Inside Afghanistan, the problem is that the government and its security forces still experience major difficulties in providing good governance and the rule of the law, promoting economic development and job creation, combating corruption and narcotics trafficking, and protecting Taliban members who attempt to reintegrate peacefully into Afghan society.
Successful managing the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan is perhaps the most urgent task of Leon Panetta, the new U.S. Defense Secretary. The fundamental issue is how fast U.S. and NATO troops will leave the country and what Afghan conditions and regional structure will emerge in their wake. No matter how effectively U.S. forces implement their strategy and tactics, they cannot win the war alone. The Pentagon needs reliable partners, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to leave behind a democratic government able to contain widespread political violence and prevent the reconstruction of terrorist bases and suppress a narcotics-funded insurgency that threatens neighboring countries.
Inside Afghanistan, the problem is that the government and its security forces still experience major difficulties in providing good governance and the rule of the law, promoting economic development and job creation, combating corruption and narcotics trafficking, and protecting Taliban members who attempt to reintegrate peacefully into Afghan society. Despite extensive foreign training programs and other support, moreover, the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police cannot yet defeat the Taliban insurgents without continued direct U.S. combat assistance.
Looking farther out, the United States needs to decide what kind of security relationship to sustain in Afghanistan after 2014. Gates has proposed a jointly operated air base, which could include the stationing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) and perhaps some manned helicopters and combat planes. A more limited option could include American advisers and contractors to supervise the military aid that will likely continue under any scenario.
One of Panetta’s most important challenges as he manages the planned drawdown in U.S. forces in Afghanistan is crafting a new regional security structure to fill the vacuum. Although Russia and its Central Asian allies have become very supportive of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, they have shown no interest in sending combat troops into Afghanistan. Their Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has limited its role primarily to interdicting some of the Afghan narcotics being trafficked throughout Eurasia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes many of Afghanistan’s neighbors as full members or formal observers, is sometimes described as a possible replacement security institution for NATO in the Afghanistan region, but its capabilities remain unproven.
The Pentagon might try to compensate for its declining troop strength in Central Asia by increasing still further its drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and perhaps elsewhere. As CIA Director, Panetta became very fond of the drone attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Yet, Pakistan’s potential collaboration in this endeavor remains problematic. Since 9/11, U.S. officials have former to constrain Pakistani support for their former Taliban allies in Afghanistan as well as other terrorist groups. Last May’s Pentagon-led helicopter assault on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in central Pakistan has further antagonized many Pakistanis. Meanwhile, evidence that members of Pakistan’s intelligence establishment continue to support the al-Qaida-linked Haqqani network fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan persists.
The Pentagon has also prudently increased the flow of supplies through the Northern Distribution Network in anticipation of possible cutbacks in the volume of goods reaching Afghanistan through Pakistan. But doing so will require making a more visible effort to meet Russian concerns about the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan, which has soared since NATO took charge of security in that country. That said, there is little reason to expect that the withdrawal of all American and other NATO troops from Afghanistan would help reduce the flow of Afghan narcotics that is devastating Russia and other Eurasian countries.
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