The foundations of Polish foreign policy for 2024, as presented by Radoslaw Sikorski, were not intended for an external listener, but were carefully prepared and presented specifically for domestic political consumption, becoming just another episode of the “Polish-Polish war” between the Civic Platform and Law and Justice. In this confrontation, there is no stake in changing the direction of foreign policy

       Radoslaw Sikorski, the new (old) minister of foreign affairs of Poland, presented the government’s foreign policy programme for 2024 at a meeting of the lower house of parliament on April 25. Unparliamentary expressions were used against foreign opponents, domestic political opponents received ridicule and accusations of unprofessionalism, and allies — present and future — were given promises of maximum loyalty.

       Among the succession of faceless Polish foreign ministers of the last decade, Radoslaw Sikorski is distinguished not only by his colourful biography (Oxford graduate, war reporter for British newspapers in Afghanistan and Angola, winner of prestigious journalistic awards, member of the national and European parliament, etc.) and colossal experience in the domestic political and international field, but also with the ability (and desire) to speak loudly in public, often to the point of provocation. Moreover, Radoslaw Sikorski demonstratively emphasised his independence in thoughts, action and judgments in his own political career — both as part of the government of the Law and Justice party (2005-2007), and in the party ranks of the Civic Platform (since 2007). Let us add that the contents of secretly recorded and published private conversations of Radoslaw Sikorski in a Warsaw restaurant in 2014 colourfully confirm his inherent categoricalness and political incorrectness beyond the point of foul in the assessments of not only his opponents, but also his allies.

       In Polish political practice, the minister of foreign affairs delivers an annual speech (exposé) to the lower house of Parliament, during which the main directions for the country’s foreign policy for the upcoming year are presented. The speech is based on a government-adopted document that outlines the framework for foreign policy activities and sets out the rationale for these activities. This document, on the one hand, provides an overview of the current state of world politics and Poland’s position in global and regional affairs. On the other hand, it presents operational decisions regarding the main areas in which the country implements its foreign policy. Representatives of the diplomatic community, heads of international investor associations, and members of international and non-governmental organizations are invited to attend this event as part of the audience. As a general rule, the presentation of the key areas of foreign policy constitutes a significant event within the domestic political landscape. Within the framework of the deliberations provided for by regulations, each political party represented in parliament is entitled to express itself and pose questions to the presenter.

       On April 25, Radoslaw Sikorski spoke in a style which was somewhat unusual (for a foreign policy audience), but familiar to domestic political debate: a significant part of the “Information on the foundations of Polish foreign policy for 2024” was a list of “mistakes, illusions and unprofessional actions” of the government of Mateusz Morawiecki in the international arena. The caustic remarks and outright derision that the current minister of foreign affairs directed towards his predecessors who were responsible for shaping and implementing the country's foreign policy forced President Andrzej Duda, who is a protégé of a different political camp, to respond in a similar manner during the session of Sejm. We note in parentheses that he is currently looking around the international stage for a suitable position after his second term as president ends in 2025.

       The President of Poland (who, according to the constitution, has some powers in the field of foreign policy) assessed the speech of Radoslaw Sikorski as “unfounded, dividing the Poles. An attack was made on the policy of the previous government... The speech contained half-truths and pathetic statements, which can only be called manipulation and propaganda.” Leaving the internal political contradictions and the mutual ridicule of leading Polish politicians to the parties involved, let’s take a closer look at the content of the speech of the minister of foreign affairs in relation to the main players on the stage of world politics.

       The main foreign policy principle stated by Sikorski is “two-legged” support: strengthening ties with the United States (regardless of whether the Republicans or Democrats are dealing the cards) ensures a strengthening of Poland’s position within the EU.

       In turn, strengthening its position within the EU institutions and relying on key EU players (read Germany and France) strengthen the importance of Poland for the United States in so-called “European affairs”. It is announced that strengthening transatlantic cooperation in the name of security will become a key item on the agenda of the Polish presidency of the EU.

       The Polish adage about the “geopolitical curse of Poland — being located between Russia and Germany” still remains relevant: the Russian and German accents of Polish foreign policy became key in Radoslaw Sikorski’s presentation.

