A Second Yalta would be an acceptable but not ideal option. First debated by US foreign policy commentators in 2011, the idea is to hold an international conference to write new rules of the game in the post-Soviet space, just as the original Yalta Conference divided Europe into spheres of influence in 1945.

       The summit of Ukraine, the Customs Union and the EU in Minsk did not produce a ceasefire agreement for Donbass, but it made clear that Ukraine is interested in discussing the terms of a deal to end the conflict. The offensive launched by self-defense forces in southeast Ukraine may give Kiev additional incentive to negotiate. The sides seem to be working toward a compromise, which is how all other armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space have ended.

       However, against the backdrop of these encouraging signs, Russia-NATO tensions continue to grow. NATO has not invited President Vladimir Putin to its summit in Wales, instead inviting his Ukrainian counterpart. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced NATO’s intention to draft a strategy to counter “Russian aggression,” which provides, in part, for the deployment of NATO military assets in Eastern European member countries. The Obama administration is scathingly critical of any step Moscow takes to address the conflict in Ukraine, and accuses Russia of violating the 1987 INF Treaty. In fact, it is the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act that is endangered.

       Over the summer Russian diplomats worked to put together a contact group on Ukraine involving Russia, Germany and France. Paris and Berlin were supposed to mediate between the Kremlin and the White House and propose a mutually acceptable solution to the Ukrainian crisis. This was a logical strategy. French and German diplomats have brokered compromises between Moscow and Washington in most conflicts over the past 20 years (from Bosnia to the 2008 short war between Russia and Georgia). Although the terms of the compromise have always been closer to the US than the Russian position, the final agreement was acceptable to all sides.

       While Franco-German mediation is the best possible scenario for Russia-NATO relations, it is unlikely. The hard line of Angela Merkel’s cabinet makes it clear that on key issues Berlin will support Washington over Moscow. The Hollande cabinet has a more flexible policy but sides with Kiev on major issues. The Ukrainian crisis has confirmed the unpleasant fact that the United States and mainland Europe remain close partners. Absent Franco-German mediation, the West has become uniformly unfriendly (though not hostile) to Russia. Attempts to exploit Western divisions have failed so far.

       A Second Yalta would be an acceptable but not ideal option. First debated by US foreign policy commentators in 2011, the idea is to hold an international conference to write new rules of the game in the post-Soviet space, just as the original Yalta Conference divided Europe into spheres of influence in 1945. US Vice President Joe Biden rejected the idea at that time, but it may become more likely in two cases – if the war spreads to other parts of Ukraine, for instance the Kharkov or Zaporozhiye regions, or if a gas dispute with Russia or the deterioration of Ukraine’s social infrastructure triggers the collapse of the state.

       The United States and Germany are not interested in partitioning Ukraine, which in its current borders guarantees the USSR will not return in any form. However, the destructive forces set loose in Ukraine may force them to accept a Second Yalta in the end. The issues that are the highest priority for the EU are Ukraine’s nuclear and chemical infrastructure, gas transit system, and the potential of quasi-state entities to appear on its territory. Therefore, it is not impossible that Russia and NATO will decide Ukraine’s destiny together.

       An international conference on Ukraine could hypothetically freeze the armed conflict, as in Transnistria and Nagorny Karabakh, but this wouldn’t improve Russia’s relations with America or the EU. If Ukraine’s balkanization becomes inevitable, NATO countries will try to push their sphere of influence in Ukraine as far east as possible, putting an end to the Russian-German partnership that brought Moscow considerable dividends оver the past 20 years. Berlin has acted as a mediator in disputes, reduced tensions between Russia and America, and helped Russia maneuver within the Western diplomatic community.

       Experts often compare the escalating standoff between Russia and NATO to the Cold War, which is not quite right. There were no territorial disputes between the USSR and the United States in the Europe since 1962; their rivalry was confined largely to the Third World. Now, NATO’s eastward expansion has recreated the conflict zone known as the Intermarium between the Baltic and Black seas in the form of Russian-US competition for influence across this vast swath of countries from Finland to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

       The EU Eastern Partnership Program triggered the conflict in Ukraine and will ultimately lead to the repartition of the Intermarium. The Customs Union countries will have to redraw borders with EU partners in order to resolve the status of “unrecognized” or “partially recognized” states: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh and recently Novorossiya. Meanwhile, both Russia and NATO have military infrastructure in the Intermarium, and so it is hard to say whether they will be able to peacefully revise the borders between the Baltic and Black seas.

       Russian experts predicted the current conflict in Ukraine as soon as the Eastern Partnership was launched in May 2009, but EU countries studiously avoided any discussion of this issue. Today there are too many obstacles standing in the way of a realistic Russia-NATO dialogue on changes in the Intermarium. The question is whether dialogue will be possible in the foreseeable future.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.