The achievements of Russian politics, including the emerging possibility for energy exports are related to the transition to a strategic partnership with China. Attempts to find other partners ranging from Japan and ASEAN countries to New Zealand and the United States have failed. The Russian-Chinese Big Treaty remains the key resource of Russia’s policy in the Pacific, as it was ten years ago.
The recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum on the Indonesian island of Bali has revealed an interesting trend. Just before the forum, a wave of criticism of Russia's policy in the Asia-Pacific Region swept the media. The U.S. and some Russian experts focused on two issues. First, the unrealistic nature of the Russian economic projects developed just before the 2012 APEC leaders’ meeting in Vladivostok. Second, the weakening of the Russian positions in the Pacific. In both cases, the issue concerns Moscow's inability to build a constructive dialogue with the leading nations of the Asia-Pacific Region.
Such criticism appears strange at first glance. The Russian side didn’t come up with any ambitious projects at the APEC forum in Vladivostok, such as the joint development of the Far East, ensuring energy security in the Asia-Pacific Region or transferring the Russian capital to the Pacific Ocean. These issues were popular with Russian experts in the early 2010s. However, about six months before the APEC forum in Vladivostok (perfectly timed to Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidential office), Moscow gradually rejected the idea of discussing major projects. Objectively, the role of APEC is declining because the nation behind it – the United States – is losing interest in it.
At the same time, there’s a sense that the Russian policy has failed, which is associated with a certain disappointment on the part of Russian society with Russia’s policy in the Pacific. The issue is not about specific failed initiatives. The problem runs deeper. Over the past years, Moscow has failed to achieve the key goal of diversifying its policy in the Pacific.
Building a dialogue with Asia-Pacific nations
Forming a strategic partnership with China was the key focus of Russia's policy in the Pacific region. Back in 1997, the countries proclaimed the concept of a multipolar world. This system was formed conclusively when the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation (the Big Treaty) was signed on July 16, 2001. The document comprises three groups of articles. The first group is about the political framework for cooperation where the parties have declared their commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect for each other's right to choose their own development path. The second includes allied commitments involving regular consultations on issues of peace and security. The third concerns consultations on developing a common political platform.
Establishing partnership with China was a major success for Russian diplomacy. However, Moscow was concerned about developing excessive dependence on China and hoped to attract technical resources to modernize the Russian Far East. Therefore, beginning in 2001, Russia's policy in the Asia-Pacific Region became, in fact, an attempt to build another system of dialogue with the Pacific countries that would not depend on its relations with China.
The dialogue with Japan was the first such attempt. In 1982, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said that Tokyo would be raising the issue of the Northern Territories during each of its talks with Moscow. This blocked the possibility of developing economic relations between our two nations. Russia tried to separate the territorial dispute from economic relations. On October 13, 1993, President Yeltsin declared recognition of all international agreements signed by the USSR, including the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956. On November 1, 1997, President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to treat the peace treaty negotiations and the Northern Territories’ issue separately. This policy was re-affirmed in 2000 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori.
Theoretically, Hatoyama's strategy presented a window of opportunity. On February 7, 2010, the day of Northern Territories, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama spoke about the need to develop trade and economic relations with Russia. However, the government of Naoto Kan, which came to power in September 2010, refused to follow through with such policies. Russian-Japanese relations were marred by two crises: one caused by President Medvedev’s visit to the southern Kuril Islands on October 29, 2010 and one caused by the adoption by the Japanese parliament of the act on occupation of the southern Kuril islands on February 7, 2011. The Yosihiko Noda government, which came to power in September 2011, attempted to revive Hatoyama policies. However, the dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo was unsuccessful.
Building a dialogue with Vietnam was the second such attempt. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of alliance of 1978 ceased to be effective. The Treaty on Fundamentals of Friendly Relations was signed in 1994 instead. In November 1997, it was supplemented by the Declaration on Promoting Trade, Economic and Science and Technical Cooperation. The following documents were signed during President Putin's visit to Hanoi on March 1, 2001: the Declaration on Strategic Partnership, an intergovernmental protocol on the inventory of the legal framework and the existing bilateral agreements, and documents on expanding cooperation in the oil and gas industry. In 2010, Moscow and Hanoi proclaimed the transition to a comprehensive partnership.
In reality, however, the comprehensive partnership with Vietnam failed to materialize. The parties have not signed an agreement on free trade or even a standard intergovernmental trade agreement. An agreement on the basics of Russian-Vietnamese relations hasn’t been signed either. Vietnam was in Russia’s way when Russia tried to partner up with ASEAN. Neither Russia nor Vietnam came up with any serious initiatives in this area.
The third attempt was related to ASEAN. Back in 1996, Russia received the status of the association’s partner. On November 29, 2004, Russia joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976. On December 13, 2005, the Joint Declaration of the Leaders of Russia and ASEAN on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership was signed. At the same time, a Comprehensive Action Program to Develop Cooperation between Russia and ASEAN for 2005-2015 was adopted. In 2009 President Dmitry Medvedev put forward a project to create the format of consultations “ASEAN plus 7” with Russia as a key partner of the Association. The countries of Southeast Asia, referring to a protest by Australia, refused to grant Russia the status of a member of the East Asia Summit. Russia and the U.S. joined the EAS only in 2010. Until now, Russia does not have a free trade agreement with any country in ASEAN.
The fourth attempt had to do with developing relations within APEC. The Obama administration has shown interest in resuming economic partnership. The experts have studied several scenarios of relations between Russia and the United States:
- Expanding economic relations between the neighboring territories (Alaska-Chukotka, Alaska-Kamchatka, and the Bering Sea coast);
- Creating free economic zones in these areas;
- Developing ports to the north of the Vladivostok-Vancouver line;
- Creating (possibly jointly with South Korea) a circle of nuclear power plants around the northern Pacific coast.
However, after the 2009 Singapore Forum, the U.S. interest in APEC began to wane. Washington is striving to replace APEC with a more effective organization, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Following the 2012 Vladivostok meeting, the TPP became the focus of intergovernmental relations between the United States and the Asia-Pacific countries. That was the reason for failure of Russian ambitious projects at the APEC in 2009-2010.
The achievements of Russian politics, including the emerging possibility for energy exports are related to the transition to a strategic partnership with China. Attempts to find other partners ranging from Japan and ASEAN countries to New Zealand and the United States have failed. Likewise, the prospects of the APEC project aren’t clear either because of the crisis of the concept of trans-Pacific integration and the uncertain position of the forum with regard to the territorial integrity of states. APEC Forum in Bali points that the Russian-Chinese Big Treaty remains the key resource of Russia’s policy in the Pacific, as it was ten years ago.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.