One of the fundamental problems that the Taliban has faced since the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) in 2021 has been difficulty in gaining full official recognition in the international arena. In order to solve this problem, the Taliban have been actively operating in many areas for four years now, demonstrating signs of strategic patience and flexibility, and playing on the interests of external forces.
The Middle East occupies a key place in the Taliban's foreign policy legitimisation strategy, especially the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which have significant international influence and are viewed by the Taliban as a kind of bridge for establishing ties with authoritative international institutions and Western countries.
However, the Middle East is not limited to the Arab monarchies; it also includes the Arab street and numerous regional conflicts, some of which are teetering on the brink of a nuclear confrontation, as in the case of the conflict between Iran and Israel, and the Taliban also takes these factors into account when putting together its strategy towards the region.
Establishing diplomatic ties
The first line of action for the Taliban has been consistent steps to establish diplomatic and official contacts and ties with the countries of the Middle East. The most actively developing ties are with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which, during the existence of the first version of the IEA (1996-2001), was one of three countries, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, that officially recognised the Taliban leadership.
In August 2024, the UAE accepted the credentials of a Taliban-appointed diplomat as Afghanistan’s ambassador. The UAE became the second country in the world after China to accept a Taliban representative in such a role. Currently, the Taliban control both the Afghan embassy in Abu Dhabi and the consulate in Dubai. During the visit to Abu Dhabi on June 4, 2024, of the Afghan delegation led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting head of the IEA Interior Ministry and concurrently the leader of the “Haqqani Network,” an international terrorist organisation, became a political sensation. The delegation also included the director of IEA intelligence Abdul Haq Wasiq. Together they held talks with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.
The Taliban continues to develop close ties with Qatar, which remains an important partner in establishing contacts between the movement and the international community. From 2013 to 2021, Doha served as a negotiating platform for the United States and the Taliban, contributing to the Doha Accords, which marked the end of the American presence in Afghanistan.
It was in Doha that the Taliban recently experienced a political breakthrough. Their delegation not only took part in the UN-organised Third Meeting of Special Representatives for Afghanistan in 2024, but were also called the "de facto Afghan authorities" by the UN. The organisers also accepted the Taliban's demand that Afghan women should not participate in the meeting. Qatar's contribution was well characterised by Suhail Shaheen, the Ambassador of the Islamic Emirate to this country, who called Doha's role in expanding the relations of the interim government of the IEA with the world important . Another confirmation of Qatar's important role in building contacts between the IEA and the West was Doha’s mediation in the release of American citizens, Ryan Corbett, William McKenty, Faye Hall and George Glezman, who are in Taliban captivity.
As for the Middle East’s leading country, Saudi Arabia, it reopened its embassy in Kabul in December 2024. Before that, Riyadh evacuated its diplomats twice: in 2021 and 2023, for security reasons.
Over its past four years in power, the Taliban has managed to establish constructive political and diplomatic relations with Iran. In February 2023, the Iranian authorities accredited Taliban diplomat Fazl Mohammad Haqqani as chargé d'affaires, despite the discontent of Afghan opposition groups. An indicator of the increased level of relations between Iran and the Taliban can be considered the invitation of Fazl Mohammad Haqqani in February 2024 to a meeting organised by Iranian leader Ali Khamenei with ambassadors of Islamic countries, where the situation in Gaza and Israeli policy were discussed. Another landmark event was the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Kabul in January 2025.
The productivity level of the Taliban's diplomatic efforts to woo Iran can be understood if we recall that in 1997, during their first emirate, the Taliban killed 9 Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist in Mazar-i-Sharif, which then put them on the brink of a full-scale armed conflict with Tehran.
Narrative strategy
The Taliban’s second move in the Middle East is the use of a narrative strategy, which is mainly built around criticism of Israel's actions. Taliban narratives include almost all the same verbal and semantic elements that are traditionally used in Middle Eastern anti-Israeli criticism.
An example is the holiday message sent by Taliban spiritual leader Hibatullah Akhundzada on June 4, 2025, on the occasion of Eid al-Adha, in which he condemned the “Zionist attacks and acts of oppression against women, children and oppressed Muslims in Gaza and other parts of Palestine” and expressed “unwavering support for the oppressed people of Palestine.” In a similar vein, Israel’s actions against Lebanon, Yemen and Iran have been condemned.
