Russia is no longer necessary as a mediator between Iran and the West because Tehran is ready to conduct independent talks with Washington. Relations between Moscow and Tehran are beset with serious problems that are making any development very difficult.
Apart from Syria, the world media is currently focused on the diplomatic initiatives of Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, who recently spoke with the US president over the phone in the first conversation of its kind in 34 years. Rouhani also announced his readiness to prove the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program in his speech at the UN General Assembly. Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Public Policy Research Center and Academic Secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Coordinating Council on Forecasting, expressed his opinion about possible changes in Iran’s foreign policy.
To enrich or not to enrich?
Iran is unlikely to curtail its nuclear program. We can only hope for a change in the form of interaction between Iran and the world community in resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran may freeze some of its activities for a certain period. It may, for example, stop its plans to upgrade its uranium from 5% to 20%. It may suspend the operation of its underground uranium-enrichment plant in Fordo. It may also opt for some confidence-building measures, such as allowing IAEA inspectors to visit its military base in Parchin.
Upgrading uranium from 5% to 20% still remains the key issue because 20% uranium may be turned into a weapons-grade product at the Fordo plant in two weeks. Iran has stockpiled enough uranium (if enriched) to produce one warhead using hexafluoride and several warheads using dioxide, i.e. in solid form that can be transferred into gas and also enriched.
So to make its nuclear program acceptable for the world community, Iran must stop upgrading uranium from 5% to 20%. It would be good if the already enriched solid oxide is not turned into gas, or still better if it is used to produce heat emitters – TVELS – for the Tehran Research Institute. Iran may well do this, since at the 2012 meeting in Istanbul with six international mediators on settling its nuclear crisis, Iran already agreed to limit the enrichment of its uranium. This initiative came from Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Rouhani – Khamenei – Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
There will be no open confrontation between the new president and Ali Khamenei. If Rouhani had any issues with him, he would have never become president. It is possible that a misunderstanding may arise between them, and Ali Khamenei may criticize Rouhani, but he will never subject him to any radical measures. Relations between Ali Khamenei and the previous president – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – were extremely complicated and at one time it even seemed that the latter would prevail. However, Ali Khamenei’s representatives won the elections to local government bodies and parliament in the spring of 2012 and he asserted his leading position.
It would be wrong to call Ali Khamenei a dictator. The point is that he does not want to interfere in relations between Rouhani and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard. This is a serious issue, because under the former president, the Guard considerably expanded its influence all along the line – in the economy, in politics and in executive government bodies.
Now the question is whether Rouhani can limit the Guard’s power in Iran. The conflict is gradually exacerbating. When Rouhani returned to Tehran from New York, the Guard’s head denounced him for his telephone conversation with Obama on the grounds that Iran should get something concrete from the United States before starting a dialogue. This is the most uncertain issue on the domestic political scene and nobody can predict its outcome. If a clear conflict develops between Rouhani and the Guard’s leadership, the latter could block all of his decisions. The Guard’s representatives head many local and executive government bodies and they will make it very difficult for Rouhani to pursue the policy he has declared as long as they keep their posts. The conflict between Rouhani and the Guard is indeed problematic. He is adequately prepared to resolve it and this he will do, step by step. It would be an exaggeration to say that Rouhani is in stark conflict with Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei will not interfere in Rouhani’s relations with the Guard, but will wait and see who wins. Let’s hope Rouhani will win.
Iran – United States – Israel
Relations between Iran and Israel are unlikely to change. Speaking about Holocaust, Rouhani admitted that it did take place, but its scale should be assessed by historians. So in essence, he disavowed the first part of his statement with the second, because if the scale of Holocaust was not so great, there was no reason to resettle the Jews that have suffered from it to Palestine. So his statement contains a hidden message, even though it is milder than Ahmadinejad’s position. What does Israel want? It is scared that if relations between Iran and the United States improve, the Americans will be less concerned about Israel. The Israelis are doing all they can to show the US that they are necessary. Israel believes that, as the US is its main ally in the region, Washington should do everything to protect it against the Iranian nuclear threat by helping to develop Israel’s national missile defense system, waging a cyber-war against Iran and subjecting it to tough sanctions. This is why the Israeli leaders are calling Rouhani a wolf in sheep’s clothing and claim he cannot be trusted.
However, we should not idealize relations between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It would seem that Obama even has sympathy for the Palestinians, but he is subjected to very strong pressure from the Israeli lobby in the United States. Obama cannot be independent here, because the lobby’s representatives provide funds for election campaigns and influence Congress’s position. In reality, the United States and Israel pursue different national interests. Far from all Americans agree that Israel should be helped on the same scale as before, particularly now that the United States is beset with its own economic problems. Moreover, there is a serious influence group in the United States that is advocating better relations with Iran. Key figures in this group are Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and State Secretary John Kerry. They favor normalization of relations with Iran but for different reasons. For example, Hagel is very interested in transferring the military center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific Region (the United States cannot simultaneously build up its military group in this region and retain its former presence in the Persian Gulf). He is convinced of the need to reduce this presence after talks with Iran.
