Moscow and Washington have differing views on the missile compromise formula. The Russian side demands that the United States take over some liabilities: from restrictions on the deployment of missiles to guarantees that missile defense systems will not target Russia. For the Americans it is a declaration of cooperation, giving them access to Russian anti-missile technology.

       As of mid-summer talks between Russia and NATO on European Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (“European ABM ") still have not reached any coordination point, which is quite alarming. The parties agreed to begin talks on cooperation on “European ABM” at the Lisbon summit of NATO on November 20, 2010. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed establishing a single missile defense sector, according to which Russia and the NATO countries must provide cover to each other within their own sectors. But the Russia-NATO Council meeting in Sochi on July 4, 2011, did not result in a breakthrough. The search for a compromise has now been postponed until the next NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. According to representatives of the alliance, the issue of establishing a joint missile defense sector with Russia is not on the agenda yet.

       Difficulties are to be expected in any significant negotiations. History buffs may recall that the complex negotiations on the SALT-1 (1972) lasted four years, and the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (1987) was negotiated for seven years. What is alarming is that as the disagreements between Russia and the NATO countries grow deeper, as doubts grow about the very possibility of reaching an agreement on missile defense. Moscow has increasingly made public statements that if a missile compromise is not reached, Russia will take counter-measures - from the rapid modernization of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) to a possible withdrawal from New START (2010). Brussels and Washington unambiguously responded that Moscow should not expect legally binding assurances that Russia’s strategic missile defense potential does not become a target. Thus, doubts have arisen about the aim of the "reset" policy itself, whose main achievement so far has been an arms control agreement between Russia and the United States.

       Disagreements over ABM issues actually conceal more serious problems. Since 1989, the USSR/Russia and the United States have conducted negotiations on arms control on the basis of the "Wyoming compromise." According to the document (1) there should be separate negotiations on ABM and START, (2) priority should be given to reducing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), (3) cruise missiles should be excluded from the strategic balance, and (4) the parties have the right to store, but not destroy, warheads (the principle of "breakout potential"). In 2009, in Helsinki and Amsterdam Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would like to review the basis of the "Wyoming compromise." According to the new formula given in New START, the parties are free to develop the strategic triad and the negotiations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The Americans responded by maintaining the principles of "breakout potential" and excluding cruise missiles issue from the strategic dialogue.

       For over a year now Russia and the United States have been trying to agree on how to interpret this provision. Moscow considers it an obligation to limit ABM systems, whereas Washington views it as a declarative recommendation for future negotiations. Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev failed to reach a solution at the Washington Summit on June 24, 2010. Therefore, since November 2010 they have been trying to solve the problem by involving Russia in the American project "Adaptive phased approach to the European Anti-Ballistic Missile” (EPAA). This outstanding problem in missile defense poses risks, therefore, not only to New START, but also to the new rules of the Russian-American strategic dialogue.

       Over the past twenty years, Russia and the United States have signed a series of agreements on missile defense. In 1992, Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush launched a joint program for the satellite surveillance of ballistic missiles (RAMOS). This was followed in 1997 by the Helsinki Agreement on cooperation in the creation of theater missile defense systems and the New York Protocol, an addition to START-II, on the differentiation of systems, strategic and tactical missile defense. (Moreover, in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement, the Missile Defense Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense was to cooperate with the Russian Scientific and Production Center "Comet" to design the TMD). On June 5, 2000, under the framework of RAMOS, a bilateral agreement was made to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center of ballistic missiles. The Moscow Declaration on Strategic Partnership (May 24, 2002) obliged the United States to consult with Russia on the deployment of strategic missile defense systems. At the Rome NATO summit (May 28, 2002), the parties also agreed to launch joint projects in the field of air defense and theater missile defense. Thus, it is clear that Russia and the United States do not need to sign a new agreement: it is enough simply to implement the previous documents.

       However, this has yet to happen, and apparently that’s no accident. Moscow and Washington have differing views on the missile compromise formula. The Russian side demands that the United States take over some liabilities: from restrictions on the deployment of missiles to guarantees that missile defense systems will not target Russia. For the Americans it is a declaration of cooperation, giving them access to Russian anti-missile technology. On June 25, 2010 Deputy Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, in her speech at the Carnegie Moscow Center, announced the need for (1) a joint data exchange center for ballistic missiles and (2) cooperation in the development of TMD systems. Particular attention was paid to multilateral interaction involving Russia, the United States and the European NATO countries in the field of "European ABM." Over the past year, the Obama administration has unequivocally maintained this position.

       Indeed, the Obama administration is unlikely to even hypothetically limit their actions in the field of missile defense. The reasons are as follows. First, huge amounts of money were invested in the development of the missile defense system. In the 2010 financial year from $ 9.3 billion from the Pentagon’s $680-billion budget was spent on missile defense. This is why many people have an interest in continuing the ABM project.

       Second, American businesses have a stake in the missile defense system. Corporations like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon and General Dynamics Corporation have orders for the development of various missile defense systems. So, limits on the ABM would mean cuts in major military contracts.

       Third, the Obama administration sees the missile defense system as an updated security guarantee to its allies. Over the past decade, the EU, Japan, Israel, Taiwan and even Australia have often complained about Washington’s neglect. The development of missile defense systems in cooperation with its partners allows Washington to prove the opposite.

       The United States has not yet decided what concession from Russia it would accept in exchange for an agreement on missile defense. So, Moscow should expect at most only a declaration of partnership in this area.

       However, even this scenario is potentially fraught with risks for Russia. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have the technical capacity to overcome missile defense system due to the high ceilings and quantitative presence of carriers with a MIRV. In exchange for an agreement on military-technical cooperation in the field of missile defense, the Americans may offer Russia to weaken one of these tools. Besides, a rapid reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in exchange for a freeze on the number of deployed missiles – an unfavorable scenario for Russia – is a possibility. So, it is no more in Russia’s interest to reach a compromise on missile defense "at all costs" today than it was last year.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.