The “new normal” in EU-Russia relations has been a fixture in political and expert debates throughout the last two years. Dramatic political differences sparked off by the Ukrainian crisis made it impossible for both sides to continue being partners as before. The feeling that business as usual was no longer on the agenda dominated analytical publications, minutes of meetings and political addresses. But for a long time, neither Russia nor the EU had a clear vision of a new pattern for relations. Today this pattern is becoming more apparent, at least in the EU Global Strategy, the new foreign and defense policy doctrine.
To delineate the contours of the new relationship with Russia, we must understand what the Strategy is all about. Russia is not the focus of attention. The key factor seems to be its overall logic which, in turn, informs the approach to relations with Russia.
The most important element in the Strategy is reinforcing the EU’s independent security role and making the EU a major regional and global political player. The document represents an attempt to remove the long-standing imbalance between the EU’s economic power and its international political capabilities. Until quite recently, it was hardly possible to portray the EU as an independent political force, despite the long-standing debate over formulating a common security policy. It was focused on promoting its soft power and economic influence. But the EU played a peripheral role in international security issues, remaining in the shadow of the US and NATO. The new Strategy unequivocally reflects Brussels’ resolve to boost its political independence, while retaining close ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Interestingly, the document regards security as an integrated whole, including both purely military threats and numerous humanitarian and economic challenges (energy, migration, failing states in neighboring countries and regions, etc.). Accordingly, the EU bills itself as a force that must independently respond to these challenges and be capable of the widest possible spectrum of actions from classical containment to averting internal crises in neighboring countries. Admittedly, this interpretation is quite justified. In effect, the Strategy addresses security gaps not bridged in full by NATO or the United States. For example, NATO is unlikely to respond effectively to migration challenges or to stop the influx of migrants. It is not designed to deal with failing states in unstable countries, but this is what causes humanitarian problems. Even in the Ukrainian crisis, Brussels’ capacity to act and autonomy from Washington were in question.
Of course, we shouldn’t overestimate the EU’s likely drift from NATO and the United States. But if this Strategy is implemented, we will inevitably see a reformatting of NATO and Transatlantic relations. Sooner or later the “US and the rest” arrangement will be the “US-EU and the rest”, and this will impact NATO. This is unlikely to be formalized in law but may well become political reality.
The quest for greater independence will be achieved in at least three ways: first, developing Europe’s own industrial and technological infrastructure to provide the military with the necessary equipment; second, evolving common security institutions (such as an EU intelligence service); and third, joint efforts, coordinated by Brussels, to deal with the entire spectrum of security issues.
The three ways will inevitably erode the role of individual EU countries. But in exchange they should have a more efficient security system that will cut costs through division of labor, cooperation and synergy. Politically, this arrangement will please numerous small countries reluctant to increase defense spending. But it may also undermine the political role of major players like France, Germany and Italy.
In the economic sphere, however, the EU would welcome greater convergence with the North American economies and closer cooperation with ASEAN and the bigger economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Here the EU faces challenges like economic development, trade and cooperation with other integration alliances (save for the Eurasian Economic Union) – an area where it traditionally has been strong.
Regarding relations with Russia, the Strategy reflects Mogherini’s five points. Russia is portrayed as a source of numerous security threats to the EU. Besides the conflict in Ukraine, there is the threat of hybrid warfare, which Moscow has been accused of waging in the last two years. But the Strategy does not define the amorphous concept of hybrid warfare, and therefore quite logically avoids suggesting any countermeasures. Energy is also discussed in the context of security, where the “Russian threat” looms large as well. An important aspect here is enhancing the role of the EU and the role of its legislation in the energy sphere. Accordingly, individual EU countries will see a decline in their status. But the EU will hardly be able to sever all cooperation with Russia, for which reason the Strategy, like the five points, implies cooperation on a limited number of issues.
What does all this mean for Russia? And how will the “new normal” work?
First, the Strategy is aimed at making the EU the key element of the European security system. Currently, Russia is a threat from this system’s perspective, a country that is alien to it. Even if the existing disputes are resolved and the parties resume their partnership, Russia’s role will at best be marginal. It is losing its partner status in the new European security architecture and has just two options – either play a marginal role or force others to heed its views. The latter would hardly be in the interests of Russia or the EU.
Second, the Strategy fails to solve the fundamental contradictions that led to the Ukrainian crisis. At the very least, it limits opportunities for a versatile policy, as it forces individual countries to choose between the EU and Russia. This will complicate Russia’s relations with countries that will attempt to derive benefits from cooperation with both Russia and the EU. The logic of containment rather than dialogue will be used to prevent crises like the Ukrainian disaster.
Third, Russia’s bilateral relations with individual EU countries, even the bigger ones, will deteriorate, and it will have to evolve a separate policy for security cooperation with the EU if the Strategy is ultimately implemented.
Fourth, the prospects for EU-EAEU cooperation are unclear, even though this is one of the few mechanisms for promoting relations with Russia in a constructive way. If this mechanism fails to start working, it will be more difficult for Russia and its partners to realize the idea of Greater Eurasia.
Fifth, cooperation on issues where EU and Russia have overlapping interests will be tactical rather than conceptual and strategic. This means greater difficulty in making positive cooperation experiences into something systemic.
As is only natural, much depends on how EU itself succeeds in achieving its plans. There are many stumbling blocks on the way, while threats beyond relations with Russia may prove much more serious, making it more expedient to abandon containment in favor of cooperation.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.