the integration of Pakistan and India within the SCO, as they actively support U.S. military and political initiatives.

       Third, the United States aims to advance a selective partnership with Central Asian states. Washington intends to restore its privileged military and political partnership with Uzbekistan. However, Clinton's visit to Dushanbe has shown that the White House may open a direct dialogue with Tajikistan. U.S. experts are counting on the Kyrgyz elite. During the political crisis in May 2010, the Obama Administration opposed the entry of foreign troops into Kyrgyzstan. Potentially, the United States can also expand its partnership with Kazakhstan. Astana is worried about perceived gains in Uzbekistan and is prepared to partner with any powers that can counterbalance a strengthening Tashkent.

       The realization of U.S. initiatives may change the nature of the SCO. The organization was created in 2001 as a system for maintaining regional security. The principles of the SCO are based on the Russian-Chinese Moscow Declaration on a Multipolar World and the "Big Treaty" signed between Russia and China in 1997 and 2001, respectively. These documents assert the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for a country's rights to choose its own path of development, and mutual support in the fight against separatism. These principles were an appeal for an alternative to the U.S. concepts of democratic enlargement and regime change.

       The United States would like to cooperate with the SCO on different issues. However, the White House would also like to see another SCO where Washington will influence the decision-making process. In this sense, U.S. actions are aimed at weakening rather than strengthening the SCO.

       In the near future, the SCO may face the same dilemma as in 2002. A dialogue with Washington is necessary to strengthen regional security in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, though, most SCO member states are afraid of granting the United States the authority to make decisions. Therefore, Moscow and Beijing will have to address a major question – how can they build a dialogue with the United States in the SCO if Washington is interested in a separate dialogue with the Central Asian countries to bypass Russia and China?

       This article was originally published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Nov. 1, 2011

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.