There are also opponents of normalizing relations with Iran, for instance, National Security Advisor to the US President Susan Rice and Senate hawks. The situation is complicated and it is too early to predict who will win. Obama is interested in improving relations, but expects Iran to make certain steps – words alone are not enough. If Iran refrains from agreeing to any practical steps, the so-called thaw will remain at the same level as now.
Russia no longer plays an exclusive role for Iran
Russian-Iranian relations are also extremely complicated because the agenda that existed under Ahmadinejad was exhausted and cannot be used for talks today. First, Russia is no longer necessary as a mediator between Iran and the West because Tehran is ready to conduct independent talks with Washington. Second, Russia no longer plays an exclusive role in relations with Iran. It was previously believed that Russia played this role in the nuclear field, but in reality this was not the case. Nothing prevented Iran from building a nuclear-enrichment plant in Fordo, and Moscow learned of this by accident, just as many other countries did. Relations between Moscow and Tehran are beset with serious problems that are making any development very difficult. It is enough to mention the cancelled deal to supply S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran and the penalty recovery lawsuit of four billion dollars that is now being reviewed by the Geneva-based International Arbitration Court. There are other problems as well. Much will depend on Russia’s readiness to offer Iran a new agenda and on Iran’s readiness to accept it.
Rouhani has outlined two major directions in the new government’s policy. The first one is to work for easing international sanctions. Russia’s role in this is not so great. If the United States decides to alleviate unilateral sanctions, nobody will ask Russia about anything. The second direction is the improvement of Iran’s economic position. Either China or the West can provide Iran with investment and technology. Russia does not have much to offer on this score. In his speech at the UN General Assembly, Rouhani did not even mention Russia, but he did mention the United States. Under the circumstances I do not rule out a worsening in relations between Moscow and Tehran in the near future. However, until the Syrian issue is resolved, it is too early to speak about this or about Russia being subjected to any geopolitical threats. The resolution of the Syrian crisis will depend on the Geneva-2 international conference, Iran’s participation in it and the implementation of the program for destroying Syrian chemical weapons. For the time being, I do not see any threats emanating from any hypothetical warming of relations between Iran and the West.
The Syrian crisis does not pose any threat to Russia from Iran’s side. In fact, they are working together on this issue. It is unclear whether any threats will appear as regards Afghanistan. If US-Iranian relations improve, they may step up cooperation on Afghanistan and Tehran may reduce its resistance.
However, there is no doubt that Russian-Iranian relations are becoming increasingly uncertain. It is unclear what changes Iran will make in its foreign policy. It is very difficult to build bilateral relations with Rouhani. He seems to be a moderate conservative, but in reality he sides both with conservatives and reformers. His policy is extremely vague and this is a serious problem. Given this is the case, Moscow should aim at preserving the current level of relations, i.e. a cautious partnership.
S-300 as the stumbling block
Russia and Iran are currently holding consultations on S-300 air defense missile systems. If Iran is interested in buying them, Russia will be able provide the supply to tight deadlines and the sides will make mutual concessions. If Tehran recalls its suit from the Arbitration Court and the sides agree on the price of the purchase, the deal on missile systems, for instance, S-300 Antei-2500 may go through. However, there are too many “ifs,” so it will be very difficult to resolve this issue. If it remains unresolved, there could be no prospects for bilateral relations. Now very much depends on Iran and its flexibility. If it delays its decision for too long, tries to bargain and impose too rigid a supply deadline on Russia, the said deal may again fall through. At any rate, the resumption of consultations on this issue is already a big step forward from the summer deadlock.
At the moment, Russia cannot make serious statements regarding Iran. It is better to wait and see. Tehran will not be in the focus of international diplomacy in the near future. Now all attention is on Russia, Syria and the United States and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. If one of the three players opposes this, the problem will not be resolved.
Iran will make a tangible contribution to resolving the Syrian issue by taking part in the Geneva-2 conference. The United States, France and Britain do not object to its participation, but some Gulf countries are against it. Turkey may oppose it as well. Iran’s participation may be fully-fledged or partial, but the latter will not suit it, in which case it will considerably lower the status of its representation or cancel it altogether.
Further developments and the world’s attention on Iran depend on too many “ifs.” As the Syrian crisis comes to be resolved and the issue of chemical weapons becomes less pressing, the world community may focus more on Tehran. However, this will not happen until the middle of 2014.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.