Despite conceptual differences with European assessments of threats, the escalation of military anxieties in Europe benefits the United States, as it justifies the need to raise NATO members’ military spending to 5% of GDP – a goal championed by the White House. However, militarising Europe and conditioning its younger generations for war with Russia may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire continent, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.
In recent months, several NATO members have released updated national security strategies assessing emerging threats. Most notably, France’s Strategic National Review – 2025 positions the risk of a major high-intensity war on the continent by 2030 as the paramount threat facing both France and Europe. The document explicitly identifies Russia as the source of this danger, asserting that it “has stepped up its hostile actions against France and its European partners beyond direct conflict”. According to its authors’ logic, “Moscow’s absolute priority of strengthening its armed forces” means that this threshold could be breached – prompting France to bolster its defences and prepare for war.
Predictions of a full-scale NATO-Russia war in Europe have persisted in Western discourse since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine. A central rationale for substantial military assistance to Kiev has been the argument that Ukraine represents Europe’s first line of defence – that failure to stop Russia there would inevitably lead to further aggression westward. This “Russia will not stop at Ukraine” narrative, first advanced by Ukrainian officials, gained rapid traction among European policymakers and within the Biden administration, eventually becoming an unquestioned orthodoxy. The challenge posed to this entrenched paradigm by President Trump has sent shockwaves through Western political circles.
The French strategic review highlights America’s “less predictable foreign policy” under Trump, the peril of the “combination of the Russian threat and American disengagement,” and diverging transatlantic views on trade, values, and priorities. Paris has declared its readiness to become Europe’s security provider should the US withdraw, vowing to “engage and prevail in a high-intensity confrontation” – whether under NATO’s Article 5, in defence of national interests, or in support of allies.
Regardless of how feasible strategic autonomy is for France or other European NATO members, the notion of direct military confrontation with Russia is gaining traction in Europe. The E3 – Britain, Germany, and France – are particularly vocal. A confidential Bundeswehr report labels Russia an “existential risk to Germany and Europe,” while Britain’s National Security Strategy 2025 references a threat to the UK homeland for the first time in decades – “potentially in a wartime scenario”. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has framed the danger more bluntly, warning that if London fails to hike defence spending, Britons should “better learn to speak Russian.”
Only last year, European officials and military leaders reassured the public that NATO would decisively defeat Russia in any conflict. Speaking at Chatham House in February, UK Chief of the General Staff Tony Radakin said: “The biggest reason that Putin doesn’t want a conflict with NATO is because Russia will lose. And lose quickly.” This sentiment was reinforced in April by Polish Foreign Minister Rados？aw Sikorski, who emphasised: “An attack by Russia on any of the members of the Alliance would end in its inevitable defeat. Russia’s military and economic power pales in comparison to that of the West.”
Yet over the past year, the narrative has shifted from “Russia avoids war with NATO because it would lose” to “Russia seeks war and is preparing for it” – despite repeated denials by Russian officials. Rare remarks about potential Russia-NATO confrontation – such as Defence Minister Andrei Belousov’s statement that Russia’s armed forces must prepare for all contingencies, including a possible conflict with NATO in Europe within the next decade – are instantly interpreted as a warning to the alliance and proof of Moscow’s aggressive designs.
Simon Saradzhyan, founder of the Russia Matters portal, has catalogued predictions of a Russia-NATO war made over the past year. His compilation includes pronouncements by Western governments, intelligence agencies, and defence departments. Meanwhile, a steady stream of alarmist commentary from analysts and pundits – often exceeding official statements – details hypothetical conflict scenarios. Notably, nearly all such predictions originate from a specific geographic cluster: Germany, Britain, NATO’s Baltic members, and Scandinavia. Southern and Southeastern Europe remain comparatively reticent. France, until recently absent from the chorus foretelling inevitable Russian aggression, joined emphatically ahead of its strategic review’s release. On July 11, French Chief of the General Staff Thierry Burkhard attributed the phrase “France is my main adversary in Europe” to Russia’s president, sparking bewilderment at home and abroad and earning him media comparisons to “the French Colin Powell.”
