The P5+1 group of international mediators will meet in Moscow on June 18-19 in an attempt to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. The forthcoming meeting raises expectations due in part to the fact that the European Union had imposed extremely tough economic and financial sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and to changes in the political situation in Iran.

       The P5+1 group of international mediators will meet in Moscow on June 18-19 in an attempt to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. The last two meetings were held in Istanbul in mid-April and in Baghdad in late May. The forthcoming meeting raises expectations due in part to the fact that the European Union had imposed extremely tough economic and financial sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and to changes in the political situation in Iran.

       Victory in the recent parliamentary elections allowed the Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei to take the lead in addressing the Iranian nuclear crisis. For the first time in recent years, Tehran agreed to limit the enrichment of uranium-235 to 20% during the Istanbul meeting. This proposal was not met with an appropriate response from the West, which adversely affected the outcome of the meetings in Istanbul and Baghdad. To help the process along, Brussels could have simply pulled back on the financial and economic sanctions in exchange for Iran suspending uranium enrichment. Instead, the West insisted on a deal to swap Iran’s low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor. The issue is no longer relevant, though, since Iran is now capable of making nuclear fuel on its own.

       Iran has made significant progress on its enrichment program. The enrichment plant in Natanz uses 52 R-1 gas centrifuge cascades (8,528 centrifuges), which made it possible for Iran to accumulate about 6 metric tons of low-enriched 3.5% uranium by May 1, 2012. Combined with two other uranium enrichment plants, the existing stockpiles of fissile material can be used to manufacture five nuclear warheads, provided a political decision is made to militarize the nuclear program. Naturally this provokes concern in the international community, especially given the lack of plausible reasons for continuing to enrich uranium (there is only one nuclear reactor in Iran and it uses Russian nuclear fuel). As a result, six UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue have already been passed, four of which impose various sanctions on Iran.

       Iran may also be producing weapons-grade uranium, which could involve the use of nuclear materials that are registered or not registered with the IAEA. This looks more likely considered that Iran has begun independent production of uranium concentrate at the Gchine deposit near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province. What’s more, Tehran has failed to comply with the requirements of the Additional Protocol (1997) and the modified Code 3.1 of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. In light of this, IAEA inspectors should expand their activities in Iran. But this is impracticable without progress at the upcoming P5+1 talks in Moscow.

       Russia's position on the Iranian nuclear issue is very clear: Moscow supports Tehran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, but demands compliance with the international non-proliferation regime. Unlike the West, Russia bases its policy on a phased approach and reciprocity, which provides more flexibility. It shuns unilateral pressure and instead focuses on the search for an acceptable compromise that could involve the suspension of uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting a substantial part of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the EU.

       The Moscow round of negotiations will no doubt be difficult. The sides have so far failed to bridge the divide between their positions. A lot will depend on the ability of the EU to lure Tehran in with financial and economic incentives. If progress can be made in Moscow, this will at least temporarily halt the escalation of the Iranian nuclear crisis, providing hope that a peaceful solution is possible. Otherwise, the probability of an armed conflict – and perhaps even a regional war with unpredictable consequences – will significantly increase.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.