The international situation in 2011 was extremely turbulent, it was a year of fundamental geopolitical, geoeconomic and popular shifts in the Middle East. Like the rest of the world, Russia tried to adapt itself to the situation, at least to minimize the damage. For Russia it was necessary to react, and fortunately not to participate directly.
On January, 19 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a press conference on 2011 foreign policy outcomes. Valdaiclub.com asked Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor–in–Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, to share his views on the Russian foreign policy in 2011 and to assess its drawbacks and strong points.
How do you assess the results of Russian foreign policy in 2011, what were its drawbacks and what were its strong points during the year?
The international situation in 2011 was extremely turbulent, it was a year of fundamental geopolitical, geoeconomic and popular shifts in the Middle East and this change sent waves through the neighbouring regions and through global affairs as well. So Russia, like everybody else, like the other great powers, was caught by surprise. Like the rest of the world, it tried to adapt itself to the situation, at least to minimize the damage. For Russia it was necessary to react, and fortunately not to participate directly.
The most interesting, although still unclear, decision was to practically endorse or, to be more correct, not to block the decision to use force in Libya. And that was seen early last year as almost a big change in Russian foreign policy, because previously Russia never took such decisions. The Russian position used to be very firm in not accepting interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. But this time Russia decided to abstain, which actually allowed NATO and the Arab countries to invade Libya and to change the regime there. That was seen as a major shift. Later developments, however, showed that this was an exception and afterwards, assessing the results of that decision, Russia came back to its traditional stance, which we still see in the Syrian case. Russia is still playing games against foreign interference, which Foreign Minister Lavrov repeatedly said during his annual press conference.
Outside the Libyan vote, motivation for which is still unidentified, the Eurasian integration, the first Customs Union entering into force, and then Vladimir Putin's idea about the transformation of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space into the Eurasian Union, was maybe the most important conceptual decision. It seems that 2011 just defined the key guidelines for Russian foreign policy in years to come.
What about the failure to see Ukraine in the Customs Union?
This is a long-term idea. It doesn't seem now that Ukraine is ready to take this decision. Meanwhile the situation in Ukraine is changing very rapidly, and not because of a Russian change. The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is changing rather because of internal domestic Ukrainian developments rather than because of Russian behaviour or Russian goals. We saw last year that Ukraine tried to intensively maneuver between Russia and the West, using some very strange and inefficient moves vis-a-vis both sides. And finally by the end of 2011 the Ukrainian political situation was quite confusing and diffused, and the relationship both with Russia and the European Union is rather problematic. So Russia’s stance is to be patient and to wait, and not to try to force Ukraine into something but to wait. Russia understands that the Ukrainian situation is pretty difficult and its leaders will need to take decisions sooner or later. And there is not much to choose between, because the European Union in 2011 finally ceased to be a major player in the post-Soviet area, the Europeans are completely bogged down in their internal troubles, financial, economic and political crises. So Ukraine is starting to lose the so-called European choice, which used to be a key element of Ukrainian self-identification.
And as regards Europe, what are the main benchmarks of Russia's relations with Europe?
In 2011 nothing happened, for understandable reasons. The European Union is completely occupied with its domestic problems. There is not much to discuss, there are no ambitious plans anymore. There is business as usual, day to day. Maybe the only practical result of 2011 for the relationship with the European Union is Russia’s joining the WTO, because WTO membership will change something, not much but something in terms of a feeling of safety for foreign investors, first of all European investors in Russia. The big, if not the only, topic for discussion between Russia and the European Union was visa-free movement, which has not proceeded too much, has not been very successful, except for some minor steps. Apart from that nothing happened, the agenda is almost empty.
What about relations with the United States? Did the reset fail?
No, the reset didn't fail, the reset was exceptionally successful but the reset was over by late 2010, maximum early 2011. The whole agenda, the whole program of reset has been completed, implemented and exhausted. What happens next? Nothing, because the sides are not able to develop a new agenda, a new framework for their relationship, and there is no chance that such an agenda will be developed in 2012 because both Russia and the United States are in the middle of presidential election campaigns, and election campaigns are traditionally a very unpleasant and unsuccessful time for any kind of foreign policy initiatives. So the aim for 2012 will be to minimize damage caused by the election campaigns. The year 2011 was pretty uneventful in terms of our bilateral agenda. The only result was negative, given the conclusion that any kind of cooperation on the missile defense project is not possible for the time being. This conclusion was important to make but not very positive.
What about the Asian vector of Russian foreign policy, Russia's relations with China?
The Asian vector objectively tends to become more important. Russian foreign policy in 2011 was less vocal and less intense in terms of Asian vector development than 2010, because in 2010 we had a very clear shift in repairing, in practical moves vis-a-vis Asia which was not continued in the same way in 2011. But despite that it's absolutely obvious that the Asian vector will become stronger and stronger in Russian foreign policy behaviour and maybe the most important topic for the next president of the Russian Federation will be how to develop a new framework, a new model for the relationship with China. China is gradually becoming Russia's most important neighbour.
What do you expect from Russian foreign policy in 2012?
It is not likely that Russian foreign policy for 2012 will be very active. Most likely it will remain reactive, Russia will try to respond, reply to numerous outside challenges. Those challenges will grow in number and Russia, which is highly dependent on foreign policy and the international developments, the international situation, should be very cautious. The main principle of Russian foreign policy should be most likely the medical one – do not harm. The rhetoric may change, because if Vladimir Putin comes back, and we know that his style is different from Dmitry Medvedev's style, much more aggressive, but in terms of real moves, Putin will be quite cautious and try to minimize damage caused by outside factors.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.