The emergence of the Union State in the late 1990s was largely perceived as a paradox, when not forces but weaknesses united: in a situation when centrifugal tendencies were at their peak in Russia, and a further continuation of the "parade of sovereignties" seemed inevitable, Belarus, which was experiencing a chronic economic crisis, proposed to launch a process of mutual integration. The paradox, however, was only apparent: both participants immediately benefited from the unification, which at first was limited to the Customs Union.

       Russia received a symbolic resource in the form of confirmation of its integrative attractiveness, which played a significant role in the subsequent refraction of centrifugal tendencies into centripetal ones. Belarus, which had developed its industrial potential in a pan-Soviet context, received a market for its products and access to Russian energy resources, which allowed it to preserve its industrial identity and avoid the destructive processes of deindustrialisation and deurbanisation, which had reached a level of about 60% there prior to the break-up of the USSR.

       In the early 2000s, the Union State found itself under pressure from the Russian neo-liberal wing: it was expected that President Lukashenko would pursue large-scale privatisation, within the framework of which the main beneficiary would be Russian corporate interests. The lever of influence was thought to be Russian energy resources, for which Belarus was critically dependent on Russia. However, with the growth of world energy prices in the 2000s, Minsk discovered a lever of influence at home: Belarus, like Ukraine, was critical for the export of hydrocarbons to the West, which provided Russia with its main source of foreign currency. The result was a tough bargaining process in which Belarus, actively exploiting the political importance of the union factor for Russia, was able not only to survive, but also to preserve its political and economic system: the backbone of the Belarusian economy, about a dozen large industrial giants, remained the property of the Belarusian state.

       Up until 2020, the Union State remained at the level achieved by the beginning of the 2000s. Its main achievement was the humanitarian sphere, citizens of Belarus in Russia and citizens of Russia in Belarus were made equal in their rights to own property and access to medical services and education. In the economic sphere, tough bargaining remained, which, nevertheless, allowed for progress. Thus, Gazprom was able to acquire Beltransgaz, and in the 2010s, Russia began construction of a nuclear power plant in Ostrovets, on the border with Lithuania, which is currently operational. Politics remained an integral part of economic bargaining, and given the unfriendly attitude of the West, which declared Lukashenko "the last dictator of Europe" back in the early 2000s, the Belarusian president found a foothold in China. With the launch of China's Belt and Road Initiative, Belarus became the only logistics and technology hub outside of China, within its framework, the Great Stone technopolis and about 60 infrastructure facilities were built near Minsk.

       The Minsk agreements brought the West back to Belarus: having found itself in the role of a mediator, the West was forced to lift a significant part of the sanctions against Belarus. Minsk de facto opened its political and information space to pro-Western NGOs, which ultimately resulted in a coup d'état attempt in the 2020 elections.

       The Union State after 2020

       The attempted coup in Belarus, undertaken by the West against the backdrop of events in Ukraine, radically changed the views on the Union State in both Russia and Belarus. The Treaty on the Union State played an important role - its Article 7 implied the possibility of providing military assistance, and Russia's statements about the possibility of providing it played a significant stabilising role. After the events of 2020, the security component became the main one in the Russian-Belarusian dialogue, which immediately reduced the previous conflict between the two countries to almost zero. The removal of the irritation brought about by constant bargaining ensured an immediate increase in mutual trust, which at the international level resulted in Russia's assistance to the country’s accession to the SCO and to BRICS, as an associate member.

       With the beginning of the special military operation and the introduction of large-scale sanctions against Russia by the West, another resource of the Union State became relevant - the Belarusian industrial potential. Minsk has fully preserved not only its Soviet industrial heritage, but also the accompanying educational infrastructure. The relative abundance of qualified engineering personnel allowed for the immediate and large-scale deployment of import substitution programs, which turned Belarus into the second (along with the Urals), industrial heart of the Union State. Along with other things, this has also led to the emergence of new industries - currently, a joint-project to build a short-haul aircraft with Russia, the “Osvey”, is being implemented in Belarus.

       The military component also continued to develop. Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in Belarus, and the deployment of the latest "Oreshnik" system is planned.

       Prospects for the Union State

       Due to the high level of mutual trust between the two members of the Union State, we may assert that it has very significant prospects. Together, they boast a considerable volume of available resources which is exceptionally diverse.