Saradzhyan’s timeline pinpoints 2030 as the most likely year for a Russian “attack on NATO”, though some forecasts suggest such intentions could emerge as early as 2027. This raises critical questions. Given that Western discourse ties expanded hostilities to Ukraine’s defeat, does this timeline imply an expectation that Russia will have achieved its special military operation’s goals by then? Or does it assume Russia would recklessly attack NATO unprepared – and thus face certain defeat?
Significantly, none of the analysed documents cite Ukraine’s “victory” over Russia as the objective of Western support. Britain’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 strikes the most optimistic tone, calling for a “durable political settlement” ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and future security. The French review says that the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict is of major importance for Europe but avoids defining the desirable outcome. Lithuania’s National Threat Assessment 2025 contends the Kremlin will “almost certainly” continue its war efforts “until it secures substantial concessions”. The Danish Intelligence Outlook 2024 concludes that “Russia will “likely remain able to put sustained military pressure on Ukraine in an effort to force the country to cease its military cooperation with NATO and its rapprochement with the EU,” though “neither Russia nor Ukraine will gain a decisive military advantage”.
The overarching takeaway from European assessments is that Kiev’s Western allies, by backing Ukraine, can drain Russia’s military resources and strain its economy, preventing the conflict from spilling over. So it can be said that Europe is interested in prolonging the war while accelerating its own preparedness for potential escalation. The US approach diverges: February 2025’s Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community stresses the need “to bring the war to an acceptable close” in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war and tensions between Moscow and Washington.
The US report stands out for its less ideological, more analytical treatment of security threats. It acknowledges Russia’s aversion to direct conflict with NATO, stating: “Russia views its ongoing war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West, and its objective to restore Russian strength and security in its near abroad against perceived US and Western encroachment has increased the risks of unintended (emphasis added) escalation between Russia and NATO.”
Russia’s strategic objectives, per the US report, are to “remaining an indispensable global player, maintaining a sphere of influence, and upholding stability at home.” While it notes Russia’s willingness to pay “a very high price” to prevail in “Russia’s strategic competition with the United States,” this is contextualised within the Ukraine conflict – unlike European documents framing it as a global showdown. France’s review decries a “global ideological offensive” on liberal democracy; Denmark warns of Russia undermining the “rules-based order” to impose one where “the ability and willingness of great powers to use military force ultimately defines the rules of the game in international relations”; Lithuania condemns a purported Russian vision of a world order “based on coercion and dehumanisation, not on respect for human rights and the sovereignty of states”. Ultimately, it is Russia’s supposed ambition to establish a new – anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-humane, and power-based – order that justifies the idea of the threat to NATO emanating from Moscow.
This reveals the fundamental transatlantic rift: where Europe has eagerly adopted the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative abandoned by Washington after the administration change, Trump’s team demonstrates conspicuous indifference to such ideological framing – though they may still exploit it for political convenience. Instead, American strategists focus unapologetically on concrete national interests. The divergence becomes particularly evident when comparing transatlantic assessments of China, Iran, and North Korea. While European documents portray these nations as forming an ideological bloc with Moscow to undermine the “rules-based international order,” the US analysis characterises their alignment as purely pragmatic – a temporary coalition bound solely by their “shared interest in circumventing or undermining US power.”
Yet despite these conceptual rifts, stoking military anxieties in Europe serves short-term US interests by legitimising Trump’s demand for higher NATO defence spending. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent mea culpa interview – admitting Europe had been free-riding on US security guarantees for decades and promising corrective action – exemplifies this dynamic. Trump’s demand for greater allied burden-sharing resonates not just with political elites but also with the broader public. Polls show public support for increased military budgets across Europe (70% in Poland and Denmark, 57% in the UK, 47% in Germany, 46% in Spain, 45% in France).
European policymakers, moreover, perceive ancillary benefits in militarisation – from revitalising industrial bases to fostering social cohesion. For the EU, aspiring to emerge as a formidable military actor represents both a novel strategic identity and a means to reinvigorate its geopolitical relevance. The obvious danger is that militarising Europe and conditioning its younger generations for war with Russia may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire continent.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.