While defining Trump’s presidency remains theoretically challenging, the concepts of “world revolution” and “Trump Spring” will likely endure in both political discourse and academic analysis, despite their inherent contradictions, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.

       The activities of US President Donald Trump are currently in the focus of world politics. His uncompromising breakdown of the established order in global trade affairs, the rejection of the existing balance of power on the world stage, and pressure on both US allies and the largest countries of the Global South – members of BRICS – all this is seriously, very dynamically (and potentially irreversibly) changing the picture of international relations.

       We have already analysed Donald Trump’s activities earlier on the portal of the Valdai Discussion Club. At the same time, one of the tasks of specialists in political science and in the theory of international relations is to develop definitions for the phenomena of real-world politics, integrating them into one theoretical framework and paradigm or another. Here, on the one hand, a scholastic, but at the same time theoretically important question arises: what definition will best help us characterise the activities of Donald Trump?

       In our previous articles on the Valdai Club portal, we proposed several such possible definitions, from various theoretical and class positions. A hegemon’s revolt? A global revolution? A neo-imperialist redivision of the world? Or even a “Trump Spring”?

       In any case, it is clear that Trump’s foreign policy activity falls into two components:

       1. A stringent trade policy for dealing with almost the entire world. Priorities of exclusive economic gain in relations with allies. Openly declared territorial claims.

       2. Peacekeeping potential/impulse, the desire to stop conflicts and restore peace. If necessary, through hard power (Iran) or secondary sanctions on Russian oil. If necessary, by abandoning traditional US alliances (attempted pivot from Ukraine and the EU towards Russia).

       It can be postulated that these two components of Trump’s policy are parallel to each other and lack a direct connection with each other. (Although, of course, an indirect rhetorical connection can be found. Peace between inveterate adversaries can promote the economic advancement of the United States in their markets, etc.). But, in general, these two policy initiatives have different short-term goals and are therefore perceived differently.

       “Trump optimism” is primarily connected with the second component: the peacekeeping one. The hope for an unexpected, practically unique opportunity (encountered once in a generation and impossible according to all the previous logic of world alignments) for a turn for the better in conflicts that might otherwise become endless. These feelings of the early spring of 2025 can therefore be called the “Trump Spring”.

       Like any such “spring” (the Arab Spring, the Russian Spring, the Prague Spring, etc.), the Trump Spring also has/had its revolutionary potential. But at the moment, for reasons beyond Trump’s control, it remains at the stage of fading hope.

       Naturally, in this desire for peace-making at any cost, one can also see the specifics of Trump’s psychological profile (vanity, the desire to remain in history, “end Biden’s wars,” receive the Nobel Prize, etc.). Without denying this, the hopes for a Trump Spring were based on a deeper and more fundamental value – the value of peace and the preservation of human lives. Trump regularly and emotionally appeals to this value in his speeches.

       It may seem strange that the psychological type characteristic of Trump can have any values at all, besides economic gain. But it turns out that it can. (This can be noted post factum in Trump’s first term: the desire for peace and the preservation of the lives of American soldiers in Afghanistan, for example). Again, it is clear that appeals to the value of peace can be instrumental in nature and be only a utilitarian construct, but nevertheless, it is this natural human response to the value of peace and the preservation of lives that formed the basis of the optimistic hopes for a Trump Spring.

       Trump’s peacekeeping efforts are focused primarily on two countries: Israel and Russia. Against the backdrop of Trump’s trade policy, these two countries have turned out to be (at the moment) essentially the only ones in the world to whom Trump has not (yet) done anything bad, but has done/tried to do only good. Therefore, the perception of Trump’s Spring in these countries has its own specifics, which distinguishes them from the rest of the world.

       For the rest of the world, Trump has appeared not as a peacemaker, but as a raging/furious hegemon. Here, the only value underlying his policy (if it can be called a value at all) is the economic benefit of the United States and the promotion of MAGA strategy.

       Can this “revolt of the hegemon” be considered a world revolution? Judging by the radical nature of Trump’s actions (and especially the plans he has voiced) and their consequences, it is quite possible that it can. In any case, the second law of dialectics is clearly at work here: the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones. And qualitative changes are, in essence, revolution.

       On the other hand, since the theory of revolution in its classical form is associated with Marxism-Leninism, it is no less clearly postulated there that only the exploited classes have the legitimate right to revolution (a monopoly on revolution, if you like). Extrapolating this position to world politics, these are only the countries of the Global Non-West and the South, only the world majority.

       According to this logic, the “revolt of the hegemon” cannot be a revolution by definition. In Marxist terms, it is defined unambiguously: as a neo-imperialist redivision of the world against the backdrop of increasing inter-imperialist contradictions. Lenin’s “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism”, remains a classic here.

       Finally, the third approach to revolution is related to its “mechanics”. Any revolution must grow out of a revolutionary situation, and a revolutionary situation is determined by three parameters: ruling class incapacity, popular unwillingness to endure existing conditions, and intensified oppression. Plus the fourth parameter – a revolutionary party as the vanguard of the revolution.

       In our previous articles, we have already addressed this issue. In particular, in the aforementioned text we cited the results of sociological surveys in individual countries both in the West and in the Global South. In most of them, public opinion is against Trump. The reason may be that Trump’s tariff policy is already causing purely personal concerns among citizens of many countries that their private well-being and private economic interests will also suffer.

       In addition, we can cite another sociological survey. This is the Eurobarometer from May 2025. Naturally, here too, as with any social survey, you can ask questions about representativeness and political expediency. But nevertheless, they relay that only 52% of European Union citizens trust the EU. This is the highest result since 2007. The same 52% trust the European Commission – the main governing body of the EU – also a record for the past 18 years. Does this indicate some kind of “rallying around the flag” against the backdrop of the aforementioned public fears of Trump? Does it mean that “increasing oppression of the exploited masses” by the old elites is not happening, at least in Europe? Outside of Europe, the declaration of the recent BRICS summit in Brazil in July 2025, which took place after all of Trump’s actions, noted that “The proliferation of trade-restrictive actions, whether in the form of indiscriminate rising of tariffs … threatens … to introduce uncertainty into economic and trade activities, potentially exacerbating existing economic disparities”.

       But, overall, this BRICS summit declaration is moderate, like most previous BRICS declarations. We have already raised this topic in a Valdai Club publication. In any case, this phrase is not a powerful protest to Trump from the leaders of the developing world and their intention to unite in an anti-Trump front and give him a full rebuff, not at all. Does this mean that there is no such “increased exploitation” of the developing world? Or is it just that BRICS as an organisation, faced with pressure and direct threats from Trump, considered it best to take a quiet and conflict-free position? There is definitely no call for revolution here.

       However, in early August, the situation began to change. After the introduction of Trump’s increased tariffs, Brazil turned to other BRICS countries (primarily India and China) to take a coordinated position on this issue. Let’s see what comes of it.

       In any case, it is clear that the two components of Trump’s activities (peacekeeping and trade) pursue different goals, and therefore evoke different responses and different assessments. Therefore, the task of giving a single definition of what Trump does seems a thankless task, albeit a theoretically important one. But, one way or another, subjectively, the semantics of a world revolution or a Trump Spring, albeit illusory, will, I think, find its place both in political romanticism and in theoretical constructs.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.