       While reaffirming Germany’s status as a major trading partner and a desirable key ally and partner in NATO and the EU, Poland points to the need to resolve the issue of compensation to the Polish state and Polish citizens for damage caused during the German occupation as an integral part of interstate dialogue. Judging by the inclusion of this issue on the official agenda, it was decided to use the plot of possible compensation as a tool of pressure on Berlin (trolling?) while simultaneously restoring an intensive near-political dialogue through non-governmental organisations and public associations.

       Russia in the document under consideration appears exclusively as an unreasonable aggressor and revisionist — “undermining the foundations of the world order... directly threatening Poland, the Baltic Sea region, the European Union, NATO” and — in the logic of the speech — a general threat to everyone around and even itself. It doesn’t make much sense to examine the accusations and reproaches against Russia contained in the document in detail — its collection of banal insults and utopian ideas differs little from the shared Transatlantic narrative. The Ukraine conflict is presented in a similar way, which in the view of Radoslaw Sikorski is a manifestation of the historical struggle “for the right to become part of the free world.”

       Much more interesting is the rather brief part of the foreign policy programme with which the government of Donald Tusk “enters the world.”

       Poland still uses the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration for Ukraine and Moldova as a tool to counter Russia’s interests in the Baltic and Black Sea region. Part of “this perspective” is the strengthening of the role of so-called “strategic communications” in the region and the expansion of “assistance programmes” for non-governmental and near-governmental organisations (including through the formation of loyalty of future socio-political leaders).

       Strengthening the role of the EU in “global affairs” (up to obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council) is also, in Sikorski’s understanding, in the direct interest of Poland.

       It is noteworthy that, arguing in terms of security and the general world order, the Polish government actually equates NATO and the EU as the single (and only) factor of stability and guarantees, comparing in the context of the Ukraine crisis the economic and military potential of NATO and the EU with the potential of Russia “even together with Belarus.”

       The Polish government considers it absolutely necessary to develop NATO’s military presence on the so-called “eastern border”, the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the development of the Alliance’s military infrastructure on their territory. In Sikorski’s understanding, it strengthens transatlantic unity and security in the Baltic Sea region. Naturally, unconditional active support for Ukraine is a key task for both NATO and the EU in the understanding of the Polish government, which categorically denies the intentions of annexing in any form part of the territory of the neighbouring state.

       An important aspect of the implementation of the foreign policy programme, which has also become a part of domestic policy, is the staff and professionalism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the significant increase in the role of the ministry in shaping and implementing the country’s foreign policy, and the relegation of the office of the president to a secondary position, the decision by Radoslaw Sikorski to replace a significant portion of the embassy staff under the pretence of establishing an apolitical (nonpartisan) diplomatic service actually represents a continuation of efforts to eliminate politically disloyal personnel and establish the ministry of foreign affairs as the sole centre of power in foreign policy decisions.

       The key resource and instrument of foreign policy is maximum loyalty to allies and a readiness to fulfil allied obligations with a declared readiness for confrontation with opponents both within the country and in the international arena. This combative attitude of the minister of foreign affairs gave rise to a fair number of caustic publications in key Polish media; one of the most revealing and characteristic was the analysis of Sikorski’s speech by the famous Polish journalist Lukasz Warzecha under the headline “Whoever is not with us is Putin. Radoslaw Sikorski turns to populism and demagoguery.”

       To sum up, the foundations of Polish foreign policy for 2024, as presented by Radoslaw Sikorski, were not intended for an external listener, but were carefully prepared and presented specifically for domestic political consumption, becoming just another episode of the “Polish-Polish war” between the Civic Platform and Law and Justice. In this confrontation, there is no stake in changing the direction of foreign policy (there may be tactical adjustments while maintaining a supra-party consensus on key areas). The foreign policy agenda — media, clickbait, provocative — as presented by Radoslaw Sikorski has no alternatives; it is the only possible correct and “patriotic” course, implemented by the government of Donald Tusk. Domestic political opponents of this course are declared traitors or “useful idiots” — however, these accusations are exchanged between the opposing sides.

       Thus, we will record that the presentation of the government’s foreign policy agenda had internal political goals within the framework of the confrontation between the government of Donald Tusk and the administration of President Andrzej Duda, where the intermediate goal is the victory of “their” candidate in the 2025 presidential elections, and the strategic goal is the elimination of the economic and socio-political base of a key domestic political opponent. But that is another story.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.