The past four years have shown that the MSC stands a better chance. It has become a respected platform where the world’s top leaders meet to discuss original security programs, whereas EASI is focused on the secondary issues of historical legacy in Russia’s relations with the East European countries.
It is no coincidence that the 50th Munich Security Conference, which will be held from January 31 to February 2, will be the focus of attention for international experts. Over the past 20 years, the leading countries’ officials have made many policy statements in the capital of Bavaria, Germany. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech on February 10, 2007 was evidence of growing EU-Russia tensions. US Vice President Joe Biden spoke about the planned US-Russian reset policy on February 7, 2009. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov urged the international community to involve small nuclear countries in the nuclear disarmament talks. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton supported the Arab Spring, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put forth the bloc’s new military-political doctrine in Munich. The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), a project launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2009, presented its report, Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community, at the 48th Munich conference in February 2012.
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) was established as an unofficial platform in 1962. It was sponsored by the Christian Social Union until the German government assumed financial obligations for it. Outwardly, the MSC is similar to other international non-governmental conferences such as the EASI and other Carnegie Endowment projects, the Bergedorf Round Table of the Korber Foundation, and the Dartmouth Conference. Why then do global leaders attend the Munich conference with such particular eagerness?
It would seem that the rapid growth of the MSC’s popularity is rooted in the ever decreasing role of the OSCE. In 1990, NATO and Warsaw Pact leaders agreed to use the OSCE to ensure European security and to turn Europe into a “bloc-less” region. The past 25 years show that the OSCE has failed them. The unwieldy OSCE mechanism is struggling on, but it is at other platforms that European issues are addressed and resolved.
First, the OSCE agenda became increasingly strayed from practical issues after 1990. The OSCE adopted many declarations on overcoming the Cold War legacy and building a united Europe, but most of these documents have little to do with such real security issues as NATO’s eastward expansion, the Five-Day War between Georgia and Russia, or the deployment of US BMD elements in Europe.
Second, the OSCE has become a source of growing tension between NATO and Russia. As a result, the OSCE has not adopted any summit declarations since 2003. Moscow first proposed reforming the OSCE in 2004. On December 5, 2006, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said for the first time that Russia may withdraw from the OSCE. The Kremlin has not yet taken this step, but it is a fact that the OSCE summits have not adopted a single serious decision since then and were limited to only the NATO-Russia exchange of human rights accusations.
Third, the OSCE has not settled a single military-political conflict in Europe. During the 1992 Balkan conflict, it delegated its powers to the UN and NATO, and its mediation in the Karabakh and Transnistria conflicts has not been successful. Its attempt to stabilize relations between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2010 failed too.
Fourth, the period of the OSCE stagnation coincided with the crisis of its mediation efforts. The OSCE was devised as Europe’s third power with an independent military potential and the ability to mediate between Russia and the United States. France has played this role since the mid-1960s, until President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) abandoned the tradition of Charles de Gaulle and began to reshape France as the US and Britain’s junior partner. Other European countries, primarily Britain and Germany, so far lack the resources to take over the role that France traditionally played.
This problem could be resolved by establishing an effective alternative to the OSCE, based on the round tables and expert forums of the 1970s. The most probable candidates for this role are the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI).
The past four years have shown that the MSC stands a better chance. It has become a respected platform where the world’s top leaders meet to discuss original security programs, whereas EASI is focused on the secondary issues of historical legacy in Russia’s relations with the East European countries. Its largest achievement to date is the afore-mentioned 2012 report, which only repeated the OSCE declarations on the need to lay the Cold War legacy to rest. It is therefore logical that EASI is turning into an MSC panel.
The connection between the MSC and EASI is also interesting because both forums are focused on Germany, a country with traditionally strong Euro-Atlantic positions. Euro-Atlanticists recognize US leadership in Europe but have been trying to limit Washington’s freedom of action by urging it to sign mutually binding agreements. Germany’s central role in European security discussions may balance the strengthening Franco-British tandem and the growing US influence in the EU. This is important for Russian diplomacy, which has greater affinity for the Euro-Atlanticists in Paris and Berlin than for the Atlanticists in London and Amsterdam.
Time will show if the MSC will become a real alternative to the OSCE. But its importance in recent times has grown dramatically. In fact, it is the only forum where Russia and NATO countries, including the United States, can seriously discuss their security problems. If they want to keep this platform for their strategic dialogue, they must prevent the MSC from deteriorating into a kind of EASI.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.