Russian-Chinese relations are receiving new interesting opportunities “after Crimea.” Neither Russia nor China will accept attempts to isolate Moscow on the world scene, and this attitude will prompt them to insist more actively on the reform of the global governance system, the existing world order and modern international law.
Today Russian-Chinese relations and the entire system of international relations are going through “the trial of Ukraine.” The Ukrainian crisis has shown that the modern world order and its international legal framework designed for “nation states” do not meet the obvious realities. It has now become clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine have yet completed the formation of their nations and construction of their nation states. The USSR’s disintegration in 1991 was just the beginning of this process, which may take a long time.
An understanding of these realities would help the West react more adequately to what is happening in Ukraine and Crimea. Formally, this move really goes beyond the limits established earlier for standard “nation states” but these limits ignore the interests of those who do not fit in into them for objective historical reasons. Better understanding and tolerance rather than alarmist statements and threats of isolation would facilitate normalization and restoration of relations between Russia and the West.
China seems to realize this. I share the view that China is treating Russia’s actions as regards Ukraine with understanding. If the current crisis prompts Russia to speed up its turn to the East, China will derive benefits from not joining Western sanctions against Moscow.
Moreover, China will be able to help Russia in this predicament: both by its experience countering Western sanctions introduced after the events on Tiananmen Square in June 1989 (at that time the attempt to isolate China completely fell through) and through positive cooperation allowing sanctions to be alleviated (as happened after sanctions were imposed on Iran).
We should have no illusions about Beijing’s position. China is refraining from open support of Russia on the Ukrainian issue for fear that it may be interpreted as encouragement of separatist attitudes in Tibet and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (previously China refrained from recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the same reason). Also, China is reluctant to risk open confrontation with the West over Russia and Ukraine. Beijing has occupied a reserved neutral position and is even ready to act as a mediator in this dispute. However, attempts of the United States and EU countries to win its support have not been (and will not be) successful. US President Barack Obama’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the nuclear security summit in the Hague, and Xi Jinping's European tour, have made this abundantly clear.
The Ukrainian crisis has created incredibly favorable conditions for Chinese diplomacy. I am not referring to just the readiness “to observe the fight of two tigers from the top of a hill.” All sides involved in the Ukraine-related conflict are trying to curry favor with Beijing, which, following its win-win strategy, will use this opportunity to develop relations with all sides on its own terms.
This would be a powerful catalyst for Russia’s “turn to the East” in its relations with China. Having announced this turn, the Russian leaders have not yet embarked on its implementation. There are grounds to expect invigoration of Russian-Chinese dialogue across the board: trade and economic relations, cross-border and inter-regional cooperation and cultural and humanitarian ties.
Some experts in Russia have even started talking about the formation of a bilateral military-political alliance in the style of the 1950s. This is hardly possible because neither side is ready to restrict its national interests in its partner’s favor or forego its sovereignty in key decision-making (this is exactly what is implied in the classic military-political alliance). However, Russia and China may indeed go for closer rapprochement and coordination of political and diplomatic efforts and military-technical cooperation.
This future would be prompted not by a desire “to make friends against the West” but by an attempt to ensure national and geopolitical interests in these conditions by concerted effort. This would be an attempt to invent a new game with a positive sum by influencing the making of its rules. China, which is increasingly active in global governance, understands (on par with Russia) that many of its Western-imposed mechanisms are imperfect and inefficient. Neither Russia nor China will accept attempts to isolate Moscow on the world scene, and this attitude will prompt them to insist more actively on the reform of the global governance system, the existing world order and modern international law.
Russian-Chinese relations are receiving new interesting opportunities “after Crimea.” China has set forth a large-scale initiative to create a New Silk Route. At his meeting with Xi Jinping in Sochi during the Olympics, President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s interest in this project and its readiness to take part in it. Crimea is a key link in the New Silk Route.
A considerable part of the agreements on trade and economic cooperation and loans signed by Viktor Yanukovych in China on the eve of the dramatic events that ousted him from power concerned Crimea. Will the new, Russian Crimea take part in their implementation?
This is just one example illustrating the well-known thesis that a new crisis means new opportunities: a chance to derive lessons from the past and move to the future.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.