The issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as delivery systems, has long moved into the practical plane. The only thing that can matter is the pace at which the inevitable proliferation will occur. In the relatively near future, we may have about 15 nuclear powers (instead of 9, as now). However, there is no reason to think that such a development of events will radically change the foundations of international politics or have catastrophic consequences for the world, writes Timofei Bordachev.
There is no reason to doubt that the creation of nuclear weapons, while a technical achievement, served as the basis for the emergence of modern world politics.
First of all, because the scale of these weapons determines the power hierarchy in international affairs, but also makes them a major military threat. All states on the planet must take this into account. The main change caused by nuclear weapons is the emergence, for the first time in history, of the phenomenon of states that are invincible to their external opponents, regardless of whether they act alone or as part of a broad coalition. This has never happened before in the entire history of the world of states, which, sadly, is a history of constant warfare.
At all times, no matter how powerful a state has been militarily, its opponents could defeat it militarily and even destroy it by banding together. The great empires of the past were, sooner or later, vulnerable to barbarian invasions. The European monarchies of the New Age, including Russia, even built a balance of power policy based on the principle that no one can be stronger than all the others. Now the situation is different – two countries are so much stronger than all the others in military terms, that nobody can even think about defeating them.
These countries, Russia and the United States, have nuclear weapons stockpiles sufficient to theoretically destroy all of humanity, which significantly devalues ？？any political rationality of war in relations between them. Soon, as predicted, China will join them and become the world’s third key power, for which only China itself can pose a danger. It is in this coordinate system that world politics has existed since the second half of the last century, and there are no signs that fundamental changes can occur in the foreseeable future – colossal volumes of nuclear weapons require no less colossal costs, which not everyone can afford. It is not surprising that even China, with all its economic might, is only now suspected of being ready to gradually approach Russia and the United States in terms of the number of warheads it has accumulated.
In other words, becoming a nuclear superpower is very, very expensive.
However, another theoretical paradox may be that the vast majority of countries throughout the world do not need such stockpiles of nuclear weapons, in principle, to be comparable to superpowers. The fact is that even the largest second-tier countries – India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Japan, Brazil or Iran, as well as small predators like Israel – cannot set themselves foreign policy goals that require the achievement of military invincibility in the full sense of the word. European nuclear weapons holders do not count – the management of their arsenals is under the direct or indirect control of the United States.
India, of course, may be an exception here, since it has complex relations with China. However, even it does not set itself the task of maintaining a dominant position at the global level. In all other cases, the necessary stockpiles of such weapons can only be oriented towards a possible clash with a potential regional adversary and as an addition to conventional weapons. This does not change the global balance of power in any way. Accordingly, it cannot lead to a significant transformation of the power structure of world politics that was formed in the second half of the 20th century.
A certain number of Western international political theorists, as well as a number of brilliant intellectuals in Russia, have long been advocating the idea that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may not be a danger, but a beneficial factor. In the most general terms, their arguments can be reduced to the fact that the presence of these weapons is a powerful deterrent to the emergence of military conflicts and generally stabilises the security sphere. First, since the number of probable losses in the event of wars increases, and states will enter them less willingly, knowing that the destruction will be more significant than the probable acquisitions. Second, the possession of nuclear weapons by average states will make them less likely targets of aggression by major powers. This argument, we note, fits in well with the current state of affairs: North Korea, having created even a limited nuclear arsenal, feels more confident in relations, even with such a superpower as the United States. Iran, which was in no hurry to create its own nuclear weapons, paid for it when attacked by Israel and the United States in June 2025. Finally, in the opinion of many theorists, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a blessing, since it generally increases the “cost of war” for all its potential participants.
At the same time, the non-proliferation regime is now in a truly ambivalent situation. Several countries at once – India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea – have proactively violated it and have not been punished by the countries that have pledged not to allow this. Observers are seriously considering that their example, as well as the negative experience of Iran, could compel countries such as Iran, Japan and South Korea, as well as the Taipei government, to seriously pursue creating their own bomb. So far, in all cases except Iran, this possibility is only hypothetical. However, for its allies in East Asia, the United States, which is seeking to create new potential threats for its strategic adversary – China, could become a likely supplier of technology, or the weapons themselves. Moreover, the Americans, in principle, do not care what the consequences of a nuclear conflict will be for Japan, South Korea or Taiwan.
Thus, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as delivery systems, has long since moved into the practical plane. The only thing that can matter is the pace at which the inevitable proliferation will occur. In the relatively near future, we may have about 15 nuclear powers (instead of 9, as now). However, there is no reason to think that such a development of events will radically change the foundations of international politics or have catastrophic consequences for the world. First, we have already discussed above that the basis of the modern world order is precisely the existence of nuclear superpowers, with which no one can compare in power. Even if another ten or more countries manage to obtain nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to be able to create such quantities as to threaten the existence of the USA or Russia, not to mention the fate of all mankind. This means that Orwell’s “peace that is no peace” will remain in the foreseeable future.
Second, since volumes comparable to Russia, the USA or, probably, China are not achievable, this does not pose a danger to mankind. The likely consequences of a clash between India and Pakistan, Iran or Israel will be extremely dramatic for their populations. However, they do not threaten the survival of man as a species and the cessation of civilised life on Earth. Millions, perhaps tens of millions, will die, but the catastrophe will still be comparatively local in nature. And the nuclear superpowers will act as peacekeepers, forcing the conflicting parties to compromise. Such a peace, of course, does not look like the most desirable option for the development of international politics.
However, it is precisely this that now seems the most probable and, most likely, the lesser evil compared to the nightmare that a direct clash between Moscow and Washington threatens us with.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.