We should first temper our tendency to frame global political evolution as a contest between rival systems. While this struggle remains significant – manifest in responses to inequality (domestic and global), neo-colonial exploitation, digital colonialism, Western disregard for international law, and the imposition of “might makes right” logic – we must avoid mimicking the West’s polarizing tactics, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.

       It is likely evident to all that the transformation of the international order and the dissolution of distortions emerging after the Cold War constitute a protracted and far from linear process. For the first time, we are witnessing changes of a truly fundamental nature – yet these shifts are neither sweeping nor revolutionary. It would be naive to assume that the previous institutions and practices, designed primarily to uphold the privileged status of a select group of states, will be seamlessly replaced by more just and stable alternatives at the wave of a magic wand.

       To the disappointment of contemporary observers, this will not occur. History offers no examples of rapid transformations in the international order – even the fall of the Roman Empire spanned centuries, marked by internal decay and external pressures. Similarly, the decline of medieval Europe’s political system endured for over a century and a half, remaining incomplete even after the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Every recorded attempt to overturn the existing order through revolutionary means has ended in the rebels’ defeat and the reinforcement of the very structures they sought to dismantle.

       Acknowledging that even the most anticipated changes cannot be swift, we must assess their driving forces accordingly. The international associations and institutions rightly seen as precursors to a new order are themselves neither final nor ideal forms of interstate cooperation. They might have attained such status if the issue were merely a reshuffling of dominant powers. Yet even this is impossible, as the very premise of such a shift appears increasingly obsolete in contemporary international politics.

       First, the prospect of a general war – rendered politically irrational by nuclear deterrence – precludes it. Second, the supposed competitors of the collective West lack sufficient ideological cohesion. If the capacity to define shared foreign policy objectives depends on common domestic standards – such as the social contract – then only a narrow group of nations, belonging to a single political civilization, can achieve this. The US and Europe constitute one such civilization. Their rivals – Russia, China, India, and other major developing states – represent distinct political civilizations, each with unique internal structures and interpretations of a just social order. Thus, expecting them to articulate a unified global agenda in the classical sense would be premature.

       For these reasons, we should approach the evolution of such institutions with measured expectations. The strategic challenges they face are vast, and their participants’ goals remain ambiguous, making inflated hopes entirely futile. Instead, we should focus on developing new frameworks for systematic cooperation among sovereign states – ones that reflect shifting global power dynamics, acknowledge fundamental differences among key players, and, as Edward H. Carr observed, recognize that prevailing theories of international institutions amount to “the science of governing the world by force.” For centuries, this force was monopolized by Western states, which crafted the discipline of international relations to legitimize their dominance and prolong it indefinitely. Emerging alternatives to Western hegemony, for which we lack established concepts, will inevitably differ in both nature and practice.

       Today, it is reasonable to argue that groups like BRICS or the SCO cannot yet serve as consolidated instruments for advancing their members’ foreign policy interests. Their expansion has introduced competing agendas, making it difficult to position them as direct counterparts to Western institutions like the G7 or the EU. Such internal divergences often draw justified criticism from advocates of an idealized future for Global Majority institutions. Meanwhile, powers like China increasingly prioritize independent strategies, leveraging their economic might and dominance in key industries. These developments underscore that replacing one international order with another – or substituting unjust power with justice – is no simple feat. Rhetoric about a new order notwithstanding, it has yet to materialize as a mirror alternative to the existing system.

       This, perhaps, is the central question regarding global political transformation. The purpose of such change, we must remember, is to avert revolutionary upheaval and steer the world toward stability. The most credible effort to govern global affairs through political processes rather than violence remains the UN system – particularly the Security Council. Yet this framework, established 80 years ago, bears the imprint of Western attempts to retain influence amid inevitable shifts. Consequently, it is flawed and has suffered significant technical corruption in recent decades. Still, it represents a marked improvement over prior systems and is sustained by a tangible balance of power. China’s nuclear parity with Russia and the US will not alter this dynamic – it is already a permanent Security Council member. In short, the prospect of sweeping political change remains distant, and this reality must be confronted with clear-eyed realism.

       How, then, can we prevent the sluggishness and opacity of genuine change from destabilizing the progressively minded Global Majority? The answer is critical for two reasons. First, because challenging Western hegemony demands a unifying vision – one currently absent due to incompatible domestic political values. Second, because the disarray among Western rivals will not revive the old order; the decline of traditional powers stems from internal decay, not external pressure. Persuading them that resistance to Western dominance is futile will only prolong the transition, risking dangerous escalations.

       Thus, we should first temper our tendency to frame global political evolution as a contest between rival systems. While this struggle remains significant – manifest in responses to inequality (domestic and global), neo-colonial exploitation, digital colonialism, Western disregard for international law, and the imposition of “might makes right” logic – we must avoid mimicking the West’s polarizing tactics. Forcing binary choices has already proven destabilizing, even in prosperous regions like Southeast Asia.

       Moreover, we should reconsider the “international order” paradigm itself. This concept is a product of Western political civilization, and engaging with it locks us into a framework tailored to US and European preferences. The order envisioned by Russia and the Global Majority may not resemble the classical model – a rules-based system enforced by military coercion. Instead, we must rethink its foundations, coordinating state efforts based on fresh principles of what is both possible and necessary.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.