The participation of African countries in BRICS provides them with the opportunity to garner significantly more clout in international affairs, while promoting issues that are important for the continent with the backing of like-minded partners, write Mayya Nikolskaya and Alina Matveeva especially for the 3rd African Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Of all global regions, Africa enjoys the widest representation in BRICS. As of late July 2025, the African group includes South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia, with Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda participating as partner countries. Several other African states have openly declared over the past two years their intent to join this group.
What are the advantages of being a BRICS partner for Africa? Can we speak in this light of a sustainable “African bloc” inside the alliance? These questions need to be answered for us to understand how to shape the cooperation agenda with African countries and how the group’s expansion should be positioned in the future.
It may sound ironic, but the marketing theory offers a convenient analysis framework. Adjunct Assistant Professor Stefan Tschauko of Columbia University, specialising in branding international organisations, uses this theory to draw inspiration. The analytical model he is developing helps assess the image of a particular organisation in the international public sphere, and provides reputation management tools for recruiting new members and obtaining political and financial support from the stakeholders.
In this model, BRICS can be positioned as an international brand, because it possesses the entire set of the following corresponding characteristics:
DNA (i.e., a steady set of characteristics);
individuality (image);
resource and ideological capital that creates brand loyalty;
and clearly visible “benefits” that it offers to “consumer” countries, i.e., its current and potential participants (see Fig. 1).
Branding theory distinguishes three main types of benefits. Functional benefits are about the practical value provided by the brand. Symbolic or emotional benefits are associated with image, status, and identity. Finally, social benefits provide a sense of belonging, support, and interaction with other “consumers” of the brand or members of a specific affiliated community.
Fig.1. BRICS brand architecture. The chart has been compiled by the authors.
Emotional benefits: Development, equality, and solidarity
A content analysis of the BRICS summit declarations from 2023 and 2024, conducted by participants in the research project, The Role of BRICS in the World Economy and Global Economic Governance: An African Perspective, (MGIMO University, Russian Foreign Ministry, Grant KMU-15/01, 2025), reveals that the words development and cooperation are among the 700 most frequently used terms.
“BRICS’ magnetism lies in the emotional appeal of its ideas,” Mihaela Papa, Principal Research Scientists at the Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says. “These are rooted in positive associations with investment and alignment with national and global development agendas.”These conclusions echo the findings of Oleg Barabanov outlined in his report titled Evolution of the BRICS Platform of Shared Values,published in April 2025 on the Valdai Discussion Club’s website. According to this report, BRICS countries in recent years have placed inclusive growth accounting for the interests of all nations among their core values.
The legacy of colonialism and its modern-day manifestations in the form of neocolonial practices remains a deep trauma haunting Africa. BRICS, by contrast, is building its identity on the principles of fairness. Within the BRICS framework, Africa has the opportunity to cease being ？ and, importantly, being seen as ？ a perpetual recipient of donor assistance and instead emerge as a full-fledged partner. For African nations, bringing closure to this historical gestalt means restoring the dignity of their civilisations and asserting respect for their interests that have long been disregarded in relations with former colonial powers.
The values of equality and equity resonate with resistance coming from all sorts of hegemonies, including on a regional level. The structure and decision-making processes of African integration associations (such as SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, and others) are deliberately designed to prevent domination by any single country. This is achieved through rotating chairmanship, collective goal setting, and institutional checks on major players, such as the role of the West African Economic and Monetary Union in relation to Nigeria within ECOWAS, or oversight by the African Union.
Similar expectations are emerging within Africa with regard to BRICS. Principles such as multipolarity, solidarity, and consensus underlyingBRICS deeply resonate with Africa’s cultural, religious, and economic diversity. African countries are invested in ensuring that BRICS operational mechanisms are based on a balance of interests, enabling all its members regardless of their economic or political weight to fully participate in shaping the agenda. This idea aligns with the humanistic philosophy of Ubuntu and its emphasis on universal interdependence, which underpins South Africa’s and some other countries’ foreign policy.
Finally, on the sensitive question of whether BRICS is an anti-Western alliance, the designation non-Western as opposed to anti-Western proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems particularly fitting for Africa, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. This sensitive approach gives African countries the freedom to choose their international partners.
Fig. 2. How would you define BRICS’ aspirations within the existing international monetary and financial system (choose one option)? (Survey of African think-tank employees, Grant KMU-15/01 MGIMO University at Russian Foreign Ministry, 2025).
