U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Moscow on his latest mission to boost bilateral cooperation. According to press reports, Kerry may also raise for Moscow ‘s consideration new ideas regarding how to restart the deadlocked Russian-U.S. arms control process.

       A story in The Washington Post says that the Obama administration is considering how to achieve progress on several issues before it leaves office at the beginning of next year by taking executive actions that do not require approval of the Republican-dominated Congress, which would likely not be forthcoming.

       According to The Washington Post author, Josh Rogin, “Several U.S. officials briefed on the options told me they include declaring a “no first use” policy for the United States’ nuclear arsenal, … seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution affirming a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons… offering Russia a five-year extension of the New START treaty’s limits on deployed nuclear weapons… cancel or delay development of a new nuclear cruise missile… take most deployed nukes off of “hair trigger” alert… cut back long-term plans for modernizing the nation’s nuclear arsenal.”

       Obama might plausibly accept some of these proposals. The president has renewed efforts to secure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Russia has ratified but the U.S. Senate has not. Even if the Senate were to give its approval, China, Pakistan, India, North Korea and other countries would also have to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. Pyongyang’s ratification is, under its current regime, implausible. Securing a UN resolution might reinforce the current great power moratorium on nuclear testing, but it would not offer new barriers on North Korea’s nuclear testing, which continues despite Russian and U.S. opposition.

       Cutting back U.S. spending on nuclear weapons modernization would accord with Obama’s genuine wishes. It would also accord with U.S. fiscal realities, since the current modernization plan is underfunded. But the new U.S. president who takes office could easily reverse such plans. The same is true with any change in the peacetime alert level of U.S. nuclear forces.

       I doubt the Obama administration would propose a “nuclear-first-use” policy. Such a step would alarm U.S. allies, who depend on U.S. extended security guarantees for their defense. In the absence of such guarantees, they would have to strengthen their own defenses, possibly through the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons. Donald Trump might accept such an outcome, but President Obama likely would understand the proliferation risks of playing around with U.S. security pledges.

       The most interesting issue is the proposal to extend the New START Treaty beyond 2021. Obama might want to do this to constrain the options of the next U.S. president, who would find it difficult to demand a return or shorter deadline. It could also weaken arguments for spending more on U.S. nuclear modernization.

       Even so, the Senate would rightly see such an action as circumventing its right to advise and consent on international treaties involving the US. I would also consider it unlikely that the Kremlin would agree to a proposal from a lame duck U.S. administration that would constrain its own freedom of action and may not be acceptable to the next American president.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.