       Geopolitics

       As the Ukrainian conflict moves into the completion phase, the role of Belarus is growing, both as a centre of attraction for Eastern Europe and as a military-strategic centre for containing Brussels and Warsaw. As a centre of gravity, Belarus realises its potential in relation to Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic states. In addition to the fact that the "Minsk platform" has retained its symbolic resonance as an attempt to peacefully settle the Ukrainian conflict, the Union State itself is a demonstration of an effective model of cooperation with Russia for them, an implemented alternative to the current militaristic course of action being pursued by Brussels. All this may become relevant if the current confrontation pitting Budapest and Bratislava against Brussels escalates. This will happen if Brussels decides to actually introduce disciplinary measures against them, up to the deprivation of voting rights, which would generate a deep crisis for the entire European Union. In relation to the Baltic states, primarily Lithuania, Belarus has become an attractive place for labour migration. The construction and then launch of the NPP in Ostrovets prompted the migration of specialists from Lithuania, previously involved in servicing the Ignalina NPP, which was closed by the EU. The further emergence of new industries near the NPP will strengthen this trend: Ostrovets will grow, largely fuelled by the migration of the remaining qualified personnel from Vilnius, which in the future risks becoming its satellite city. At the same time, the attractiveness of Belarus for the population of the Baltic countries has already become a problem for their governments, which are trying to suppress this trend with administrative and prohibitive measures.

       In relation to Poland and Brussels, the military-strategic component is becoming critical. The latest decisions taken in Poland indicate that the Polish leadership has taken a course towards restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth project from the time of Pilsudski, and within its framework will lay claim to at least the western Ukrainian regions, primarily Lvov and Ternopol. This trend, as strange as it may sound today, may receive some support from Brussels, even despite all the traditional contradictions between Brussels and Warsaw: the strengthening of Poland and its military expansion into the Ukrainian regions may be viewed in the EU as an instrument of containing and weakening Hungary and Slovakia. For the Union State, Poland’s appeal to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth project is an understandable and unconditional challenge, which in the long term will inevitably give rise to Polish ambitions in relation to the territory of western Belarus.

       Economy and the Global South

       The presence of the Great Stone Chinese technology park near Minsk creates the potential for turning Belarus into another technological point of “access to the global world”, within the framework of which the transfer and acceptance of modern technologies is carried out. The possibility of such a development vector is supported by Belarus’ current energy surplus, which removes restrictions on industrial development, and Belarus’ membership in the SCO and BRICS contains the potential for the political design of such a “transfer point”, the factor of high mutual trust between the Chinese and Belarusian leadership, the availability of human resources, and the presence of its own developed IT sector. The centre of the latter, the High-Tech Park, flourished until 2020, but has survived well after that. In addition, the centralised Belarusian political system, which allows for quick decision-making and equally quick and controlled implementation, is also a plus here.

       Russian-Belarusian economic projects

       Current cooperation between Russia and Belarus is most successfully implemented in the field of industrial cooperation: this includes cooperation in the production of BelAZ quarry dump trucks, agricultural machinery, trucks and municipal transport, and electric transport (power systems are supplied by Russia). Cooperation in the military-industrial complex is also successfully being implemented.

       The next issue is the digitalisation of industrial processes, especially since human resources are sufficient in terms of IT specialists. Minsk has ambitions to implement a platform approach here, like China does, but such a project can only be implemented as a joint one: on a Belarusian scale, such a project would be clearly redundant, but on the scale of the Union State, it may well be profitable.

       The country’s scientific and educational potential remains poorly utilised today: given that sovereignty in the field of chip production remains a promising goal, the issue of training specialists in complex computing systems is on the agenda. Such specialists are always in short supply, not only in the former Soviet countries, but also in the countries of the Global South, and the existing joint scientific and educational potential makes it possible to set such tasks.

       Conclusion

       After 2020, Russia and Belarus moved from inter-industry cooperation, which does not exclude conflict, since mutual deliveries can be replaced, to intra-industry cooperation, which excludes conflict: in a positive-sum game, only both participants can win, and it is impossible for one to win at the expense of the other. It is important that the gain is the newly created value, and there is no redistribution of previously created assets.

       This has led to a progressive increase in mutual trust at all levels, from the elite to the broad strata of both societies. In turn, this creates the prerequisites for planning and implementing ambitious joint projects in a variety of areas, from geopolitics to economics. In this context, the future of the Union State seems very interesting and promising.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.