The fact that talks have been held and two documents have been signed in Minsk is a positive sign and a step toward conflict de-escalation, especially considering the costs.

       However, the signed documents and the accompanying facts, events and statements have raised questions and fears.

       First, no decision has been reached on the hottest issue – Debaltseve. Fierce fighting can be expected to continue in the Debaltseve pocket and other places right up until the official ceasefire begins at 12 a.m. Kiev time on February 15. If the death toll on either side reaches 200-300 people by the deadline, any glimmer of peace would be stamped out. The probability of this is, unfortunately, very high.

       Furthermore, the Minsk agreements extend the deadline for the three most important issues – local elections, border control and constitutional reforms – until the end of 2015. Of course, these issues are closely interconnected, but the timeframe also shows that the sides mistrust each other and are afraid of losing face by being the first to act.

       The agreements have not formalized Ukraine’s foreign policy status as a nonaligned state, which is the root cause of the global conflict over Ukraine. President Francoise Hollande said at a news conference in early February that France was “opposed to Ukraine joining NATO,” which sounded to Russia like a promise that France would veto the admission of Ukraine to the bloc, as it did in Bucharest in 2008.

       There are openly contradictory provisions in the Minsk documents. For example, clause 10 stipulates the disarmament of all illegal groups, which clearly refers to the Donbas self-defense forces. However, one of the notes to the document mentions “the freedom to create people’s militia units by decision of local councils.”

       This could be a way to legalize the self-defense forces, which are unlikely to lay down their arms. It’s hard to imagine that Kiev would send its militia to the region.

       These contradictions are evidence that all the negotiating sides had to make concessions. The signatory parties, namely Poroshenko, the self-defense leaders and even Putin, will now need to convince their supporters back home that they have won.

       As for concessions, President Poroshenko’s “victory” is the omission of federalization and nonaligned status in the documents, which also mention Ukraine’s territorial integrity several times. Ukrainian pilot Nadezhda Savchenko is likely to be released soon. Poroshenko’s standing in Kiev is weak, and so he needs symbolic face-saving victories such as Savchenko’s release.

       The self-defense forces have been promised the restoration of all government mechanisms in their region, including pensions and benefits, which amount to lifting the economic blockade.

       As for Putin, he has won Hollande’s and Merkel’s support, which can improve his image and pave the way to the normalization of Russia’s relations with Europe, but not the West as a whole, because the United States stands apart from Europe.

       Relations between Moscow and Brussels could improve, and the EU could consider lifting sanctions this spring, although this possibility has not been put on paper, if the Minsk agreements are implemented on the ground. In this event, the economic operators’ negative expectations would not materialize and investment projects could be revitalized. This would have a beneficial effect on Russia’s economy.

       The granting of new IMF loans announced simultaneously with the Minsk talks and the ceasefire, if implemented, would prevent economic collapse in Ukraine in the short term. However, the strategic goals of economic development and normalization of relations in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle have not been achieved.

       What grabbed my attention in the second Minsk document is the sides’ commitment to creating a common humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, which brings us back to the idea of a Greater Europe.

       In my opinion, this formula is hiding the main divide between the Western elites – those who are advocating the idea, like Hollande and Merkel, despite the situation in Ukraine, and those who want to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe, including Ukraine. The ongoing fight between these two positions will continue for a long time. The choice is between involving Russia in European processes and pushing it further east and north.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.