By mid-summer, Russia changed the vector of its policy towards the crisis in Ukraine. The probability of an armed interference has decreased relative to the spring, and Russia is now advocating the idea of a Russian-German-French contact group on Ukraine. The Kremlin is responding to Kiev’s military operation mildly in the hope that Paris and Berlin will help it find a compromise solution.

       By mid-summer, Russia changed the vector of its policy towards the crisis in Ukraine. The probability of an armed interference has decreased relative to the spring, and Russia is now advocating the idea of a Russian-German-French contact group on Ukraine. The Kremlin is responding to Kiev’s military operation mildly in the hope that Paris and Berlin will help it find a compromise solution.

       The first such contact group was created during the Bosnian crisis in the mid-1990s. After the conflicting sides in Bosnia – Serbs, Muslims and Croats – rejected the UN Security Council initiatives in 1993, the Clinton administration proposed a contact group on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It consisted of the US, Russia, the UK, France, Germany and Italy. In 1994, the group prepared a peace plan that proposed creating a confederation of the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. That plan was included in the Dayton Accords on November 12, 1995.

       Russian diplomacy has attempted to apply this scenario to Ukraine. The developments of the past few months have indicated a high degree of understanding between the US and the EU. On the other hand, France and Germany, the leading countries in continental Europe, often mediated in US-Russian conflicts during and after the Cold War era. The agreements reached by the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany in Berlin on July 2 showed that the Kremlin and the White House need this mediation again.

       However, the potential of a contact group on Ukraine is lower than the potential was in Bosnia. First, the great powers wanted to settle the Bosnian crisis as soon as possible. Second, the US, unwilling to be involved in a large-scale war, was ready to accept a German compromise scenario. Third, despite the “Slavic unity” rhetoric, the Bosnian issue was much less painful to Russia than the crisis in Ukraine. There are none of these prerequisites in Ukraine, and EU diplomacy has less room to maneuver than 20 years ago.

       Judging by statements made by Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel, there is a choice of three compromise scenarios.

       The first scenario provides for a ceasefire, to be monitored by international observers. The Poroshenko administration has so far refused to consider a unilateral ceasefire but said it would not use military planes or artillery against Donetsk, a city with a population of about a million. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin mentioned the possibility of accepting a compromise Paris-Berlin peace plan under OSCE guarantees.

       The EU could also offer a slightly different solution within this plan – send an EU police mission to eastern Ukraine. The EU sent such missions to Congo, Macedonia and Georgia. The EU police would not have a peacekeeping mandate, but would only monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on June 27 created the conditions for this.

       Under the second scenario, the sides would sign an agreement on humanitarian corridors, which the media often describe as providing safe passage out of Ukraine for “Russian militants” and the civilians who want to leave. In fact, humanitarian corridors are used to deliver humanitarian aid and medical assistance to areas of hostility. They should be monitored by missions of humanitarian organizations and can only be safe and useful under a ceasefire.

       The third scenario provides for starting peace talks and is the most difficult to implement. Moscow demands that “Novorosiya,” formed by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics, attend the talks as equals. But this is unacceptable to Kiev. The Poroshenko administration fears this would amount to admitting that Ukraine has no inherent prerogative to determine its territorial structure. The most it would agree to in this scenario is the drafting of a crisis settlement roadmap.

       Russia should keep in mind that the contact group’s agenda on Ukraine could be expanded to include the Crimean issue. The US could argue that Russia should discuss Crimea with Ukraine, and if Moscow agrees, Washington could say that this amounts to a promise to talk about Crimea’s status.

       A contact group has so far remained a hypothetical proposal. The Poroshenko administration, encouraged by its achievements in early June, has opted to continue the military operations. But it will have to consider external mediation if hostilities in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions continue.

       Russia needs to avoid an “enforced consensus,” that is, a search for compromise on US conditions, and so it should closely monitor the drafting of a roadmap for peace talks in the EU.

       This article was originally published in Russian on www.ng.ru

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.