One of the central conceptual innovations of Russian foreign policy has been the emergence and development of the Eurasian security architecture idea. The idea itself was formulated by President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly in February 2024; he expanded upon it in other speeches, and it has been included in the agenda of a number of Russian foreign policy initiatives in bilateral and multilateral levels, Ivan Timofeev writes.

       Two years before the emergence of the idea of a Eurasian security architecture, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward a global security initiative at the annual conference in Beijing. The initiative served as an important framework for China’s foreign policy over the next two years and will retain its conceptual significance for a long period. Given the importance of Russia and China as major powers and the unprecedentedly high level of relations between them, questions arise about the compatibility of the two initiatives and the possibility of them becoming linked. What are the main principles of the Russian and Chinese initiatives? To what extent do they coincide? What are the differences between them and is it possible to combine them?

       The Russian idea puts at the forefront the principle of equal and indivisible security, the principle of sovereign equality of states with the leading role of the UN, and the diversity of political systems and structures in Eurasia. An important prerequisite for putting forward the initiative is the crisis of the Euro-Atlantic system. An attempt to build such a system on the basis of the Helsinki principles of 1975, as well as the declarations and agreements that followed the end of the Cold War, ended in failure. Moscow has viewed NATO expansion as a growing threat and an undermining of the principle of equal and indivisible security. If Russia perceived the Atlantic integration of former allies in the Warsaw Pact and the Baltic states coldly but saw no need for reciprocal hostile steps, then the prospect of involving post-Soviet countries, especially Ukraine, into the Alliance’s orbit was perceived with increasing alarm. “Colour revolutions” have become one of the political techniques for replacing elites in post-Soviet countries in a way that favours the Euro-Atlantic lobby. It was the “colour revolutions”, especially the events in Ukraine in 2014, that Moscow saw as gross interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states with the aim of changing their political course. The military intervention in the Yugoslavia conflict also undermined the principle of sovereign equality. The picture was complemented by the erosion of arms control, including Washington’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the undermining of the adapted CFE Treaty, etc. Growing concern was caused by the politicisation of international settlements and supply chains through the use of unilateral restrictive measures – sanctions.

       Moreover, this didn’t simply concern Russia; it also, for example, concerned Iran, against which a significant amount of US sanctions are in effect, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015. Russia views the Ukrainian conflict as a direct consequence of the collapse of the inclusive security system in Europe due to the preservation and expansion of US hegemony. However, Moscow also sees Washington’s destructive role in many other parts of Eurasia, including the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, an important component of the Russian idea of Eurasian security is the solution of the region’s problems exclusively by the countries and associations of the region itself. Extra-regional players with hegemonic ambitions are undesirable.

       The Eurasian security system can be built from various elements, such as newly emerging bilateral security treaties. Its basic principles coincide with the doctrines of a number of international organisations, such as the SCO and the CSTO, and it also appears to be a convenient framework for the creation of new international associations and structures.

       The starting point of the Chinese global security initiative is humanism: valuing human life and the well-being of society. Hence such goals as the fight against inequality and poverty, the harmonisation of levels of development, and the prevention of new outbreaks of epidemics. However, international security is the most important condition for stable development. It should be built on the principle of mutual benefit, based on the UN Charter. The principle of sovereign equality and indivisible security also runs like a golden thread through the Chinese initiative. A group of goals of the initiative includes the peaceful resolution of conflicts as well as the rejection of both the rudiments of the Cold War and the politicisation of the economy and finance in the form of unilateral sanctions. It also includes the fight against common problems and challenges, including climate change and terrorism, as well as bolstering digital and biological security. The Chinese approach assumes global coverage. However, special emphasis is placed on Asia as the driver of economic growth and the centre of international cooperation. The global security initiative is also distinguished by a special emphasis on multilateralism and joint problem solving, primarily on the basis of UN institutions.

       China does not directly focus on the United States and the West as a security problem. However, they can clearly be seen between the lines in the context of Beijing’s rejection of unilateral sanctions and the imposition of ideological standards, as well as the preservation of the legacy of the Cold War and the threat of hegemony. Beijing is actively implementing the initiative it has put forward. It has appeared at the centre of China’s agenda in international institutions, as well as in dialogue with partners in the international arena. Within the framework of the global security initiative, a number of projects of humanitarian, economic and military-technical assistance are being implemented to the benefit of various countries around the world.

       The Russian and Chinese initiatives coincide, first of all, in their fundamental principles. Both Moscow and Beijing value equal and indivisible security, the equality of sovereign states, and respect for their diversity. The ideas of the two countries are not conceptual competitors. They have a common semantic and political-philosophical core. The differences between them are determined rather by details, which, nevertheless, should be taken into account. China is putting forward its idea during a period of relatively stable relations with all centres of power. Even the rivalry with the US has not prevented Beijing from relying on the Initiative’s principles in its dialogue with Washington. The US is not excluded from the security equation. Russia is proposing its idea during a period of intense rivalry with the US, not considering it as participant in the Eurasian architecture, but leaving room for US allies in Europe, based on the continent’s geographic boundaries.

       Beijing’s initiative is global in nature, while highlighting Asia as a key link. Moscow’s initiative is continental in nature, based on the crisis of European (Euro-Atlantic) security as a trigger for the formation of a new Eurasian system. The Chinese project places significant emphasis on multilateralism and solving common problems. The Russian project also includes these elements. It also expresses concerns about economic and financial security, as well as in other areas. However, the Russian approach still emphasises hard security in its classical military-political dimension.

       The Chinese initiative is being implemented through its consolidation in the political agenda and projects of assistance to a wide range of countries and in various dimensions.

       The Russian initiative is being implemented through the creation of new bilateral agreements in the field of security, the development of existing security institutions, and via a dialogue regarding a more systemic and integrated set of principles shared by partners on the continent.

       In other words, the Russian initiative in the field of Eurasian security architecture and the Chinese initiative regarding global security are largely compatible, although they imply different emphases and methods of implementation. They may well be implemented in parallel, and in a number of issues they may be linked to each other. In any case, we are talking about soft and flexible systems that are sensitive to the interests, characteristics, and expectations of each side.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.