By restoring their old alliance, Paris and London are solving tactical problems, but are not very concerned about the longer term, writes Alexey Chikhachev, Associate Professor of the Department of European Studies, Faculty of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, and leading expert at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Institute of Foreign Economic Relations, Higher School of Economics.

       The state visit of the President of France to the United Kingdom, the first to make use of this protocol status in seventeen years, took place in an extremely intense international context. Both countries, which had previously set a course for creating a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine, were forced to seek additional impetus for this initiative after it failed to gain immediate support among other countries’ governments. Both Paris and London have made it clear in recent months about their claims to be special participants in European affairs, as well as in adjacent areas, including the Arctic and the Mediterranean. France and the UK are simultaneously faced with the task of how, while preparing for high-intensity conflicts much closer to their own territory, not to lose the remnants of influence in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. The issue that has long remained unresolved has been illegal migration across the English Channel. However, the main topic of discussion, which tied all the other stories together, was saving the unity and influence of the Western camp at a time when the US has begun to worry about it much less.

       The desire of France and the UK to come to the forefront as a substitute for American leadership is understandable in both historical and modern terms. On the one hand, it immediately refers to the most troubling chapters of twentieth century history – the First and Second World Wars, which the countries went through on the same side of the barricades. The difference is that now the main declared opponent of this would-be “Entente Cordiale” is Russia, whereas in the above-mentioned cases it was considered an ally (except during the intervention period going into the 1920s). As President Macron insisted during his visit, it is this shared history that gives the alliance between France and Britain a solid foundation, turning it into an “outpost of defence and security for our continent and democratic values,” and, no less, gives it the moral right to “lead other nations in Europe and beyond.” Even if they once saw each other as irreconcilable opponents on opposite banks of the English Channel, this is now a matter of the past: “pride and prejudice,” in his words, have finally given way to “sense and sensibility.”

       On the other hand, in terms of their current capabilities, Britain and France stand out qualitatively from all other European countries. The sense of their own importance is given to them by the nuclear umbrella, with which they would now like to cover not only themselves, but also their closest neighbours. Although London takes a more cautious position, traditionally looking back at the United States (and interacting much more with the latter in matters of acquiring the corresponding systems), for Paris it acts as a natural interlocutor in this matter, allowing it to smooth out the excessively pro-French orientation in the idea of ？？European containment. The countries have close strategic cultures, in which the idea of ？？projecting power abroad occupies an important place: it was the French and the British who in the recent past were more active than other Europeans in various theatres, from the Sahel to Afghanistan. Despite some significant nuances, their armed forces are largely similar and have a comparable training level. For example, demonstrations of naval power are often carried out jointly (missions of aircraft carrier groups in the Indian Ocean). Finally, both British and French foreign policies are simultaneously demonstrating a commitment to Atlanticism: if for the former this trend is not at all new, then in the latter it began to intensify noticeably since 2022.

       The fact that they further undermine European security with their actions instead of strengthening it, and their existing capabilities are clearly inferior to the “contained” Russia, does not seem to bother either country – it is more important to send a signal of unity.

       From a substantive point of view, however, the visit also brought several noteworthy results, enshrined in the Lancaster House 2.0 declaration (with a reference to the place where the previous bilateral military-political agreements were signed in 2010).

       First, London and Paris will now more actively coordinate their nuclear doctrines: all decisions will remain in the hands of national authorities, but the parties will inform each other in more detail about their assessments of the situation and further steps through a working group under the auspices of top officials. Moreover, here, apparently, there are opportunities for the British to join the French nuclear exercises, and for national navies to interact when patrolling the North Sea with strategic submarines from each country.

       Second, the size of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Forces (CJEF), now focused on actions in Europe instead of remote areas, will increase from 10,000 to 50,000. In addition, it should form the basis of the contingent that can be sent to Ukraine in the future. The last point is the most important, because it is along Franco-British lines that the actions of this contingent are expected to be fully planned (starting with their actual deployment to Ukrainian territory immediately after the hypothetical establishment of a ceasefire), and to exercise command and control. It is important to take into account that we are not talking about an absolute increase in troops in quantitative terms, but only about the maximum number of forces that, if necessary, London and Paris will agree to allocate from national armies under the auspices of this format (including to offset obligations to NATO).

       Third, the declaration has a large military-technical chapter, where France and Britain also have a broad agenda – the development of new anti-ship missiles, replenishment of stocks of SCALP / Storm Shadow cruise missiles (their own, not Ukrainian ones), development of initiatives in the field of air defence, long-range weapons, laser weapons, etc. To this end, it is proposed to involve the British side in the ecosystem of EU military-industrial cooperation instruments, in particular, the SAFE joint procurement programme.

       Fourth, in addition to the usual phrases about cooperation in cyberspace, AI and intelligence, the decision to establish a new line of communication between the two capitals, as well as provide mutual access to overseas military bases, is noteworthy. In turn, a new “one for one” formula was put forward during the visit to solve the migration problem: the UK will agree to let in legal migrants from Calais, while France will take back the same number of violators from the northern coast.

       It is important to note that for both countries, Macron’s visit to the United Kingdom became a clear reflection of their current foreign policy strategies. For London, five years after Brexit and after a brief infatuation with the concept of “Global Britain”, the issue of “returning to Europe” is quite relevant – a rapprochement with European partners where possible, especially in the military sphere. As of 2024, the British side is in the leading group of countries that have surpassed the previous level of defence spending in relation to GDP, but further growth will be difficult without support from pan-European funds. France’s situation is even more difficult – 2% was achieved with great difficulty, so cooperation with neighbours is also necessary. In this sense, Britain, again, acts as an additional partner against the background of how cooperation with Germany is developing more slowly than expected (although it is incorrect to talk about a complete replacement due to a different set of projects). As mentioned above, in recent years Paris has increasingly begun to adhere to the Atlanticist line (confirmed in the new Strategic Review), so its rapprochement with Poland and Northern Europe is organically complemented by the British link.

       The first battles of the revived Entente are coming soon – and not on the fields of Ukraine, but in France and Britain themselves. In both cases, the current government’s position is quite shaky. Macron and his team are looking to square the circle, trying to save €40 billion in the budget (which will go, among other things, to defence), without raising taxes or causing public anger due to cuts in the social sphere. The work of Starmer’s cabinet is generally supported, according to July data, by only 12% of the population. However, the narrative about the need to unite the West by becoming its leaders instead of the United States, as well as pompous visits and declarations, are apparently still relatively well-received among European voters. In the United Kingdom, three times more respondents specifically approve of the Prime Minister’s military course; in the Fifth Republic, more than 70% support an increase in defence spending. However, the further the initiatives of both leaders go, the less cordial their agreement with their own citizens will become, and the Franco-British tandem itself will play an increasingly hostile role towards Russia.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.