Moscow and Washington failed to develop a new positive agenda of Russian-American relations. Thus, there is a risk that the "Reset Policy" may share the failure fate of the previous attempts of the Russian-American rapprochement.

       This fall the Russian-American relations have become emotionally strained. Officially, Moscow and Washington deny any crisis between them. Yet, both states keep addressing each other with some harsh rhetoric and “unfriendly gestures” such as, for instance, the introduction of mutual visa black list. The mass-media responded with calls for "resetting” the “Reset policy".

       Obviously, a serious psychological crisis underlies these disagreements. Both Russia and the U.S. met the initial targets of the "Reset Policy ". However, Moscow and Washington failed to develop a new positive agenda of Russian-American relations. Thus, there is a risk that the "Reset Policy" may share the failure fate of the previous attempts of the Russian-American rapprochement.

       The objectives of the "Reset Policy"

       Mutual nuclear deterrence still remains the material and technical basis of Russian-American relations. Conceptually, Russia and the United States base their relations on: 1) the threat of destroying each other’s strategic capacities; 2) deterrence of the opponent through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage. Economic ties remain on quite a low level. The Jackson-Vanik amendment, which has been operating since 1974, blocks normal trade regime.

       At the same time, Russia is the key state in the U.S. strategic priorities. The mass-media often discuss the issue of the decline of Russia's role in the U.S foreign policy. But it is not true. Russia remains the only state that is technically capable of destroying the United States and can develop the comparable types of weapons. Therefore, the U.S. priority is the reduction of Russia's strategic potential, whereas Russia’s priority is keeping the nuclear parity with Washington.

       Thus, the “Reset policy" has been based on objective reasons. The first one was the danger of collapse of the arms control regime. December 31, 2009 was the expiry date for the START-I (1991). The SORT (2002), valid until December 31, 2012, has not had their own inspection mechanism.

       The second reason aimed at eliminating the threat of direct military conflict between Russia and the USA. During the "Five-Day War" in August 2008, for the first time after 1983 Moscow and Washington were on the brink of a regional military conflict. Similar scenarios could be repeated in Central-Eastern Europe.

       The third cause was the desire of the Barack Obama administration to find out the conditions under which Russia could be ready for a major reduction of its strategic potential. In his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, the U.S. President called on Russia to go as far as up to 75% reductions of its strategic nuclear forces (SNF), eliminate tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and shift to a "virtual deterrence" – a situation when the arm heads are stored separately from the strategic delivery vehicles. These priorities have been officially written in the "U.S. National Security Strategy-2010".

       The "Wyoming compromise” developed in the 1989 included: 1) conducting separate negotiations on the Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) systems and START, 2) the priority of reducing the heavy ICBMs, 3) possible availability of return potential and 4) the exclusion of cruise missiles from the strategic balance. But in 2009, Russia insisted on the revision of the "Wyoming compromise." The current START Treaty (April 8, 2010), i.e. START-III, reduced the strategic potentials of up to 1,550 for each party and fixed the new rules of the strategic dialogue. Russia agreed to maintain the return potential and refused to negotiate over the cruise missiles issue. The USA agreed on negotiations on missile defense and strategic offensive arms, and refused to reduce the priority of destruction of the heavy ICBMs. Thus, the collapse of the arms control system was averted.

       Washington’s fork

       The turning point of the "Reset policy" was the meeting of Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in Washington (June 24, 2010). By that time, the parties had disagreed on the interpretation of the preamble for the START-III, which fixed the linkage between the negotiations on the ABM and new START. Russia developed a draft of an optional protocol to the agreement relating to the defense. But the Obama administration refused this project. The White House offered Moscow to sign a declaration on missile defense cooperation. But over the past 15 years, Russia and the U.S. have signed at least five such declarations, which have not been met. So, further activities were just limited to the joint statement of intention to cooperate in tracking ballistic missiles.

