The polarization of the Asia Pacific Region is in the way of Russia’s new Asian strategy. The Obama administration’s policy of containing China will lead to a split in the region. This puts Russia in a difficult situation where it’ll have to choose between a strategic partnership with China and the advancement of its relations with the South-East Asian countries.

       This past November could be called Asian month in Russian foreign policy. The first ever Russian-Japanese negotiations in the 2+2 format were held on November 1-2. On November 12, President Putin visited Vietnam where several agreements on interagency cooperation and individual economic projects, including military and technological cooperation, were signed. From Vietnam, the Russian President went to South Korea where he signed several ground-breaking documents: in addition to agreements on economic cooperation, the parties agreed on visa-free entry in both directions.

       These visits were instrumental as Putin determined Russia's foreign policy priorities in the Asia Pacific Region. In his interview with South Korean KBS TV, he supported the Eurasian initiative advanced by South Korean President Park Geun Hye. The initiative concerns a Eurasian economic union, part of which includes connecting the Korean railway system with the Trans-Siberian Railway. According to Putin, the next steps should include normalized relations between the DPRK and South Korea, and the construction of a Trans-Korean gas pipeline. American experts were quick to see an “Asian offensive by the Kremlin” in Putin’s statement. Historical parallels with the early 20th century when the Russian Empire pursued a “big Asian strategy” as it tried to gain a foothold in Korea and ice-free port in the Pacific are becoming increasingly popular.

       Three turning points

       In fact, Russia’s goals in the Pacific are not this ambitious. The search for a new Asian strategy is not proactive, but rather a reaction to its weakening position in the Asia Pacific region that occurred around 2011- 2012.

       Over the past twenty years, Russian policy in the Asia Pacific region has experienced turning points on three occasions. The first was during the visit of President Boris Yeltsin to Beijing in December 1992 when the leaders of Russia and China announced plans to build a strategic partnership. The ensuing 10 years were an attempt to implement this goal and included launching the Shanghai process, demilitarizing the border, signing the Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World (1997), and the Russian-Chinese Treaty (2001). The latter concerned mutual obligations similar to forging an alliance and included cooperative consultations on international issues, developing common foreign policy strategies and providing mutual diplomatic support.

       The second turning point in Russia’s Pacific policy came in the fall of 2002. By that time, the Kremlin realized that a strategic partnership with China was not enough. In order to build a more comprehensive policy, the Kremlin initiated dialogues with Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN. These hopes didn’t materialize, and Russia failed to sign a single free trade zone agreement, let alone a consultative pact, with any of these countries. Moscow did sign several joint declarations with ASEAN however. But still, Russia wasn’t invited to join the East Asia Summit (EAS) at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, which meant that it wasn’t recognized as a full member of the integration processes in the Asia Pacific region. Efforts toward preferential partnership between Russia and ASEAN had fallen through.

       The third turning point came around in 2009 when the Kremlin put forward the concept of a pivot to Asia. This thesis was made public by President Dmitry Medvedev at the APEC summit in Singapore in 2009. It became widely popular as various integration projects were becoming available. Moscow not only obtained East Asian Summit membership (2010) but it was assigned the APEC presidency (2012). The idea of investing in the modernization of the Russian Far East and promoting integration initiatives was gaining popularity. The possibility of Russia’s participation in trans-Pacific integration projects ranging from APEC to a hypothetical northern alternative to ASEAN was extensively discussed. Notably, in 2012 the presidential Council on Defense and Foreign Policy initiated discussions on the potential relocation of the Russian capital to a city in Siberia or the Russian Far East.

       The third stage of Russia’s Pacific policy ended in early 2012. The United States lost interest in APEC as a mechanism for building a trans-Pacific free trade zone and blocking China’s economic initiatives. Washington has instead accelerated the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is an integration-based association of the Pacific countries without China. Initially, the TPP was supported by small south Pacific nations. However, in late 2011, the United States began talks with Vietnam, Japan and South Korea regarding TPP membership which would turn it into a viable alternative to China’s rapprochement with ASEAN.

       However, Russia has little presence in regional integration. Whatever the outcome of the debates around the TPP, Russia is unlikely to become a member of the association in the foreseeable future. A favored consultation mechanism between Russia and ASEAN also failed to materialize. Russia has only been an APEC member since 1995 and this due to US support. However, the role of APEC is declining. The development of Russian-Chinese relations is becoming a real alternative for Moscow, something that is currently being promoted as part of the 2001 treaty. But, the policy of building priority relations with someone other than China has so far been unsuccessful.

       Taken together, these circumstances predetermined Russia’s poor performance at the Vladivostok APEC Summit in September 2012. The real agenda was not Moscow's energy initiatives, but the establishment of the TPP. Russia shelved its ambitious projects in the Asia-Pacific Region immediately upon Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin in the spring of 2012. An ambitious breakthrough in Asia has yet to be realized.

       Window for a dialogue

       Putin's visits to Hanoi and Seoul revealed the basics for a new strategy. Russia wants to maximize the window for a dialogue with other Pacific nations. The major economic projects of the early 2010s have been put off indefinitely. Instead, Moscow is building an economic dialogue with Asia Pacific countries without binding itself to any rigid mutual commitments. This approach allows it to address four sets of problems.

       First, the dialogue with the Pacific countries should demonstrate that Russia has an alternative to its relations with China in Asia. Of course, Beijing will be Russia’s priority partner for the foreseeable future. But Moscow is seeking to create economic relations that can offset the Russian Far East’s excessive dependence on economic ties with China.

       Second, the Kremlin is using this dialogue to prove that its foreign policy in Asia has been successful over the past 10 years. Moscow has a good chance to return to previously unrealized economic projects in the Pacific region.

       Third, the fact that Moscow has more than one potential partner will prompt China to pay more attention to Russia’s interests.

       Fourth, Russia is expanding its economic ties as a platform for attracting investment. China imports Russian raw materials and high-tech (military and aerospace) products. However, Russia is seeking new partners who will be willing to invest in the development of its transportation and logistics infrastructure in the Russian Far East.

       A conundrum

       However, the polarization of the Asia Pacific Region is in the way of Russia’s new Asian strategy. The Obama administration’s policy of containing China will lead to a split in the region. This puts Russia in a difficult situation where it’ll have to choose between a strategic partnership with China and the advancement of its relations with the South-East Asian countries.

       Russian diplomacy doesn’t have a lot of maneuvering room here. The South-East Asian countries are beginning to perceive Russia as an ally of China that cooperates with Beijing on military-technical programs and energy resources. China sees Russia's contacts with US allies as a violation of the spirit of the 2001 treaty (we can recall that contacts between the Russian Space Agency and Australia and New Zealand in December 2010 were frowned upon in Beijing).

       These variables raise doubts about the Kremlin's ability to pursue a multi-vector policy in Asia. Sooner or later, Moscow will have to decide whether its relations with US allies are detrimental for the Russian-Chinese 2001 Treaty.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.