The Popular Front must concentrate the national elite by attracting a group of politicians and public figures that enjoy the complete trust of the public and reflect the interests of all social strata of Russian society. The groups that voted for Vladimir Putin in March 2012 have a vital interest in its existence and development.

       The Popular Front must concentrate the national elite by attracting a group of politicians and public figures that enjoy the complete trust of the public and reflect the interests of all social strata of Russian society. They should form new national elite.

       That said, the front should not replace the ruling party (let United Russia continue playing this role). But it should be more sensitive to the aspirations of civil society and should implement these aspirations in law-making activities as much as possible. United Russia’s rating has gone down precisely because it did not show real interest in the problems of civil society.

       Politically, the front is now a mothballed project, but the groups of the public that voted for Vladimir Putin in March 2012 have a vital interest in its existence and development.

       United Russia and the front should divide the political field in the following manner: the ruling party should continue its activities in the future State Duma under the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev and express the interests of the conservative part of Russian society; while the front should become a political projection of a broad coalition of public interests – creative moderates (the so-called creative class, which is obviously disappointed in the so-called opposition that was trying to attract its interest), and the Left-wing forces that traditionally express the interests of the poor.

       A mechanical replacement of the front with United Russia will not resolve the problems of the latter and its ratings will not increase, because in this case there will be no qualitative change in the party structure and voters will not react to this transformation – political technology will have to do its job, which is bound to lead to early disappointment with the new structure.

       The front should try to avoid the biggest mistake in its role as United Russia’s backup – not to welcome into its ranks defectors and failed policy-makers, as was the case with the Just Russia Party in the past.

       As long as Putin remains president, he should try to avoid direct leadership of the front. Instead he should delegate to this post his confidant, who enjoys prestige among pro-Putin groups of population.

       Regions are designed to be a venue for the front’s projects, but it should not rely exclusively on the local elite as its personnel corps. It is necessary to ensure the proper ratio between the federals and the regionals – strategic mentality and tactical innovation.

       The front’s regional offices should create initiatives that could be transformed at the federal level and returned to the regions with corresponding funding and administrative support.

       United Russia is clearly interested in making the front its subsidiary (as it happened with the Just Russia Party, which could never shake off its label of “toy opposition”), but such positioning is bound to seriously damage the image of not only Putin personally, but also the supreme authorities in general. This is fraught with the emergence of the revolutionary situation, which could well be exploited by external groups with unpredictable consequences for Russia.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.