While the recent U.S. National Security Strategy clearly takes a harder line regarding Russia and the value of hard power and economic sanctions as policy instruments than the 2010 Strategy, one has to closely read the 2014 and 2010 Russian Doctrines to see the few major differences.

       The most recent version of the Russian Military Doctrine is not a major departure from the previous 2010 version. While the recent U.S. National Security Strategy clearly takes a harder line regarding Russia and the value of hard power and economic sanctions as policy instruments than the 2010 Strategy, one has to closely read the 2014 and 2010 Russian Doctrines to see the few major differences.

       In its press release announcing the new doctrine, the Russian Security Council justified the revisions as needed to take into account legislation that had appeared since 2010, as well as recent changes in the structure and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, and the need to guide development and acquisition of a new generation of weapons systems. Only a few paragraphs appear to directly respond to the Ukraine conflict or other recent developments.

       Despite some earlier speculation that the Russian government would announce some kind of preemptive nuclear strike doctrine, the text actually deemphasizes the Russian doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts. This concept was never very credible given the disconnect between the limited stakes at issue and the risks of inadvertent escalation.

       Russia’s stronger conventional capabilities now mean that Russia can achieve its military objectives throughout the Soviet periphery without the need for unconventional weapons; though Russian strategists are still developing the precise meaning of "non-nuclear deterrence," Russia clearly need not fear military attacks from its direct neighbors. The Doctrine notes that the risk of a great power war remains small, so Russia can continue to concentrate on building up its capacity for local wars in nearby countries. Putin was right when he asserted that he could capture Kiev in a matter of weeks, though this is evidently not his plan.

       Although China is building up its military power, no one in Beijing, Moscow, or Washington expects to see China or Russia come into direct conflict anytime soon over China’s latent territorial claims over Siberia or anything else. Chinese and Russian military strategists presumably welcome not having to worry about a two-front war since they constantly face security challenges along the rest of their periphery.

       Another doctrinal novelty is the new emphasis on the Russian military’s role in defending Moscow’s interests in the Arctic region, though this was foreshadowed by the creation of a separate Arctic Command and seems logical given Russia’s growing economic interest in its potential northern riches.

       I find the Doctrine’s mixture of internal and external challenges, covering a wide range of social phenomenon, interesting. The Security Council highlighted such new challenges as those presented by the global growth of religious extremism, ethnic violence, state separatism, the decline of patriotism in Russian youth, the “intensification of global competition,” the “rivalry of value orientations and models of development,” and the “indirect action” tactics of “leading states” (i.e., NATO members) – their manipulation of popular protests, extremist organizations, private security companies, and other tools and agents against legitimate independent governments. In describing Russia’s “hybrid warfare” tactics in Ukraine, Western analysts list many of the same non-kinetic challenges but ascribe them to Russia.

       All of this comes with one big caveat however. Military Doctrine can enlighten readers as to a country’s security priorities and general national security strategy, but it is hardly a definitive guide to future strategy and tactics. Doctrine tends to lag behind and mirror rather than lead the development of actual policies. Russian leaders’ security views have changed far less in recent years than Russia’s capabilities, which have rebounded. In particular, the Russian military has shown great skill recently at tactical and operational improvisation tailored to the requirements of a contingency. Russian leaders also regularly refer to their nuclear deterrent, despite its de-emphasis in the current doctrine

       Whereas the new U.S. National Security Strategy refers to Russian “aggression”, “belligerence,” and related terms almost a dozen times, Russia follows Chinese practices in only indirectly referring to U.S. military threats. But my impression is that Russian and Chinese military planners are much more focused on the Pentagon in their force and contingency planning than is the U.S. military, whose attention is dispersed across North Korea, Iran, ISIS, and countless other security threats.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.