Social benefits: A collective herald on the international stage
The participation of African countries in BRICS provides them with the opportunity to garner significantly more clout in international affairs, while promoting issues that are important for the continent with the backing of like-minded partners. For instance, in the declaration of the 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the member states clearly demonstrated consensus on a wide range of international issues. This “united front” was particularly evident in the group’s position on the Middle East: both members and partners unanimously called for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza, adherence to international humanitarian law, and support for the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.
Furthermore, the declaration highlighted special focus on African conflicts and the “African solutions to African problems”principle. This can be viewed as an achievement of BRICS members advocating for a stronger role of the African Union and greater African agency in resolving crises on the continent.
Supporting the Kimberley Process is another key point for Africa. The KP is an international certification scheme established in 2000 to prevent the global trade of conflict diamonds aka blood diamonds. In contrast to recent Western attempts to undermine this process or rewrite the KP to suit their own interests, preserving the process in its original form will help African countries retain control over their natural resources.
Finally, working within BRICS enables African countries to align themselves with partners such as India, China, and Russia, who offer alternatives to Western-centric narratives and development models. The particularities of African thinking foster an inclination to emulate successful examples and to rely on proven strategies. Accordingly, African countries’ national development visions frequently reference specific country models from within BRICS, seeking to adapt their experiences to local realities and objectives. For example, Uganda’s Vision 2040 cites the successes of China, India, and Brazil in developing ICT, biotechnology, and building high-tech industries, such as aviation, from scratch and in advancing human capital. Nigeria’s national strategy through 2050 contains references to China’s infrastructure development and industrialisation model. Following this logic, Africa’s orientation towards learning from and internalising others’ experience promotes deeper alignment with the BRICS group.
Functional benefits: Bilateral partners and multilateral institutions
In terms of practical value, African countries primarily view BRICS as a platform to stimulate economic growth and expand multilateral cooperation. Within BRICS, Africa is interested in practical, results-oriented efforts aimed at implementing infrastructure projects, developing human capital, and facilitating technological exchange. Access to the advanced agricultural and energy technologies could, in the long run, help African nations strengthen domestic production and reduce dependence on imports.
Interaction in these areas with founding partners is expected to follow two parallel paths: through bilateral channels with individual BRICS members whose trade volume has already surpassed $1 trillion and through specialised entities within the grouping. BRICS’s “development initiators” are perceived differently across Africa, but each holds specific value: Russia as one of the principal ideologists and defenders of multipolarity; Brazil due to shared identity and historical and cultural ties with the region; and India and China as major investors.
African countries place high hopes on the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). However, unresolved issues remain, for example, regarding the participation of newly admitted BRICS members such as Ethiopia, their share in the bank, and the expansion of NDB projects to other African nations. As of now, NDB membership is limited to South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria. Moreover, the bank is currently unable to facilitate transactions between Russia, a BRICS founding member, and African countries.
Fig.3. Do you think that the New Development Bank under the BRICS umbrella can become an effective alternative to the World Bank in the near future?(Survey of African think-tank employees, Grant KMU-15/01 MGIMO University at Russian Foreign Ministry, 2025).
The launch of new payment mechanisms bypassing existing ones, for example, within the BRICS Pay system is intended to expand economic flexibility. As for transactions in national currencies, despite the officially declared readiness, there is a clear understanding in African countries that such a transition is unfortunately not yet feasible under the current financial architecture.
However, surveys of the African academic community show near-unanimous support for the establishment of organisations for natural resource-exporting countries under the auspices of BRICS. This suggests that at least a significant portion of African elites view BRICS as a pillar of a new economic order, one that envisions the redistribution of revenue in favour of the Global South and Africa’s full integration into global supply chains.
Fig.4. Do you think BRICS needs to establish: a) free trade zone, b) the Secretariat, c) single currency, d) organisation to coordinate the supply of commodities? (Survey of African think-tank employees, Grant KMU-15/01 MGIMO University at Russian Foreign Ministry, 2025).
Is the African bloc within BRICS unified?
