The Uzbek government has announced its freezing its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Islam Karimov believes that membership in a Russia-led alliance can harm the chances for fruitful cooperation with America. The situation in Central Asia is not stable today and will be much worse in years to come. Russia unlike US cannot withdraw and forget, this is vital area for Russian security.
The Uzbek government has announced its freezing its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian led military and political alliance, which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The news was unexpected, even Uzbek diplomats were confused when their Russian counterparts informally asked for an explanation. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Tashkent earlier in June, and both sides agreed that talks with Uzbek leader Islam Karimov were very constructive. Despite this, Uzbekistan has again decided to withdraw. It had done it previously in 1999, rejoining in 2006. Formally member states cannot freeze their membership, only leave, so this decision by Tashkent appears strange.
What can be behind this move? Development of CSTO and its transformation into real military-political alliance is a major priority for Moscow, which anticipates an escalation in tension in region after the expected US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan 2014. CSTO is one of oldest structures in the post-Soviet area – it was established 20 years ago (ironically it was initially called Tashkent treaty). Until quite recently the CSTO was not much more than a club of “friends of Russia”, without clear and firm commitments.
Since 2009-2010, when the atmosphere became tenser in the area, around Afghanistan, Kirgizstan etc., Russia started to pay attention to the security situation there, and the CSTO is seen as the most promising instrument to address it. Russia’s intentions met various degrees of enthusiasm in different member states, but Tashkent used to be most skeptical and reluctant among them all. Practically any Russian proposal to deepen integration in this field was refused by Uzbekistan. The country is suspicious of multilateral formats and prefers bilateral ties with different partners. Tashkent wants to keep flexibility and avoid choices. The question for Russia is, whether trying to endlessly achieve consensus is better than to let those unwilling go and work with those willing.
Uzbekistan has a tricky record with the US. In 2001 when Washington was preparing operations in Afghanistan, Tashkent signed a strategic declaration with the Americans, which paved the way to a strong US military presence in Uzbekistan. The massacre in Andizhan in 2005 stopped cooperation, but neither side denounced the declaration as such. Now interaction is increasing, and Tashkent, hopes to become a key partner of the US in this region after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. That is why Islam Karimov believes that membership in a Russia-led alliance can harm the chances for fruitful cooperation with America.
To what extend Tashkent is right in its calculation remains to be seen. The relationship with US is very unstable. Uzbekistan is, to put it softly, is far from being a truly democratic country, and social or political problems which are likely to emerge soon due to the economic crisis and personal problems inside the national leadership, can lead to rapidly increased tension with the US on domestic issues. Another factor of uncertainty is to what extent the US is ready to take responsibility for security in Central Asia after its exit from Afghanistan. Financial limitations for US strategy are obvious and growing, so Washington will need to choose priorities. Whether Central Asia will remain among them is open to question. Russia unlike US cannot withdraw and forget, this is vital area for Russian security.
The situation in Central Asia is not stable today and will be much worse in years to come – for objective reasons. Big geopolitical interests are focused here; all major players in today’s international affairs are present with their needs and demands – Russia, China, India, US, Iran, Turkey etc. Each country has right to choose its way to achieve security, permanent manoeuvring and non-alignment are legitimate ways as well.
But the stakes are high, as well as the risks to remain alone while facing major dangers. If the calculation is incorrect, one will pay much for mistakes.
Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor–in–Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, member of the Valdai Discussion Club.
This article was originally published in Russia Today
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.