The aim of the protests was quite simple. The political process behind the demonstrations against Vladimir Putin and for fair elections has now become irreversibly transformed into a technological one.

       ValdaiClub.com interviewed Alexei Mukhin, President of the Center for Political Information.

       What was the aim of the protests of May 6-9?

       The aim of the protests was quite simple. The political process behind the demonstrations against Vladimir Putin and for fair elections has now become irreversibly transformed into a technological one. On the one hand, for the rank and file demonstrators, it was an adrenaline rush, a way of trying to provoke a response from the OMON riot police, and on the other hand, for the organizers, it was a revolutionary protest with a provocative subtext. The purpose of the protests for the organizers was undoubtedly to pick a fight with the law enforcement agencies, because the authorities used to be able to stamp these developments out. On the whole, the authorities acted according to entirely understandable logic – if there is a standoff between OMON and the demonstrators then that is a standoff between society and the state. But if there is a fight between two opposition rallies with politically opposing viewpoints then that’s a struggle within society itself, with the authorities acting as peacemaker.

       During the election cycle in 2011-2012, there was a difference of opinion in society, which found its way into the voting. The situation has now changed radically and the organizers succeeded to some extent in creating a confrontational scenario between society and the state, due to a lack of decisive action on the part of the authorities and a certain loss of control by them over the way events unfolded.

       This process was organized in a highly professional manner, by a very important client. In this case the client was more than likely one of Russia’s rivals in the economic sphere, and is probably to be found among the G7 countries. There is even a theory that this is precisely the reason why Vladimir Putin refused to attend the G8 summit at Camp David and will now only be going to the G20 summit.

       In the future the techniques and methods of carrying out these types of events will become even more radical, since the organizers need to capture the attention of the public, who will be looking on with interest at the development of this mud wrestling bout.

       Why did the conflict escalate? Why did the participants of a peaceful protest break through the cordon and start throwing pieces of asphalt at OMON officers, who in turn used extreme brutality in carrying out mass arrests and breaking up the demonstration?

       It’s very simple. In the first instance the state reacted wholly appropriately to the protests, inviting the opposition to sit down and discuss how to achieve a constructive dialogue and cooperation. A portion of the opposition agreed to cooperate, one camp completely lost all interest in the protests and another camp became radicalized. I think in the future we can expect this uncooperative element to become marginalized, since radical acts are a big turn-off for a significant segment of the “angry citizenry” and cause them to simply turn their backs on the protest movement.

       The radical opposition will in turn attract other radical elements, not only in the capital but in the regions too, where this stratification in the opposition is very graphically illustrated. In this context it is worth noting that the formation of these types of groups falls under the jurisdiction of the Russian Criminal Code.

       Why the more radical protest leaders were so prominent – people like Alexei Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov? Where were the more moderate political and public figures like Gennady Gudkov, Sergei Mironov, Alexei Kudrin, Mikhail Prokhorov, Leonid Parfenov and Boris Akunin?

       It’s clear that the people you have just mentioned are not capable of the type of actions that are in the protestors’ arsenal. Carrying out such a fight calls for an absence of certain moral boundaries. Those politicians who are now taking part in the radical protests do not possess these moral boundaries.

       Sadly not a single one of the government or public officials proposed any alternative forms of cooperation between the authorities and the public. The parties followed the traditional route by issuing an invitation to cooperate to all members of the opposition. In the first instance this proved worthwhile, but in the second alas not. Moreover, the least sensible and constructive segment of the opposition ignored the ones who entered into a dialogue with the authorities, which has unfortunately led to disillusionment with the whole idea of cooperating with the authorities.

       The authorities should have collaborated more subtly and closely with the opposition representatives, but this did not happen for a number of reasons, one of which was the purely human factor of Kremlin officials and politicians believing that the incident had run its course and the opposition demands could continue to be ignored. This led to a change in the situation within the opposition movement and to the radicalization of a number of elements within it, who felt that the government had turned its back and so they could do whatever they wanted.

       How effective are “people’s strolls” and the protest camp at Chistiye Prudy (known as Occupy-Abai) likely to be as tactics?

       The aim of the organizers of these actions is very simple. It’s nothing to do with overthrowing the government or taking over the reigns of the country themselves. Their goal is to discredit the government leaders and Vladimir Putin personally. What’s more, the strategy used in these campaigns is very clever: one segment of the opposition tries to provoke the police to clamp down on the protests and launch counter-attacks against the demonstrators, while another segment takes peaceful strolls and organizes flashmobs. Putting the two pictures side by side can make it look like the police are attacking peaceful citizens out on a walk, for no apparent reason. This isn’t aimed at a domestic audience, because Russians understand perfectly well what is happening on Moscow’s streets, but at foreign viewers, primarily those in the West, who shape public opinion, which is firmly against so-called authoritarian regimes. That is the reason behind setting up the protest camp at Chistyie Prudy and the “people’s strolls.”

       Do you think it is possible that the radical opposition will refocus on audiences here at home, in the regions for example? Or do Russian audiences not need any of this?

       The opposition as a whole gained huge political capital from September 2011 when Dmitry Medvedev announced he was not going to run for a second term as president, because he was heading the United Russia list and because Vladimir Putin was going to run for president. Many people were unimpressed by this job swap and it unleashed significant protest potential, which the opposition has made use of. This capital did not exist before, which is why the opposition was in “sleep mode.”

       The opposition is making every effort to profit from this capital – on the one hand inside Russia, trying to galvanize the disaffected in society and prod them into action. But it should be noted that any disaffection is on a purely emotional and psychological level, since no clear economic or political slogans have been put forward. An analysis of the Internet space clearly shows that the primary campaign strategy operates on the emotional level, with calls to attack the police, but without any other slogans on offer. On the other hand, the opposition is trying to gain an advantage from this political capital in the West and is working hard, as part of the campaign which I have already talked about, to discredit the top leader of the country Vladimir Putin.

       This kind of diversification in the distribution of political capital is typical of the Russian opposition, and it has to be understood that this process is essentially market-based, with little connection to constructive politics. It is an entirely destructive political fight. I honestly spent a lot of time in discussions with the opposition trying to find just the slightest trace of any kind of rational or positive idea, alternatives to those put forward by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev for political party reforms, but all I was met with were destructive, negative demands.

       What sort of future do you see for the For Fair Elections movement? Will there be a schism between the radicals and those who want to follow a peaceful path of protest?

       In the near future a segment of activists from this movement will go back into sleep mode, largely because a part of the opposition, especially those from the artistic intellectual community, have run out of money and need to work and earn a living. That is why a lot of them have already left or are leaving the protests. Another segment, significantly smaller in number, is working to ensure fair and transparent regional elections. As a result the topic of elections is becoming less prominent, but since the protest organizers want to keep the adrenaline going, and are determined to use all means to do so, a whole range of politico-technological issues will be raised, which will require real political demands, but there won’t be any.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.