The Ukrainian drama will strengthen the global image of Russia as a nation regaining its past power. Many European leaders have underestimated Moscow ever since the collapse of the USSR. Now, too many might be overestimating it.
Russia has blocked the European Union’s inroad into the former USSR. This was achieved, however, by Russia's ability to create obstacles, rather than by offering a more attractive choice. And the outcome may only be temporary.
Russian diplomacy has seen several successes this fall. The Kremlin’s virtuoso move in Syria was followed two months later by another geopolitical breakthrough as, on November 21, Ukraine officially announced the suspension of its preparations to sign the EU Association and Free Trade Agreement only a week before the official signing date, November 28 at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius.
For months Ukraine had been like a rope in a Brussels-Moscow tug-of-war. To all appearances, it favored the Western option, at least up through last summer.
At least two factors swayed Kiev – first, Russia’s resolute resistance. The Eurasian Union idea, on which Putin’s strategic ambitions rest during his third presidential term, would have taken a hit if Ukraine had signed the AA and DCFTA agreements in Vilnius. So the Kremlin worked to thwart the Kiev-Brussels alliance. The “customs war” in mid-August came as a warning, showing Ukrainian political and economic leaders what they could expect if they fell out of favor with Moscow. The customs dispute was followed by targeted commercial sanctions against Ukrainian oligarchs Petro Poroshenko and Viktor Pinchuk.
However, it is likely that Vladimir Putin’s three closed door sessions with Viktor Yanukovych proved to be the most persuasive argument against Ukraine’s European hopes.
The second factor was more psychological in nature. The European Union made the release of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from her seven year prison term a key condition for its rapprochement with Ukraine. Perhaps na？vely, the West thought Ukraine’s national interests would outweigh Yanukovych’s electoral ambitions. They were wrong: Yanukovych preferred the disastrous symbolism of his diplomatic retreat to the risk of releasing a charismatic opposition leader.
The question of Ukraine’s allegiance offers some lessons. First, this latest episode followed NATO’s expansion into the post-Soviet space, which Russia stopped five years ago diplomatically at the Bucharest summit in April 2008, and four months later, through armed intervention as it defeated Saakashvili’s Georgia. Now, Russia has blocked the European Union’s inroad into the formerUSSR. This was achieved, however, by Russia's ability to create obstacles, rather than by offering a more attractive choice. But this is the result.
Second, the European Union overestimated its influence on Ukraine after playing a part in the Orange Revolution in late 2004. Lithuania, as the current EU president, has failed to forestall Russian efforts with the European Council and Commission. Only a pragmatic policy that includes Russia will ever allow Europe to be truly unified.
Third, even if Russia has actually won this battle, it is only a partial and likely short-lived victory. It is possible that a new Ukrainian president from the opposition or Yanukovych elected for a second term will again seek institutional rapprochement with the European Union. Its joining the Eurasian Union is, on the other hand, far less probable. It is possible that Russia can persuade President Yanukovych to lean in Russia’s direction, but for a very high price.
Finally, the Ukrainian drama will strengthen the global image of Russia as a nation regaining its past power. Many European leaders have underestimated Moscow ever since the collapse of the USSR. Now, too many might be overestimating it.
This article was originally published on www.gazeta.ru
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