       As a result of the summit, the Obama administration concluded that the Kremlin would not make deep cuts in its strategic nuclear forces without adequate concessions from the United States. Russia came to conclusion that the U.S. was not ready yet for compromise on ABM. The Americans, however, could not find anything which would be a concession for Russia on ABM issue. Thus the aim of the "Reset policy” became restricted to a compromise on ABM for the sake of preserving the START.

       In the next eighteen month the parties still did not succeed in resolving the ABM problem. At the Lisbon summit of NATO (November 20, 2010) Russia and NATO agreed on trying to find a compromise within the European ABM project. But on January 9, 2011, the NATO Council decided that the system of the European ABM alliance would be deployed separately from Russia. The talks in Sochi (4 July 2011) were not successful, either. The search for a compromise is delayed until the Russia-NATO summit in Chicago (May 2012). The failure of the negotiations on ABM could lead to the collapse of the START and the whole system of the "Prague compromise".

       Regional problems

       In addition to the strategic contradictions, there was the growth of some regional problems. Firstly, the parties have not yet agreed on the agenda of talks on European security. The Russian draft of the European security treaty (EST) was rejected by NATO in the winter 2010. The "Euro-Atlantic security initiative" is interpreted differently in Moscow and Washington. Russia wants to include the issue of arms control in Europe in it and involve, first of all, Britain and France in the strategic dialogue. The USA sees the priority in resolving conflicts in the former Soviet Union.

       Secondly, there was a set of contradictions over the Central Asia issue. In 2009, Kremlin and the White House expanded their cooperation on Afghanistan. But at the Lisbon summit NATO put forward a program of withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Moscow fears that it will come into a greater regional war left by Americans. Another cause of anxiety, as seen by Russia, is the U.S. efforts to join in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) this autumn.

       Thirdly, the U.S. and Russia failed to create a mechanism for cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. The Obama administration put forward a number of projects ranging from the acceleration of integration processes in APEC to development of "Northern alternative to ASEAN". Russia dismissed these initiatives. Moscow fears that through such integration projects Washington will try to weaken the control center of the Far Eastern regions.

       Scenarios after 2012

       The opponents of the"Reset Policy" immediately took advantage of the contradictions. They argued that it was not worth making concessions on the START since the U.S. did not compromise on defense. Similarly, American opponents wondered whether the White House shoulld have reduced its activity in the CIS if Russia did not make concessions on disarmament? "Magnitsky case" and "Bout case" focused both Russian and U.S. public opinion on these issues.

       In the U.S. the criticism of the "Reset policy" was intensified after the decision of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to run for President. It is not just a matter of coincidence. The Obama administration often gave the media the idea that the purpose of the "Reset" was to oppose the "liberal" line of Medvedev and the "conservatism" of Putin.

       Thus, there can be three scenarios for the development of the bilateral relations in 2012. The first, and the most negative one, involves the removal of the "reset" and return to the "little confrontation" between Russia and the United States (2007-2008). The second scenario is stagnant. According to it, the bilateral relations may be limited to finding a compromise in the field of arms control. But it will be the only sphere for interaction.

       The third scenario seems more positive. The parties will continue to seek solution to difficulties in negotiations on the ABM / START and develop a positive agenda of the bilateral relations. It can be based on a "code of conduct" within four issues: 1) the obligations in the event of conflict with third countries, 2) the agenda of negotiations on arms control in Europe, 3) the norms of the dialogue between NATO and the CSTO, and 4) identification of security issues in Central Asia.

       The positive scenario, however, does not mean that Russia and the U.S. will give up the conflict model of mutual nuclear deterrence. Nor does it mean that serious disagreements on regional issues will disappear. But such development will not prevent both Moscow and Washington from establishing stabilizing economic ties. The basis for the dialogue still could be the US’s promotion of Russia into the World Trade Organization and the development of economic relations in the Asia Pacific region. Both of these issues became topics for the meeting of Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Honolulu.

       This article was originally published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta .

       Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.