As emphasised by Darya Zelenova, Tamara Andreyeva et al. in their paper titled “Shaping the BRICS agenda: Navigating global issues and national interests”since South Africa joined BRICS in 2010, a configuration has taken shape in which Pretoria serves as a bridge between the grouping and the rest of Africa. As a BRICS member, it has widely used the format to advance African interests. For example, the first BRICS summit held in Africa ？ Johannesburg Summit 2013 ？ became an important catalyst for enhancing cooperation between external actors and African countries in infrastructure, industry, and social development. Today, the influence of the African component within BRICS is increasingly evident, as shown by the incorporation of South Africa’s national priorities and broader African initiatives into the 2023 Johannesburg Declaration. The key topics include gender equality, sustainable development, the climate transition, Pan-African integration, and African Union initiatives.
However, South Africa’s role as the group’s lead voice for Africa has been diminishing over time as seen from the foreign ministers’ meeting in Rio de Janeiro in April 2025, where, for the first time in BRICS history, the group failed to issue a joint communiqué due to objections from Egypt and Ethiopia. These countries pushed for revising the draft’s reference to a permanent seat for Africa on the UN Security Council. The formulation proposed by Brazil, which implied assigning such a seat to South Africa, did not sit well with Cairo or Addis Ababa. As a result, neither country signed the document, even after it was revised. Thus, it is premature to speak of a unified African bloc within BRICS when it comes to global representation.
In addition, the expansion of BRICS into Africa is inevitably changing the group’s identity and trajectory of development. For example, while major economies like South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria already serve as regional hubs for finance, trade, agriculture, and industry to varying degrees, Uganda is a country with an average level of economy, and its GDP is 7.5 times smaller than Nigeria’s. Uganda’s partner (rather than full-member) status highlights BRICS’s push for a more multi-tiered cooperation model. However, such heterogeneity also means that coordination of goals and actions between countries may become more difficult. It also raises the issue of how responsibilities and burdens are to be shared between members and partners.
Western hostility also represents potential risks for Africa in BRICS. For instance, in July 2025, Donald Trump described BRICS as an “anti-American” association threatening US interests and seeking to undermine the US dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. In response to BRICS initiatives, Trump announced a 10-percent tariff on imports from countries that supported the group’s policies. In other words, BRICS integration is being perceived as a challenge to the existing world order. This cannot fail to make Africa’s export-dependent economies consider the limits of how deeply they can afford to integrate with BRICS.
Finally, shifting political landscapes within BRICS countries and partners can influence cooperation priorities within the bloc and affect their approaches to external actors. A striking example of this is Argentina: the election of Javier Milei in 2023 marked the country’s rejection of BRICS accession and a complete distancing from the group.
Conclusions and recommendations
1. The choice of BRICS as a partner and the emergence of the “African vector” within the group reflect the transformation of international relations, in which Africa is no longer on the periphery of the global world. This fills the spirit of BRICS with meaning and makes it attractive to African countries.
2. The strategic positioning of the BRICS brand in Africa should not be achieved through imposition, but through co-ownership and co-engagement. For African countries, membership and partnership in BRICS is synonymous with both symbolic recognition of the region’s potential and, functionally, hope for new opportunities for development.
3. At the same time, African countries still do not fully understand what specifically to expect from BRICS and wonder whether the high expectations for such cooperation will be justified. As it enters the new African space, BRICS must be aware of its responsibility to back up these expectations with real initiatives and support for its African partners. Otherwise, disappointment and threats to the group’s reputation are inevitable. Symbolic steps and ideas must be translated into specific projects in the region. Only then will the alliance be perceived not as a hollow slogan or a “pocket” source of income for the establishment, but as an important part of genuine national development strategies.
4. BRICS is slowly but surely approaching a bifurcation point where the further expansion of the group will “compete” with its effectiveness. In such a scenario, the union faces a choice: either to deepen political coordination and institutional integration, possibly through the introduction of a “double majority” mechanism for decision-making; or create issue-oriented coalitions/committees with varying degrees of institutionalisation. In this case, each country would determine its own “specialization” within BRICS and oversee it in accordance with the national priorities, be it coffee exports or the development of green energy. In this regard, the historical experience of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance with its industrial cooperation between member states may be of interest to researchers. In any case, any of the proposed scenarios should be discussed with African partners, taking into account Africa’s share in BRICS and the strategic nature of Russia’s cooperation with it.
The authors express their thanks to Chief Researcher at the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor at the Department of World Economy at MGIMO University Denis Degterev for kindly providing information and survey results. The full results of the grant research will be released in November 2025.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.