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       THE conventional wisdom says US-Pakistan relations will struggle during the second Donald Trump administration. It’s easy to understand why.

       The new administration features some of Washington’s harshest Pakistan critics. Its transactional approach ensures that longstanding claims by Pakistan about its strategic importance — rooted in its location — will fall on deaf ears.

       New areas of cooperation during the Joe Biden administration — clean energy and climate change — won’t be priorities. Washington’s foreign aid freeze and dismantling of USAID will largely end development assistance, a pillar of the partnership. On the whole, the Trump administration will be more focused on other issues and places.

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       To its credit, Islamabad has done a decent job of trying to get the Trump administration’s attention. It has leveraged Washing-ton’s concerns about terrorism by pitching itself as a useful counterterrorism partner; it recently helped the US apprehend an IS-K leader.

       It’s also signalling its willingness to buy more American goods: it recently removed a two-year ban on imports of American soybeans, a top Pakistani import from the US.

       Additionally, Islamabad is capitalising on the administration’s interest in critical minerals: it’s finalising a new critical minerals harmonisation framework meant to increa--se investor interest. This will be unveiled during an investment forum — from April 8 to 9 — which will be attended by US officials. Furthermore, Pakistan, responding to the Trump administration’s embrace of cryptocurrencies, is taking steps to legalise crypto, and recently established a new cry-p-to council chaired by the finance minister.

       There are real opportunities to strengthen even a limited partnership.

       But these efforts will fall short. The Tru-mp administration won’t seek a full-scale CT partnership, in part because its broader threat perceptions don’t align with Islam-abad’s. Its chief concern is IS-K, not TTP. Meanwhile, even without import bans, Pakistani purchases of American goods will be modest. In 2024, they barely touched $2 billion. The administration’s new 29 per cent reciprocal tariff on Pakistani exports to the US, Pakistan’s largest export market, will further complicate matters.

       Pakistan’s purported $8 trillion worth of untapped minerals may be enticing to Wa--shington, but its worsening security situat-i--on will be a turn-off. Many mineral reserves are located in the most terror-hit provinces, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Both were recently targeted with a Level 4 (“Do Not Travel”) US State Department travel advisory.

       Crypto’s adoption in Pakistan remains a work in progress. It likely won’t be a big attention-getter in Washington. Despite all this, there are real opportunities to stren-gthen even a limited partnership. More can be done with less. First, we know the Trump administration welcomes Islamabad’s cooperation in finding terrorists that target or threaten Americans. This may be discussed at the next round of a bilateral CT dialogue, scheduled for June.

       Additionally, the US intelligence community’s latest annual threat assessment describes TTP — which doesn’t currently target the US — as a “potential future threat.” This suggests the possibility for some broader non-kinetic CT cooperation, such as information-sharing about IS-K and TTP.

       Second, US-China competition can be an opportunity, not an obstacle, for US-Pakis-tan relations. With CPEC progress having slowed, Islamabad has an opening to make a pitch for more US infrastructure investment. If Washington sees this as a way to counter China, it may be game — perhaps through the US International Development Finance Corporation, which has previously explored investment possibilities in Pak-istan. The chal--le-nge would be limiting the security risks attached to possible US inv--estments.

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       Third, the US and Pakistan can partner in multilateral settings in Central Asia. Pa--kistan has long prioritised developing deeper tra-de and connectivity links with that region. The Trump administration has supported connectivity projects, so long as there is ample burden-sharing. Central Asia could be an especially conducive space for US-Pakistan cooperation, because US multilateral collaborations on connectivity projects in other geographies — like the Indo-Pacific (through the Quad) and Middle East (through IMEEC) — envision strong Indian participation.

       Finally, there’s scope to better privatise the US-Pakistan relationship, and elevate the Pakistani diaspora’s role. Pakistani-Americans work in high-growth sectors like tech and clean energy. They boast the skills, funds, and networks to help bolster Pakistan’s development.

       Ideally, they could contribute to badly needed reforms and other structural fixes that would bring long-term sustainability to Pakistan’s economy — an outcome that would make Pakistan a more appealing partner to the US, and a more impactful global actor overall.

       The writer is a South Asia analyst.

       Published in Dawn, April 8th, 2025