The current dilemma in Ukraine-European Union relations reveals serious shortcomings in the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Since the program was launched in 2008, none of its six target nations have managed to advance to a level where the EU association mechanism could be applied in full measure. Some are still struggling to get their economies on track; others have difficulty putting their political house in order.

       As for Ukraine, it is buying time by sitting on the fence. On the one hand, it seeks to preserve and further expand its ties with the Russian market. On the other, it aspires to a closer partnership with the EU, hoping for new market opportunities there. And the question looks like it’s here to stay. To complicate matters further, Ukraine now finds itself under strong pressure from both sides. Brussels opposes the prospect of Ukraine joining Russia in the post-Soviet Customs Union, whereas Moscow objects to its potential integration into the EU. Kiev has chosen to take a wait-and-see stance for now, with no clear answer in sight.

       There are three basic scenarios for how this situation could play out. One possibility is that European integration remains a strategic choice with Ukraine, in which case it will have its EU association agreement signed eventually. This option has a lot of supporters in Ukraine, although, admittedly, the process is going to be both costly and time-consuming. It may take Ukraine about ten years to adjust its government system to European standards with no immediate benefits likely.

       Some Eastern European countries went through this adjustment in the late 1990s-early 2000s, when the EU still had money to offer as bailouts. But given today’s economic and financial difficulties, Ukraine may be on its own. If Ukraine’s leaders opt for the European approach to development, the nation will have to go through a tough decade of government system restructuring, with many political careers ending in ruins. But the European-style legal system to be formed as a result would enable Ukraine to more easily integrate into globalization trends.

       Another possibility is for Ukraine to develop partnerships, albeit weaker ones, with both Russia and the EU. To achieve this, a trilateral commission would have to be set up for Kiev and Moscow to try to convince Brussels of the need to create a mechanism that would allow a double affiliation. Personally, I see this scenario as the more realistic one.

       Ukraine could also decide in favor of collaboration with Russia, to eventually join the Customs Union and the Eurasian market. This choice would be an economically motivated one as it is no secret that Ukrainian goods are more competitive in the markets of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus than elsewhere. Rapprochement with Russia could give Ukrainian industry a boost.

       But the country would miss out on several opportunities, including the consolidation of the national regulatory base and reorganizing to European standards. For Ukraine, joining Russia in the Customs Union would be a step toward Asia rather than Europe.

       Moscow is likely to approve of both the second and the third scenarios while Brussels may find only the first option acceptable.

       Also, it’s possible that Europe could just run out of patience. The European Parliament is in for a fresh election next May. A new Parliament’ views on the Ukrainian issue remain to be seen, but chances are it will turn out less geopolitically-motivated than the current one.

       There are several reasons why Ukraine has put off the signing of the EU association agreement. Viktor Yanukovych’s decision was prompted largely by Yulia Tymoshenko, who is seen as a serious challenger in the 2015 elections. Indeed, Ms Tymoshenko is a strong political influence, with solid support and potential.

       Another reason is Ukraine’s weak economy. Unlike Russia, the country has no natural resources of its own; nor does it boast high technology as Germany does. This is why Ukraine should base its decisions on the domestic economy’s mid-term potential. Meaning they will be better off siding with Russia. Ukraine, which has failed to restructure its energy sector independent from Russia, can still rely on its Eastern neighbor for pragmatic business cooperation. This decision would also save Ukraine the time and money required for the adjustment to European standards.

       The decision to put the EU association agreement on hold must have been made under pressure from the oligarchs who are influential in Ukraine’s upper echelons of power. They need this accord to get EU legal protection for their businesses. On the other hand, they are reluctant to run their businesses in line with European requirements, including transparency, organizing trade unions, and applying Western auditing standards. But they are not willing to lose their solid financial ties with Russia. This is what makes me think the decision to suspend the European integration process comes primarily from Ukraine’s business elite.

       Russia should not, in my estimation, get involved in European geopolitics and, then take credit for Ukraine’s decision, as if it was a Russian geopolitical achievement.

       The Cold War is a thing of the past. It is important that Russian leadership focus on practical and positive decisions, bearing in mind that Russia’s own future lies in Europe rather than Asia, where it risks being overshadowed by China.

       It is also important to understand that Russia would never have signed an association agreement with the EU if it included the terms that are being offered to Ukraine, that is, with the European Union acting as a mentor. Any alliance between Russia and the EU is possible only on condition of equality. This implies that stability on the European continent can only be ensured through cooperation and good-neighbourly relations between Russia, the European Union, and Ukraine.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.