One of the most important events of last year for Russia’s national defense was the adoption and launch of the State Arms Procurement Program for 2011-2020. It heralded the start of a large-scale rearmament of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the introduction of new and up-to-date weapons and military equipment. Long overdue and inertia-laden, the move to re-equip the military is a highly important – and extremely expensive – component of Anatoly Serdyukov’s military reform.

       The equipment of the Russian Armed Forces simply does not pass muster. Available weapons systems are inferior to their Western equivalents. Moreover, they are so physically old that they are impossible to operate. This was on full display during Russia’s 2008 peace-enforcement operation in Georgia when numerous defective tanks, armored and motor vehicles malfunctioned during en route. If implemented, the State Arms Procurement Program will help increase the share of modern weapons to 70% and even replace some weapons systems completely.

       Obviously, such ambitious plans imply far greater funding for defense procurement. In the next ten years, the Defense Ministry alone is to receive 19.5 trillion rubles ($635.8 billion). Consequently, annual funding will total almost two trillion rubles or some $53 billion. This exceeds spending levels in France, the United Kingdom and Germany, which have larger and better-developed economies.

       Naturally, analysts are divided over the size of allocations. Former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin has openly criticized such plans. On the whole, liberal analysts see the State Arms Procurement Program as a sign of militarization and the victory of the anti-modernization political course. Indeed, one can predict that national defense spending will have to be increased, reaching 4% of Russia’s GDP. This will make it possible to implement specific rearmament plans, to raise the pay of military personnel, and to intensify combat training programs. This is the maximum possible level of defense spending while maintaining sustained economic growth. Of course, it would be preferable to invest in human resources, including healthcare and education, and the relevant infrastructure. Nevertheless, this is the absolute minimal spending necessary to make up for the 15-year drought when no weapons or military equipment were procured. At that time, Russia’s conventional forces did not receive any new equipment. No conventional weapons were procured. Moreover, if we don’t accomplish this objective today, then this will lead to even greater spending in the future. On the whole, the impending increase in defense spending represents the minimum necessary given demand and the maximum possible given available economic and financial capacity.

       Under the rearmament program, weapons will be purchased from abroad. This new practice is in glaring contrast with Soviet-era military-technical policy after World War II, which put self-sufficiency and self-reliance above all. On the other hand, the current practice is nothing but a return to pre-revolutionary Russian concepts. It also incorporates Soviet-era practices of the 1930s. It should be noted that even the most powerful, technologically advanced and industrial countries, including the United States, buy foreign weapons in a modern globalized world. For instance, the United States spends billions of dollars a year on foreign military equipment. However, one should keep in mind that such purchases are primarily conducted within military-political and even civilizational alliances. Notably, intra-NATO military trade accounts for the bulk of the alliance’s military imports. Of course, Russia has found itself in a more difficult and sensitive situation because of its “strategic solitude” and because it lacks allies with a well-developed defense industry and military technologies. Consequently, Russia will be forced to opt for a rather selective approach regarding foreign purchases. Such purchases will be conducted on a limited scale, and they will hardly be called hi-tech. It appears that such purchases will prioritize troop control, reconnaissance and communications systems, as well as unmanned combat air vehicles, personnel-training systems and simulators and navigational equipment. Russia will receive most of these systems from France, Germany, Italy and Israel.

       On the whole, the Russian defense sector’s relatively serious technological lag, as well as its limited industrial and economic capacity, provides no alternative to limited military imports. Due to the lack of well-developed legislation for organizing tenders and managing offset transactions, as well as the rampant corruption in Russia, this practice will creates numerous opportunities for financial fraud and lead to a situation similar to India where corruption scandals linked with foreign arms purchases are a constant. Today it is clear that the purchase of Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which exceed the Russian Navy’s actual requirements, has the potential for precisely such a scandal. After all, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and French ship-builder DCN, which manufactures Mistral class ships, have a rather controversial reputation on the global arms market.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.