Russia is ready to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It will hardly agree to reduce them because of NATO’s overwhelming conventional arms superiority but it is ready to discuss Article VII of the NPT Treaty, which spells out the rule for nuclear weapons deployment on the territory of non-nuclear countries.

       In December new rifts emerged between Russia and the United States over European security. The OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius on December 6 did not adopt the Russian proposal to draw up the organization’s charter. At the Russia-NATO Council meeting on December 9, Russia and the United States failed to coordinate an agenda for missile defense cooperation in 2012.

       These problems conceal a much deeper trend. Moscow, Washington and Brussels have not yet established an effective mechanism for upgrading the European security system. In December 2009 they launched a semi-official project, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), but have made no breakthroughs so far.

       The EASI was the result of the failed talks on the European Security Treaty. The Russian Foreign Ministry released a draft treaty in November 2009 but NATO countries refused to discuss it. Washington, London and Warsaw feared that key provisions (the indivisibility of security and renouncing the use of force) would undermine America’s security guarantees to its NATO allies. The EASI, which does not have official status, became a form of continuing the dialogue. The Carnegie Corporation, the Robert Bosch Foundation and the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) are playing a leading role in this initiative. Prior to the Tallinn NATO summit in April 2010 the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed support for the EASI, whose experts prepare annual reports on European security priorities and present them at a conference in Munich every year.

       The EASI dialogue is focused on four major problems: missile defense, conventional arms in Europe, energy security and historical disputes, primarily in Russian-Polish relations. Conflicts in the post-Soviet space, primarily in Transdnestr and Nagorny Karabakh are also discussed, whereas arms control in Europe has been relegated to the background. This change of emphasis is giving disproportionate weight to the dialogue on European security.

       After 1991 the United States viewed European security as a means to preserve its military presence in Europe and spread its influence to the territory of the former Soviet Union. In this context the Obama administration has pushed to the fore the issue of frozen post-Soviet conflicts, followed by the issue of energy security, that is, the terms for the transit of Russian hydrocarbons into EU countries. Missile defense is getting the least attention. The focus of European security talks has shifted to the Russia-NATO Council. The U.S. sees the EASI as simply a venue for discussing certain projects.

       But for Russia, European security primarily concerns the issue of the U.S. military presence in Europe. Russia agreed to include settlements of post-Soviet conflicts in the agenda, hoping that in exchange its partners will engage in a joint search for solutions of sensitive issues of arms control in Europe.

       First, this involves a search for a compromise on the British problem. Since 1962 the British nuclear arsenal has been included in the U.S. nuclear planning system but it is not subject to the New START limits.

       Second, Britain and France are not parties to the 1987 INF Treaty. The Soviet Union and the United States eliminated medium- and shorter-range missiles as a category. Britain and France do not have them but in theory can rebuild them with U.S. help. It is important for Moscow that Paris and London take part in the relevant talks.

       Third, Russia is ready to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It will hardly agree to reduce them because of NATO’s overwhelming conventional arms superiority but it is ready to discuss Article VII of the NPT Treaty, which spells out the rule for nuclear weapons deployment on the territory of non-nuclear countries. This is one step toward the resumption of talks among the victors in WWII on signing a fully-fledged peace treaty with Germany.

       Fourth, the sides could more actively use the EASI as a means to reach a compromise on missile defense in Europe. The United States is not prepared to restrict its deployment of strategic missile defense systems. The architecture of missile defense in the Euro-Atlantic region is a more realistic task. The EASI can act on this even without discussing the issue. However, Russia would no doubt feel critical toward this change in the initiative’s format. There can be no constructive dialogue on European security without a discussion of the Cold War legacy.

       This article was originally published in Russian in Nezavissimaya Gazeta.

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.