The international standing of Belarus largely depends on Lukashenko’s negotiating tactics, which he has been using in his relations with Russia quite successfully.

       President Vladimir Putin has departed for his first foreign visit to Belarus, although his agenda initially called for his attendance at the G8 summit in the United States. Moreover, he has held his first meetings with foreign leaders following his inauguration, with the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Sochi on May 11-12. This is a clear indication of Russia’s foreign policy choices.

       On the other hand, the significance of first visits is relative. Mikhail Saakashvili made his first foreign visit as the Georgian president to Russia and only later did he go to the West for serious talks. The symbolism of the first foreign visit is a new concept in Russian political culture and society, something that, in fact, is more amusing than actually significant. Relatively recently, no one cared where Gorbachev, Andropov or Chernenko went on their first visits as heads of state.

       But if you accept this symbolism, you should play by its rules. The first foreign visit must not end badly. Therefore, contentious issues should not be put on the agenda and should not be discussed publicly during this visit. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev met with his Belarusian counterpart in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, the other day. The meeting went incredibly smoothly, and Medvedev said that Russian-Belarusian relations had entered a very good period.

       Relations between Russia and Belarus are much more complicated than the smooth image of the first symbolic visit. The downside of the Customs Union is that the Russian regions’ transit and logistic capabilities will face competition from Belarus and Kazakhstan. I wrote for the Valdai Club in the past that the transit potential of Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway could be seriously undermined by the creation of a common customs space with Kazakhstan, which is a shorter route from China to Europe than the Russian Far East and Siberia.

       Integration with Belarus is fraught with major risks for Russia’s western regions. For example, major logistics and customs checkpoint plans for the Smolensk Region will be a waste of funds within the framework of the Customs Union with Belarus. Besides, EU companies shipping their products to Russia complain that customs clearance takes much more time and effort at Belarusian checkpoints and that the Customs Union’s Customs Code is an unfinished document that is much worse than Russia’s customs legislation. No wonder they are losing interest in exports to Russia.

       Alexander Lukashenko will now have more opportunities to practice the tactic of maneuvering between Russia and the EU. When Ukraine’s relations with the EU rapidly deteriorated following Yulia Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, the European political community decided that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych is a worse monster than even Lukashenko. This offers the Belarusian president more opportunities for contacts and subsequently for launching a dialogue with the EU.

       The international standing of Belarus largely depends on Lukashenko’s negotiating tactics, which he has been using in his relations with Russia quite successfully. First, he often deviates from a coordinated policy, making new demands, requests and complaints, and then tones down his statements in order to ultimately receive at least part of what he initially wanted at diplomatic talks. A vivid example is the gas talks, during which Belarusian leader often rejects Russia’s proposals and says that Belarus is crucial for Russia’s energy transit to Europe and military security. This creates the right environment for talks and concessions.

       In short, Belarus will likely continue to use this relatively efficient tactic of diplomatic negotiations.

       Second, Lukashenko continues to maneuver between Russia and the European Union. When tensions at bilateral negotiations peak, he says that Belarus can choose between a pro-Russia and a pro-EU vector of development. Such statements are usually complemented by a thaw on the domestic political stage, the release of political prisoners, permission for opposition rallies, etc. By doing this, the Belarusian government pretends to opt for closer cooperation with the EU, or indicates that it is not leaning towards Russia too strongly. Such maneuvers force Russia to act more flexibly and to make major concessions at the talks.

       This is not a thickheaded, uncompromising strategy, but a smart diplomatic negotiating tactic.

       And lastly, symbols are not inflexible at all, as can be seen from the process of choosing the country for Putin’s first foreign visit on the Kremlin website. The announcement that the Russian president would make his first foreign visit to Belarus was made on May 16. On May 25, it was accompanied by the news that the first foreign visit would be a three-destination tour of Belarus, Germany and France. In the event of any problems, Belarus could be presented as a mere stopover on the way to the leading European countries.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.