Ukraine has not preserved its 1991 borders. The signing of the Geneva memorandum on April 17 reaffirmed the willingness of Russia, the United States and EU countries to reach a compromise. While the sides continue to trade tough talk and symbolic sanctions, the Kremlin and the White House are also holding a parallel dialogue on the coordinated geopolitical revision of Eastern Europe.
The signing of the Geneva memorandum on April 17 reaffirmed the willingness of Russia, the United States and EU countries to reach a compromise. In the past month the world media was filled with talk about the start of a new Cold War. But this did not come to pass. Instead, while the sides continue to trade tough talk and symbolic sanctions against some high-ranking officials, the Kremlin and the White House are also holding a parallel dialogue on the coordinated geopolitical revision of Eastern Europe.
The situation is reminiscent of what happened in the mid-1800s. After the 1848 revolutions, Italy and Germany were swept by powerful unification movements aimed at revising European borders. The great powers opted to work together to compromise with the revisionists, Sardinia and Prussia, making it possible to prolong the order established by the Congress of Vienna, which had paid dividends to all sides for half a century. The question is whether this experience can be repeated now.
Washington’s interests
The United States has shown ambivalence on the Ukrainian crisis. The Obama administration does not want all-out confrontation with Russia. However, for Washington the existing borders in the post-Soviet space guarantee the inviolability of the world order that took shape in the early 1990s. With this in mind, the White House is pursing three goals with respect to Ukraine.
First, the Obama administration fears that other countries, primarily US allies, will start to doubt US leadership. The White House keeps threatening Russia with additional sanctions and flexing its naval muscles in the Black Sea to prove to its allies that it can still talk to Moscow from a position of strength. Washington thinks that otherwise Central European countries may question the reliability of US security guarantees under NATO.
Second, the White House does not want to sever dialogue with Russia. For all the public bluster, Americans continue consultations with Moscow both on Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation and Ukraine’s federalization. Washington fears that Moscow may unilaterally revise post-Soviet borders, and the challenge for American diplomacy is to prove to allies that Russia cannot take any action without US approval.
Third, the Obama administration is modifying the US presence in Eastern Europe. The Ukraine crisis is helping Washington achieve two aims – consolidate the Polish-led Vyshegrad Group and undermine the Russian-German partnership.
Washington is also working around the 1936 Montreux Convention by building up its military presence in Romania and Bulgaria. American experts are concerned that for all its expansion NATO lacks real infrastructure for projecting power in the Baltics and Black Sea region, potentially undermining US guarantees under NATO.
Washington is against any change in the configuration of East European borders, which currently benefits the US. But if this proves impossible to prevent, Washington seems prepared to discuss the terms of revision, while insisting on gradual steps and the consent of the other parties to this demonstration of US supremacy.
Moscow’s interests
For Russia the Ukraine crisis is closely linked with the issue of the Eurasian Union. In October 2011, Vladimir Putin called creating the Eurasian Union, and its promise of deeper integration than the Customs Union, the key goal of his new term as president. For the next two years Moscow tried to recruit Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine as members. The Kremlin might have perceived the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement as a US play against the Eurasian Union.
Russia sees Euromaidan not as another coup but as the collapse of the Ukrainian state. Viktor Yanukovych was duly elected president in 2010. His ouster shows that western and central Ukraine are completely indifferent to the interests of the south and east, which is why the latter want security guarantees against arbitrary moves by the new Ukrainian authorities.
For now, Russia has solved two problems. It has managed to ensure Crimea’s relatively painless accession and to raise the issue of Ukraine’s federalization to the international level. Discussion of the latter has dampened diplomatic tensions over Crimea. I think it would be ideal for Moscow if Ukraine became a federation of three republics: Southeastern Ukraine, Ukraine proper and a Rusyn-Hungarian autonomous region in Transcarpathia. This may well be the outcome if the OECD is engaged more broadly in a settlement and Kiev is gently prodded to compromise.
