The lessons of the Korean War are especially important for Russia. At the time, by trying to expand its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union put its own international prestige at stake by stretching its relations with the West to a breaking point – risking the disintegration of the still nascent United Nations and almost turning the Cold War into a hot one.

       We remember June 22, 1941 well – for Russia, it marked the start of one of the most tragic historical upheaval of the 20th century. Yet few people remember June 25, the date when the Korean War of 1950-1953 began.

       The Korean War is considered a localized conflict, although it was the largest since World War II and claimed several million lives. It is also called the unknown war or the forgotten war, and its chronicles remain hidden in archives. Its lessons were wasted, many of its heroes left unknown, and its victims buried secretly in a foreign land.

       The Korean War was the first serious test for the United Nations, only recently established by the victors of WWII. The Cold War was unfolding and all but escalating into a global conflict supplied with weapons of mass destruction. Under the circumstances, the great powers were tempted to meet their own ambitions, reneging on reciprocal promises and defying the logic of compromise and collective action.

       Only now that the United Nations has gained real opportunities to work effectively in line with its own Charter can we rightly assess the risks and inadequacy of Cold War policies.

       In the middle of the 1940s, following the end of WWII, the victors were portioning out spheres of influence and establishing the United Nations as a means of accommodating their own interests as well as taking collective international action. With the surrender of the Japanese shortly after the fall of Berlin, the map of Asia, like that of Europe, was placed on the drawing board and primed for fresh conflict.

       The Cairo Declaration, adopted by the Allies in 1943, first stated their intention that “Korea shall be free and independent.” The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that Korea would be divided at the 38th parallel into Northern and Southern zones of military occupation following the Japanese surrender. In August 1945, Soviet forces entered from the North, and American troops landed in the South in September of the same year.

       On March 20, 1946, the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Joint Commission began drafting recommendations on the membership of the Korean transitional democratic government. From the start, the commission’s work was fraught with conflicting Soviet and American views on democracy. Eventually, the process ended in a deadlock, and the United States submitted the Korean issue to the United Nations.

       It was in many ways the turning point for future Soviet-American involvement in the region.

       Parliamentary elections took place in the Southern zone in May 1948 under the supervision of the UN transitional commission (the U.S.S.R. refused to admit UN representatives in the North). The Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Seoul on August 15, 1948. The authority of the U.S. military administration was terminated. That same summer, communists in the North proclaimed their own state under Soviet patronage. Kim Il-Sung was appointed prime minister. The new state claimed a mandate over the entire country.

       Meanwhile, these events took place against the backdrop of acute aggravation in Soviet-U.S. relations, and it was no coincidence. Cold War escalation followed its own logic: Stalinist diplomacy took a confrontational line towards the West across the board. On August 25, 1948, the U.S.S.R. severed diplomatic relations with the United States under the pretext that the Americans were holding two Soviet teachers against their will (Washington reported that the teachers decided to stay in American custody of their own accord).

       On December 12, 1948, the UN General Assembly recognized the South Korean government in Seoul as the country’s lawful government and recommended the withdrawal of military occupation. On December 25, the Soviet Union declared that it had pulled its troops out of North Korea. This notwithstanding, both super powers continued building up their presence on the Korean Peninsula, and the mutual antagonism of the two Korean regimes was increasingly apparent.

       Under the circumstances, a direct clash between the North and South was just a matter of time. On June 25, 1950, North Korea mounted a military offensive on the Republic of Korea. That same day, the UN Security Council convened to discuss the Korean issue at the request of the United States. It adopted a resolution demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean troops South of the 38th parallel.

       On July 7, 1950, the Security Council established a unified command over U.S.-led troops operating under the UN flag against North Korea. U.S. troops accounted for more than 90% of the UN force; sixteen other states deployed troops as well, while five dispatched medical units.

       Russia, China, and North Korea still consider these actions unjustified. Historians and specialists in international law dispute their legitimacy and status. At the time, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Yakov Malik boycotted Security Council meetings and forfeited the right to veto.

       In January 1950, the UN Security Council rejected Soviet demands to exclude Chinese nationalists on the Island of Formosa, now Taiwan, from the UN. In response, the Soviet delegation boycotted UN meetings for eight months. This was an automatic excuse to regard all Security Council resolutions adopted during this period as illegitimate.

       The inadequacy of the UN Charter and other international norms in the event of open confrontation between the super powers became particularly pronounced with the onset of the Korean War. To overcome the stalemate in the Security Council as a result of the Soviet boycott, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested a plan in October 1950 to expand the UN mandate for repelling aggression by granting the General Assembly the right to act in lieu of the Security Council if it failed to achieve consensus among its permanent members.

       The Korean War witnessed fast and dramatic changes in the tide of victory. The two sides crossed back and forth across the 38th parallel, and, more than once, the capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang changed hands.

       Initially, China became concerned by the success of American and South Korean troops. In response, it sent 180,000 so-called volunteers to the frontline. In reality, these were regular troops acting under orders. Within a month, their strength reached half a million. Gen. McArthur suggested striking at Chinese territory to the North of the Yalu River and even the possibility of using nuclear weapons. President Harry Truman rejected the plan for fear it might entangle the United States in a third world war against the Soviet Union and China.

       In early 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman in the White House. He threatened China with the use of nuclear force if Beijing refused to accept an armistice in Korea. With Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet foreign policy also became more restrained. On July 27, 1953, the two sides reached an armistice agreement in Panmunjom, near the 38th parallel. Korea was divided into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.

       There were no winners in the Korean War. The North and South have not signed a peace treaty to this day. American troops are still deployed at the 38th parallel under the UN flag, causing incessant protests on behalf of North Korea.

       In some estimates, 2.5 million people perished in the war on both sides, of them one million are Chinese losses. And, in the almost sixty years since, the international community has remained on the horns of a dilemma in which a growing emphasis on collective action has superseded the validity of unilateral responses to conflicts or acts of terror, which may be less powerful but more urgently needed.

       The lessons of the Korean War are especially important for Russia. At the time, by trying to expand its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union put its own international prestige at stake by stretching its relations with the West to a breaking point – risking the disintegration of the still nascent United Nations and almost turning the Cold War into a hot one. The logic of compromise and collective action was sacrificed to the promotion of ideologically motivated geopolitical interests, and the result was a complex and often bitter legacy that we would do well to learn from today.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.