Despite the urgency of the situation in Ukraine, Russia is well-positioned to benefit, and it would be a huge mistake not to press its advantages home. Nobody noticed the sincere pro-Russian attitudes in parts of the country, and in this sense the Crimean Maidan proved to be very useful – it showed the West a different Ukraine, one that is with neither the pro-Western forces nor the discredited government.

       Political scientist Piotr Dutkiewicz on how Russia could use the crisis in Ukraine to its advantage.

       Despite the urgency of the situation in Ukraine, Russia is well-positioned to benefit, and it would be a huge mistake not to press its advantages home.

       I’ll start from the beginning. The West, led by the European Union, was angry at being outmaneuvered by Vladimir Putin in the association agreement saga. For the EU this agreement had a purely political meaning, and EU representatives who were in charge of this process did not realize the urgency of the economic situation in Ukraine. They did not understand that financial aid was much more important to Ukraine at the moment than cultural and political declarations. The West felt deceived and this shaped its attitude to the Ukrainian issue.

       The West’s attitude has been one-sided ever since – a mix of three aspects of discontent. Clearly Ukrainians were displeased with their corrupt, semi-criminal regime. But it was also clear that the protesters sympathized with the West and felt European and that many of them were anti-Russian.

       All these feelings came together to form a simplified picture: Ukraine’s Russia-backed semi-criminal government strongly opposed European integration.

       What has public opinion missed?

       First, nobody noticed the sincere pro-Russian attitudes in parts of the country, and in this sense the Crimean Maidan proved to be very useful – it showed the West a different Ukraine, one that is with neither the pro-Western forces nor the discredited government.

       Second, the real financial situation in the country was not properly understood. In fact, Ukraine was going bankrupt. Everyone wanted to see a new anti-Russian, pro-Western government in Kiev, but few understood that they would have to pay for it from their own depleted coffers.

       Finally, and most importantly, few appreciated Ukraine’s enormous economic dependence on Russia. Russia is a market for Ukrainian goods and labor; without Russia, Ukraine simply cannot survive. In fact, Putin spoke about this, but the West refused to believe him.

       Only in the last two or three days has the Western press hinted that public opinion on Ukraine at home is more nuanced. The West has begun to realize that the Ukrainian knot cannot be untied without Russia and that Moscow holds many of the keys to resolving the situation.

       Now, in order to capitalize on the good position Russia finds itself in, it must avoid fuelling tensions in Crimea. It should enter talks not with the ambiguous and unstable interim government in Kiev, but with Ukraine and the EU in trilateral format.

       What trump cards does Russia have?

       First, it is free of any financial commitments to the new Ukrainian government.

       Second, Western politicians have just realized that not only does Russia have interests in Ukraine but Ukraine has tremendous interests in Russia. Again, this has just now dawned on Western politicians.

       And finally, Russia may press its advantage and make demands of the EU on Ukraine and other issues.

       Russia will not be responsible for the Ukrainian government or finance its economic policies, but simply by trading with Ukraine it will not let the country fall into a deep debt pit. In exchange, Russia may seek accommodation on numerous vital interests, for instance, the status of the Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine; the basing rights of the Black Sea Fleet; and, most likely, Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union. Both Russia and China have an interest in seeing Ukraine in the Customs Union, so this is a fairly realistic demand.

       To sum up, Russia stands to gain important leverage in exchange for retaining Ukraine’s privileged position in its economy. Brussels should be made a guarantor of any trilateral agreements along these lines. The EU may play a bigger role in this respect than individual European countries, because the EU can influence the IMF’s decision to provide loans to Ukraine.

       As for the legal aspects of Ukraine’s political crisis, while the coup was clearly unconstitutional and should be recognized as such, this was far from the first revolution of its kind. The international community should find a way to channel public outrage into a legal framework going forward. But for the time being Russia must accept the inevitable consequences of the events in Kiev pragmatically and without emotion, and turn its unexpected strategic advantages into diplomatic initiatives.

       This article was originally published in Russian in Известия newspaper on 28.02.2014.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.