Russia is facing many urgent development problems and the main goal of foreign policy is to create favorable conditions for their resolution. Policy today and especially in the next few years will be determined by constantly changing external circumstances, which are so unpredictable that no strategy is possible at all.
Valdaiclub.com interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, participant of the VIII summit of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Editor–in–Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal.
Is Russia likely to face abrupt changes in its foreign policy after the elections in 2012?
No, it isn’t. First, there are no abrupt changes underway in Russia in general. On the contrary, continuity prevails across the board. President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will only switch positions. Both will remain in power. Medvedev has pursued the tandem’s line rather than his own in 2008-2011. Putin’s return may change the style or shift some accents but that’s about it.
Second, the window of opportunity is narrow. Russia is facing many urgent development problems and the main goal of foreign policy is to create favorable conditions for their resolution. This goal allows for broad interpretation and can be achieved in different ways but the restrictions are obvious – to preserve freedom of action without allowing its relations with major partners to deteriorate too much.
Third, policy today and especially in the next few years will be determined by constantly changing external circumstances, which are so unpredictable that no strategy is possible at all. All you can do is react and stay flexible.
Many Russian and foreign experts believe that the Russian-American reset will go nowhere after 2012 and Russia will reorient its foreign policy to China and the new Asia. Do you share this view?
The two countries have successfully completed the reset. They have normalized relations and ended the deadlock that had resulted by the end of the George W. Bush administration. The reset had a limited agenda and was achieved. New elements are required in any event, but they may not appear before the spring of 2013 – after the elections in Russia and the United States – when an empowered administration takes office and formulates its proposals.
Even if Russia reorients its foreign policy to China and the new Asia, which is not guaranteed, it will not regard America less important, as the U.S. is a major player in the Pacific.
The shifting of attention to this region may in fact renew Russian-U.S. relations by ending their fixation on the Euro-Atlantic space. The future of U.S. missile defense – not only in Europe but also probably in Asia – will remain an unavoidable irritant. As for Asia, this project will be a major factor with respect to China, although without threatening Russia’s strategic potential.
What will Russia gain from its Eurasian project? Do you think China will join this project? Is it a threat to the European countries?
If you are referring to the Eurasian Union proclaimed by Vladimir Putin, there is one country, Ukraine that will determine whether this project will produce a serious and promising association or will remain just an interesting idea. Russia and the European Union (EU) will be competing, first and foremost, over Ukraine, to the extent to which the EU will be able to divert itself from its urgent internal issues.
The EU’s nervous reaction to this idea shows its apprehensions about the emergence of an integration alternative for post-Soviet countries, though it is not yet convinced that this alternative will be successful.
China will never join projects proposed by other countries because it is a project in itself. Beijing does not like the Eurasian Union idea because it wants to create a vast Eurasian free trade zone where China would be able to freely sell its goods, manpower and capital. Integration centered on another power, Russia, may restrict this goal.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.