The rise of the French-British tandem has met with a positive reaction from the United States. Washington succeeded in blocking the EU Mediterranean partnership, managed to devalue the role of the Mediterranean Union as an autonomous project and resumed cooperation with France on security issues.

       This autumn is marked by an unprecedented activation of the French and British diplomacy. On September 1, the International Conference on Libya opened in Paris with France and Britain as its key participants. On October 5, four representatives of Russia and China vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution worked out by Britain and France imposing sanctions against Syria. On October 11 NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu said the alliance had nearly completed the United Defender” operation in Libya, initiated by Paris and London. In summer the Defense Ministers of Britain and France also had an opportunity to strengthen cooperation on their navy policy.

       These events show a significant change in the British and French policy. Over the past half century, London and Paris have not proposed any independent global military or political initiatives. Since the Suez crisis in 1956, these two countries have preferred to work in cooperation with the United States as part of NATO (during the Kosovo War in 1999) or with the U.S. approval (during the Falklands War in 1982). Now the situation has changed. Britain and France are trying to regain the role of active players in global politics, which they lost in the 1950s, and Washington is fully aware and even encourages it.

       After the collapse of the British and French empires, neither power made any attempts to pursue an active policy outside Europe. Britain established a special relationship with the United States, which involved (1) the interaction on defense and political issues and (2) inclusion of the British nuclear arsenals in the American system of nuclear planning. France pursued the Gaullist policy and tried to become independent from the United States. But French Gaullism was of regional character as it aimed at strengthening the European integration process and achieving the EU's military and political independence from NATO. France acted cautiously in its former African colonies, supporting loyal leaders through education of the elite, diplomacy and arms supplies. Both Britain and France were experiencing the syndrome of colonial empires’ collapse.

       By the early 2010s, Britain and France seemed to have recovered from this syndrome. In the first decade after World War II, both Paris and London have been putting forward political and defense projects in regard to Africa and the Middle East. The experience of the Libyan War proved that such projects may involve military operations outside Europe. Pressure on Syria demonstrates that Britain and France are ready to take action in their former colonies. The British and French politics seem to be similar to the 1940s, when both states sought the status of full-fledged great powers.

       Another trend is the growing interaction between the British and French policies. Since mid-1960s Paris and London had different strategic priorities. Britain viewed the future of the European Community and the European Union in cooperation with the United States and NATO. By contrast, France advocated European Union’s independence from NATO and therefore cooperated with continental Europe, especially Germany. Paris, Berlin and Rome considered Britain an autonomous power, which distanced itself from the integration process and was lobbying Washington’s interests.

       However, during Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to London (March 26, 2008) the parties agreed to extend the format of bilateral cooperation. France's return to NATO military organization (March 2009) added the material and technical basis to this cooperation. On November 2, 2010 Britain and France signed a declaration on cooperation in defense and security for the period of 50 years. The NATO operation in Libya served as a precedent for the implementation of these agreements. The leading role in the EU, which previously belonged to the French-German tandem, now seems to be played by the French-British union. This turnabout may lead to new divisions in the EU.

       First, the formation of the French-British tandem means that France stopped pursuing the Gaullist policy. Paris does not criticize the American influence on Europe anymore. The French-British Declaration of 2010 stressed that "NATO remains the main guarantor of security in Europe." Moreover, the increased cooperation with London emphasizes the desire of Paris to strengthen the transatlantic relationship.

       Second, Paris is reviewing the concept of France's potential nuclear independence. The French-British Declaration of 2010 pointed out that NATO would remain a nuclear alliance, and the French and British nuclear forces would jointly implement a policy of deterrence. But the British nuclear arsenal was included in the American system of nuclear planning in 1962. Thus, strengthening the French-British cooperation in the nuclear field, which is provided by the French-British Declaration of 2010, reinforces American influence on France’s nuclear policy.

       Third, France is trying to relate to the United States and Britain its policy in the Mediterranean. Since the late 1980s Paris and Rome have been discussing the idea of creating a special "Mediterranean Space." The Barcelona Conference (1995) launched the process of EU cooperation with the countries in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Britain and Portugal blocked the project of setting up an autonomous Mediterranean NATO group. However, in 2008 at the initiative of France, the Mediterranean Union was established. The Libyan War in the NATO format blocked those initiatives. It proved that the EU without the United States is not yet able to maintain control over its own "security zone." France seems to have failed as the leader of the autonomous NATO Mediterranean Union, which objectively diminishes the influence of Paris in the European Union.

       Fourth, new tensions have appeared in the traditional French-German tandem. Under Jacques Chirac, the French-German tandem was the basis of the EU. Paris was always supported by Berlin on key issues. Moreover, Germany had a strong partner to criticize Washington and strengthen its military and political independence. Now with the establishment of the French-British tandem Germany realized it is becoming an outsider. Germany remained on the sidelines of NATO’s Libyan operations. Berlin is rendering less support to the French initiatives in the Mediterranean or the strengthening of the EU. German policy is becoming more independent from Paris. Hence, Germany’s wish is to lift restrictions on German sovereignty (according to the Moscow Treaty of 1990).

       However, the rise of the French-British tandem has met with a positive reaction from the United States. Washington succeeded in blocking the EU Mediterranean partnership, managed to devalue the role of the Mediterranean Union as an autonomous project and resumed cooperation with France on security issues. The Obama administration welcomed the strengthening of partnership between Paris and London. From the White House viewpoint the EU with the French-British tandem at its core is far more loyal than when France and Germany played the leading roles.

       However, in the long term the establishment of the French-British tandem weakens rather than strengthens the European Union. Over the past half a century the EU was the French-German project: it was based on the union of Germany’s economic potential and France’s defense and political potential. The rise of the French-British tandem automatically makes the EU more “pro-Atlantic,” dependent on the mechanism of NATO and U.S. presence in Europe. This may cause some dissatisfaction with the French policy in continental Europe.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.