The current balance in the Middle East is fragile and unstable. It can be upset by the aggravation of contradictions between the great powers in both global and regional, Middle Eastern context, by increased friction and the emergence of conflicts between the states of the region themselves, by the emergence of crises within these states, where in some cases the domestic political situation is unstable, as well as by some completely unexpected and unpredictable events, which have so often arisen in this region over the long years of its history, writes Konstantin Khudoley, Professor of the Faculty of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University.

       At the same time, the number of participants in the conflict is increasing, the territory covered by military activity is expanding, and the forms of struggle are becoming increasingly acute. Throughout all these years, the tendency towards escalation has been dominant. Outwardly, the short-lived June 2025 military campaign which saw the participation of the armed forces of Israel, Iran and the United States ended successfully for all three countries, whose leaders were able to save face by declaring victory. Cases where all participants in military actions consider themselves winners, and the losers are absent, are quite rare, but it cannot hide the fact that a significant regrouping of forces has begun in the region, which, apparently, will have cardinal consequences.

       Iran undoubtedly was and will remain at the centre of the ongoing processes. The extent of the damage to its nuclear programme, as well as military, economic and scientific potential is difficult to determine now, but the fact itself is beyond doubt. The most significant thing is that the American and Israeli strikes have fully revealed the fragility and inefficiency of Iranian state structures. Israel’s first strike eliminated a number of generals who held senior positions in the armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, other security agencies, nuclear scientists and some others, and serious failures occurred in the civil and military governance system. This became possible not only and not so much because of the mistakes of individual officials, but due to obvious structural problems in the security agencies, total corruption in the state apparatus, and the complete indifference of a significant part of the population, whose standard of living has been extremely low for many years, and who, seeing no opportunity to improve their situation, are in a state of complete apathy with regard to everything that is happening. It should be added that in the last two years, Iran’s allies, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and others, who had long been on the front line of the military confrontation with Israel and received generous aid from Tehran, have suffered heavy defeats, and in June 2025 they did not risk engaging in military action, limiting themselves to purely declarative statements. Of course, Iran has not suffered a strategic defeat, nor has it disintegrated into several parts, nor was there a “regime change”, but its ability to pursue the old policy aimed at destroying the State of Israel and spreading the Islamic revolution on an international scale is questionable.

       It is quite obvious that Tehran lacks the resources for such a large-scale game and is unlikely to have them in the near future. The recent international crisis will undoubtedly accelerate internal processes in Iran in the short term, and certain changes will occur there, although it is very difficult to say whether it will be in a few years or months. The establishment of Western-style democracy or the restoration of the monarchy in Iran seem unlikely, since the social base of both models is quite limited. However, there is no doubt that representatives of a new generation of the elite will soon occupy the leading positions. They do not want to completely dismantle the existing political system, since they grew up and rose to the top within it. But they will undoubtedly be free from the revolutionary fanaticism of the events of 1979 and will approach existing problems more pragmatically. It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the lifting of sanctions and a return to world markets will be one of their priorities.

       Of course, for any Iranian government, the most difficult issue will be the nuclear programme. It is extremely risky for the Islamic Republic to fully meet the demands of the United States, not just because it could undermine its authority on the global scale – this is hardly important for Tehran now – but also within the country, where discontent is already quite strong. Nevertheless, Tehran is unlikely to be able to refuse the United States. New attacks from the US and Israel in this case would become more than likely, and their consequences – military, economic, and domestic – could be much more serious than they are now.

       Israel has certain reasons to believe that its position in the region has strengthened. Direct threats to its existence that it has faced for many years, such as the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons or terrorist attacks by Hamas, Hezbollah and others, have been postponed if not completely eliminated. However, a significant amount of uncertainty persists in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, especially in the short term. In addition, Israel has suffered not only material but also human losses during the military clash, both among military personnel and the civilian population. No air defence system provides a 100% guarantee, but the Iron Dome was certainly expected to be more effective. The Palestinian problem also remains unresolved.

       The United States continues to assert itself as one of the most active players in the Middle East, pursuing its objectives through every available means – including military force. While few would question America’s overwhelming military might, some Russian and foreign analysts have recently suggested that the US is drifting toward isolationism, retreating from long-standing commitments and hesitating to deploy its armed forces. Yet Donald Trump’s actions appear to defy this narrative, underscoring his adherence to Ronald Reagan’s doctrine of “peace through strength” – not as mere rhetoric, but as a guiding principle. The deployment of advanced strategic bombers, armed with devastating payloads, to target Iranian nuclear facilities may well have been a deliberate show of force – one intended to send a message far beyond the Middle East.

       Another important point is that the military intervention of the United States in the Middle East did not mean a rejection of the main ideas of the policy proclaimed by Donald Trump in his speech in Riyadh (May 2025). The US wants to reconstruct the Middle East not through “regime change” (no steps in this direction with regard to Iran, other than a number of propaganda statements designed to encourage Tehran to make concessions, have been observed even during the most acute moments of military action), but through reorienting the economic ties of these states. Almost certainly, if negotiations begin, Washington will raise issues not only about eliminating the possibility of creating nuclear weapons, but also about reorienting peaceful nuclear energy towards ties with American corporations. Attempts will be made to involve Iran in economic cooperation with Arab states, and the issue of lifting sanctions will be resolved gradually in order to prevent the strengthening of anti-American circles in the Iranian elite.

       At the same time, if the negotiations fail (and the probability of this is approximately 50/50), the US may again resort to military force, although within strictly defined limits – the option of sending American ground troops to Iran can be practically excluded. Most likely, Donald Trump will step up efforts to normalise relations between Israel and the Arab states and restore diplomatic relations with a number of them. The United States is unlikely to initiate the emergence of new international organisations in the Middle East, but will try to find itself at the centre of a system of various agreements and treaties (“deals”) between the states of this region. So far, the practical steps of the United States in these areas are, at least outwardly, weakly interconnected and it is not yet clear how effective they will be.

       In the new situation, new problems and challenges are emerging for Russia’s policy in the Middle East. Of course, the Middle East conflict, for a number of different reasons, is more important for the West than the events in Ukraine. However, it is unlikely that the West will completely focus on the Middle East and forget about everything else. A certain shift in emphasis is possible, but nothing more. Preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime is still important for Russia. Objectively, the emergence of new nuclear states, especially in geographical proximity, does not correspond to its interests. Therefore, Russia should probably continue to convince Iran of the need for steps to allay concerns about its nuclear programme in many countries, but to do so as tactfully as possible to preserve the positive aspects of bilateral relations. However, the most difficult problems are in the economic sphere. The lifting of US restrictions on the sale of Iranian oil to China and other similar steps may follow. They will most likely change the situation on the world oil market to the detriment of Russia. Even a partial lifting of sanctions may reduce Iran’s interest in the North-South transport corridor, and the activity of Western corporations in penetrating the Iranian market will increase significantly. Russian capital will face a difficult, competitive struggle. In the event of a resumption of hostilities, the situation may be even worse. A huge region engulfed in war and chaos could emerge near Russia’s borders, which cannot but affect the life of the southern regions of Russia.

       Thus, the current balance in the Middle East is fragile and unstable. It can be upset by the aggravation of contradictions between the great powers in both global and regional, Middle Eastern context, by increased friction and the emergence of conflicts between the states of the region themselves, by the emergence of crises within these states, where in some cases the domestic political situation is unstable, as well as by some completely unexpected and unpredictable events, which have so often arisen in this region over the long years of its history. The inertia of the long-term confrontation is very great, and it is unlikely that it will be possible to stop it immediately. However, this does not mean that such attempts should not be made.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.