The danger for Russia lies elsewhere. The Kremlin’s strategy to achieve compromise at the talks with the United States is causing growing discontent in Russian society, especially in the provinces, where a powerful movement is taking shape. Its members are demanding that Russia respond adequately to the US threat of sanctions (for instance, a complete ban on NATO transit to Afghanistan, withdrawal from the New START Treaty and all other arms control treaties, and the start of real support for Iran and Syria). Putin is receiving a mandate from voters “to cause the Americans some pain,” and this could greatly complicate the Kremlin’s attempts to negotiate a loose federal structure in Ukraine.
Warsaw versus Budapest?
The Ukraine crisis is perceived differently by the two leading countries of the Baltics and Black Sea region. Warsaw has denounced Russia for its actions, but the government of Donald Tusk is trying to avoid tough statements. Warsaw is not worried about changes to borders (the Poles have territorial claims on Ukraine). The Polish authorities have invested too much to turn Kiev toward the EU and NATO since the mid-1990s to give up now. Failure will be perceived as another setback for Polish diplomacy. This is why Warsaw is trying to get Washington involved in the Ukraine crisis.
Hungary’s approach is different. After WWII the Hungarians became a divided nation: ethnic Hungarians live in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia. As early as 1991, Prime Minister József Antall voiced the idea of uniting Greater Hungary. As a result, Budapest has taken a very soft position on Russia’s actions. The government of Viktor Orban sees Ukraine as a useful precedent for gaining recognition of fully-fledged Hungarian autonomies in Transylvania, Transcarpathia and probably southern Slovakia.
Such attitudes in Hungarian society are creating a foundation for Russian-Hungarian partnership. Moscow and Budapest have conducted an intensive dialogue since 2005. Russia’s changing attitude to borders in Eastern Europe may create a new reality. Moscow may perceive the Greater Hungary project as a natural counterbalance to Warsaw and Washington’s plans to consolidate the Vyshegrad Group.
Berlin’s interests
Germany has been hardest hit by the Ukraine crisis. Two parties have competed in the German establishment in the past 20 years. The first wanted to turn Germany into a true great power and eliminate the vestigial restrictions on German sovereignty. The other made its priority the economic development of the Baltic-Black Sea region. The former required cooperation with Russia, whereas the latter depended on relations with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Baltic states and Ukraine. The anti-Russian rhetoric of Angela Merkel’s cabinet is leaning towards the latter party.
But a dispute with Russia will deprive Germany of its privileged status in NATO as the go-between in talks with Moscow. Russia will become vigilant about Berlin’s attempts to create a precedent for a broad interpretation of the 1990 Moscow Treaty. Germany’s role as the EU’s energy center will become questionable as well. A Germany that is friendly to Russia has been perceived as a great power capable of mediating between Russia and the United States. A Germany with an anti-Russian policy will be perceived as yet another “eternally aggrieved” country like Poland or Latvia.
Kiev’s interests
Ukraine’s interests are the most difficult to pinpoint. There is not a fully legitimate and internationally recognized government pursuing a definite policy in Kiev. Several influence groups, including right-wing nationalists, are currently vying for power.
What’s even more interesting, despite making loud statements, in the past two months the government of Olexandr Turchynov has taken no practical steps to reverse Crimea’s accession to Russia. Nor has it done anything to prevent disturbances in Eastern Ukraine. Failure to follow through on vows of military action is making the situation worse rather than better.
There are three courses of action open to the Ukrainian government to be elected in May. First, they can try to subdue the riots by force and potentially turn Ukraine into another Yugoslavia (this will be the outcome if the nationalists win). Second, Ukraine’s federalization in three or more republics. Third, it can shed some regions and integrate into NATO and, possibly, the EU. Ukraine without Crimea, Kharkov and Donbass will be more ethnically homogenous and anti-Russian. In theory, the United States and Poland may use such a country to achieve their declared strategy of “deterring Russia.”
No matter what the outcome, one thing is certain – Ukraine has not preserved its 1991 borders. Now its future borders are being discussed at international level. This opens up opportunities for a serious revision of borders in Eastern Europe.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.