The Taliban narrative strategy has three goals. First, this is the acquisition of widespread legitimacy in the Arab and Iranian streets, where most are extremely radically opposed to Israel. Second, by broadcasting such narratives, the Taliban want to show that they are the spokesmen for the sentiments of the Afghan people, i.e. the only legitimate Afghan authorities. Third, an analysis of the used vocabulary indicates that the IEA authorities are deliberately positioning themselves as a legitimate subject of the international community and international law. Thus, in a statement made by the official representative of the IEA, Zabihullah Mujahid, regarding Israel's attack on Iran, it was noted that it violates the basic principles of international law, such as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Also from a position of subjectivity, the Taliban sent its congratulations to the Tahrir al-Sham group (banned in Russia), which put an end to the rule of President Bashar al-Assad in 2024. It expresses hope that “the process of transferring power will be carried out in accordance with the aspirations of the Syrian people, paving the way for the establishment of an independent and service-oriented Islamic government.”
Meanwhile, a distinctive feature of the Taliban narrative strategy in the Middle East is that it does not move into the realm of practical action, for example, in relation to Israel, and has increasingly acquired ritual features. This can apparently be explained by the reluctance to spoil relations with the West and the traditional Arab elites closely associated with it, which will negatively affect the Taliban's attempts to change its image and gain recognition from the United States and Europe. The Taliban is investing serious resources in forming a new image: of a constructive and responsible international actor, placing key bets on the fight against ISIS-Khorasan (banned in Russia) and the Afghan drug trade.
Using economic opportunities
The Taliban is currently actively leveraging its significant reserves of undeveloped natural resources, as well as its transit prospects and demographic potential in pursuing the strategy of gaining international legitimacy. Not only an economic but also a geopolitical game is unfolding around potential projects, a powerful initial impetus to which was given by China, which entered the oil and mining sectors of Afghanistan and demonstrated a desire to take control of lithium production. The states of the Middle East have also been invited by the Taliban to take part in this game. Iran currently occupies a leading position, with its trade turnover with Afghanistan growing by 84% to $3.197 billion in 2024. Iranian exporters are making very good profits, given that Afghan exports to Iran amounted to only $54 million. The statement by Payam Baqeri, Deputy Head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, served as an indicator of Tehran's positive attitude towards the further development of economic cooperation with the IEA, in which he noted that the countries can build a mutually beneficial partnership using their resources and capabilities. According to him, “Iran’s advanced industrial infrastructure and access to global markets, combined with Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, fertile lands and young workforce, make them natural economic partners.”
The UAE and Qatar are showing some interest in Afghanistan’s economy. In 2022, the UAE-based GAAC holding signed several contracts to manage Afghan airports, and provide ground handling and security. The contract for managing the airports will be valid for 10 years. In February of this year, Afghan Consul General Abdul Rahman Feda made a statement that an Afghan trade attaché would be sent to the UAE in the near future. The purpose of his work will be to strengthen trade relations with Afghan and foreign businessmen living in the UAE.
Dubai is already considered a key hub for large Afghan businesses. According to Obaidullah Sader Khail, the chairman of the Afghan Business Council in Dubai, 85% of Afghan millionaires and billionaires live in Dubai. They, however, are in no hurry to do business in Afghanistan, since the current authorities lack international recognition.
In turn, Qatar has been studying the possibility of participating as an investor in the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway construction project since 2023, worth about $5 billion. The implementation of this project will connect the markets of Central and South Asia, turning Afghanistan into a key transit country at the international level. In addition, in 2024, a joint Qatari-Afghan venture was created to implement the Jabal Siraj Cement project. Investments of $220 million are expected.
Conclusion
The Taliban have achieved certain successes in the Middle East, especially in developing cooperation with the UAE, Qatar and Iran. However, the position of the West is still standing in the way of the further development of full-fledged cooperation. The Gulf monarchies cannot ignore the criticism of the US and Europe, as well as Western human rights organisations, of the Taliban for violating the rights of women and girls. This policy has already been decried as “gender apartheid.”
The Taliban's ban on women's education in public and private universities in 2022 was condemned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. According to Reuters, on May 12, 2023, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also raised the issue of lifting bans on girls’ education and women’s employment during secret talks with Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar.
Nevertheless, the Taliban leader and the ultra-conservatives congregating around him (conditionally “Kandahar”) remain adamant, which does not allow the generally pragmatic wing of the Taliban (conditionally “Kabul”) not only to accelerate the process of expanding the entire spectrum of ties with the Arab monarchies, but also to fully use them to normalise relations with the West. At the same time, there is still a certain probability that the Taliban, without lifting the ban on the de facto exclusion of women from public life, will be able to achieve improved relations with the West by using their connections with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. This probability arrived with Russia's official recognition of the IEA on July 3, 2025, which gives a powerful impetus to a new round of the geopolitical game around Afghanistan. If Iran (Saudi Arabia's traditional regional rival) and China (the US's global competitor) follow Russia in the near future, this could, theoretically push the Persian Gulf monarchies and leading Western countries to make similar strides to recognise the IEA. The result of all this may be that criticism of the Taliban's violation of women's rights may recede into the background, turning into ordinary rhetoric.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.